26. Book VII, Vol. 2: Domestic surveillance activities directed by the White House. by Edwards, Don
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Watergate Hearings Law Library Collections
1974
26. Book VII, Vol. 2: Domestic surveillance
activities directed by the White House.
Don Edwards
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/watergate
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons,
Legal History, Theory and Process Commons, and the Politics Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Library Collections at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Watergate Hearings by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
Edwards, Don, "26. Book VII, Vol. 2: Domestic surveillance activities directed by the White House." (1974). Watergate Hearings. Book
29.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/watergate/29
DRAFT 6/5/74
30. In June 1971 Dwight Chapin, the President's Appointments
Secretary, and,Gordon Strachan, an aide to H. R. Haldeman, recruited
Donald Segretti to disrupt the campaigns of candidates for the
Democratic presidential nomination. Shortly thereafter, Haldeman met
with Herbert Kalmbach and authorized Kalmbach to payout of political
funds Segretti's salary and expenses, which totaled $45,000 during
the next year.
30.1 Donald Segretti testimony, 10 SSC 3980.
30.2 Gordon Strachan testimony, 6 SSC 2502.
30.3 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2877.
30.4 Herbert Kalmbach testimony, United States v.
Chapin, April 2, 1974, 386-88.
30.5 Herbert Kalmbach deposition, Democratic National
Committee v. McCord, July 31, 1973, 23-26.
30.6 Dwight Chapin testimony, Watergate Grand Jury,
April 11, 1973, 16-17.
30.7 Checks issued to Donald Segretti by Herbert
Kalmbach, sse Exhibit 223, 10 sse 4311-13.
[7448]
20. On June 5, 1970 the President, H. R. Haldeman, John
Ehrlichman and Presidential Staff Assistant Tom Huston met with FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Donald
-Bennett, National Security Agency Director Noel Gayler, and Central
Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms. The President dis-
cussed the need for better domestic intelligence operations in light
of an escalating level of bombings and other acts of domestic
violence. He appointed Hoover, General Bennett, Admiral Gayler, and
Helms to be an ad hoc committee to study intelligence needs and re-
straints. He named Hoover as the chairman and Huston as the \~"'hite
House liaison.
20.1 President Nixon statement, May 22, 1973, 9 Presi-
dential Documents 694..
.~. 20.2 Tom Charles Huston testimony, Senate Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, May 21, 1973, 133-35
(received from Senate Armed Services Committee).
20.3 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 8 SSC 3027-28.
20.4 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2527.
20.5 Tom Charles Huston t~stimony, House Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, July 9, 1973, 1357-58
1371-73.
[7449]
21. On June 25, 1970 the Committee completed its report en-
titled "Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)"
knOlYU as "The Huston Plan." The report included a discussion of the
current restraints on intelligence collection with respect to electronic
surveillance, mail'coverage~ surreptitious entry, use of campus in-
formers, use of military undercover agents, and other intelligence-
gathering procedures. The Report set forth the arguments for and
against maintaining or relaxing existing restraints on the various
forms of intelligence collection and of establishing an inter-agency
intelligence evaluation committee. Specific options for expanded intel-
ligence operations were set forth for the President's consideration.
The Report stated that two of the proposed intelligence-gathering pro-
cedures, surreptitious entry and opening first class mail, were illegal.
At Director Hoover's insistence, the Report included notations that the
FBI objected to proposals for establishing a permanent coordinating com-
mittee and for lifting restraints on intelligence collection methods in
all categories except legal mail coverage and National Security Agency
communications intelligence.
21.1 Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence
(Ad Hoc), June 1970 (received from CIA).
21.2 Tom Charles Huston testimony, Senate Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, May 21, 1973, 137-38.
21.3 Tom Charles Huston testimony, House Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, July 9, 1973, 1381-82.
21.4 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 8 SSC 3029.
21.5 President Nixon statement, May 22, 1973, 9 Presi-
dential Documents 694. [7450]
22. During the first week of July 1970 Huston sent the Special
Report and a Top Secret memorandum entitled "Operational Restraints
on Intelligence Collection" to Haldeman. In the memorandum Huston re-
connnended that the President, from among the options discussed by the
Report, select in most areas discussed the option relaxing the re-
straints on intelligence collection. Huston specifically noted that
covert mail covers and surreptitious entries were illegal but nonethe-
less recommended that the restraints on the use of these techniques
be relaxed. Huston justified his recommendation in part on.the past
practices of the FBI. Huston also recommended the formation of an
interagency evaluation committee, as outlined in the Report.
22.1 Tom Charles Huston memorandum, "Operational Restraints
on Intelligence Collection" (received from House
Armed Services Committee).
22.2 Tom Charles Huston testimony, House Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, July 9, 1973, 138-39.
22.3 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 8 SSC 3028.
• f
[7451]
23. On July 14, 1970 H. R. Haldeman sent a Top Secret memorandum
to Huston stating that the President had approved Huston's recommenda-
tions for relaxing restraints on intelligence collection. Haldeman
requested that a formal decision memorandum be prepared. On or about
July 23, 1970 Huston prepared and distributed to the members of the Ad
Hoc Committee a Top Secret decision memorandUM~ with copies to the
President and Haldeman, advising of the President's decision to relax
the restraints on intelligence gathering by use of the techniques of
covering international communications facilities, electronic sur-
veil1ance and penetrations, illegal mail covers, surreptitious. entries,
and development of campus sources.
23.1 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 3030.
23.2 Memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to Tom Charles Huston,
July 14, 1970 (received from SSC).
, -----23.3 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2874.
23.4 Tom Charles Huston testimony, Senate Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, May 21, 1973, 139-42
(received from Senate Armed Services Committee).
23.5 Tom Charles Huston testimony, House Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, JUly 9, 1973, 1389-90.
23.6 President Nixon statement, May 22, 1973, 9 Presi-
dential Documents 694-95.
23.7 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Richard Helms,
July 23, 1970 (received from CIA).
[7452]
24. On or before July 27, 1970, Director Hoover met with AttoDley
General Mitchell, informed Mitchell for the first time of the June 5,
1970 meeting and the July 23, 1970 decision memorandum, and stated
Hoover's opposition to the Plan. Mitchell joined with Hoover in opposing
the Plan.
24.1 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1603-04.
24.2 John Mitchell testimony, 5 SSC 1823-24.
24.3 Richard Helms memorandum to the record, July 28, 1970
(received from House Armed Services Committee).
[7453]
25. On either July 27 or July 28, 1970 Huston, on instructions from
Haldeman, recalled the decision memorandum of July 23, 1970 and requested
that the members of the Ad Hoc Committee return their copies to the Hhite
House. Haldeman told Huston that Mitchell had called concerning the Plan,
that the memorandum would be reconsidered and that Haldeman, Hoover and
the Attorney General wouLd meet to discuss the subject. Mitchell has
testified that he informed the President and Haldemari of his opposition
to the Plan.
25.1 Tom Charles Huston testimony, Senate Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, May 21, 1973; 142-44.
25.2 Tom Charles Huston testimony, House Armed Services
Cow~ittee Executive Session, July 9, 1973, 1391-95,
1414-15.
25.3 Richard Helms memorandum, July 28, 1970 (received from
House Al~ed Services Committee).
25.4 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1604-05.
r:
25.5 John Hitchell testimony, 5 SSC 1824.
25.6 H. R. Haldeman te~timony, 8 SSC 3029-30.
25.7 Hemorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman,
August 5, 1970 (received from SSC).
25.8 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R •.Haldeman,August 7, 1970 (received from SSC).
[7454]
26. In or around August 1970 H. R. Haldeman transferred White House
responsibility for matters of domestic intelligence for internal security
purposes from Tom ChaIres Huston to John Dean. On September 17, 1970 Dean
and Attorney General Mitchell discussed procedures for commencing a domestic
intelligence operation. On September 18, 1970 Dean wrote a memorandum to
the Attorney General regarding -the establishment of an interagency domestic
intelligence unit and the use of an existing group called the Inter-
Divisional Information Unit (lD1U) as a cover for the operation of the new
unit. Dean recommended that restraints should be removed as necessary to
obtain needed intelligence rather than on a blanket basis. Dean informed
Mitchell that Haldeman had suggested he would be happy to join Mitchell
in a meeting with Hoover.
26.1 Tom Charles Hus t on testimony, Senate Armed Services
Committee ~x~cutive Session, Hay 21, 1973, 144.
26.2 John Dean testimony, 3 sse 916.
26.3 John Dean testimony, 4 SSC 1446, 1456.
26.4 John Mitchell log, September 17, 1970 (received
from SSC).
26.5 Memorandum from John Dean to Attorney General Hitchell ,
September 18, 1970 (received from Department of Justice).
26.6 Tom Charles Huston testimony, House Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, July 9, 1973, 1415-16.
[7455]
27. In or before December 1970 the Intelligence Evaluation Cownittee
was created to improve coordination among the intelligence community and
to prepare evaluations and estimates of domestic intelligence.
27.1 President Nixon statement, May 22, 1973, 9 Presi-
dential Documents 695.
27.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 916,1064-67.
27.3 John Mitchell testimony. 4 SSC 1637.
[7456]
28. In the latter part of 1970 the Secret Service irista1led a
wiretap on the telephone of Donald Nixon, the President's brother ,
in Newport Beach, California, and also instituted phys i.caL sur-
veillance. Caulfield was assigned by Ehrlichman to monitor and
report to him on the wiretap. Caulfield has testified that the
purpose of the surveillance was the concern that Donald Nixon might
be involved with persons seeking to use him for improper political
influence and thereby embarrass the President. The President has
stated that his brother was aware of the surveillance while it was,
occurring because he asked about it, was told about it, and he
approved of it.
28.1 John Caulfield testimony, sse Executive Session,
March 16, 1974, 30-39, 44-46.
28.2 President Nixon news conference, November 17, 1973,
9 Presidential Documents 1351.
[7457]
29. On February 10, 1971 in the month before Director Hoover was
to appear before a House Subcommittee on Appropriations, the FBI
terminated the nine wiretaps from the 1969-71 electronic surveillance
program which were still in operation.
29.1 Report by Senators John Sparkman and Clifford
Case to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
19-20 (received from Senate Foreign Relations
Committee).
29.2 Henry Kissinger testimony, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Executive Session, September 17, 1973, 269
(made public October 4, 1973).
29.3 Memorandum from W.C. Sullivan to Tolson, Feb ruar y
10, 1971 (received from Department of Justice).
[7458]
31. On June 13, 1971 The New York Times published the first
installment of excerpts from the History of U.S. Decision-Making
Process on Viet Nam Policy, popularly knm.;rnas the "Pentagon Papers."
The Pentagon Papers, prepared in 1967 and 1968 at the direction of
the Secretary of Defense, were based largely upon CIA and State and
Defense Department documents classified "top secret." On June 15, 1971,
at the direction of the President, the government instituted legal
actions in an unsuccessful attempt to prohibit further publication of
Pentagon Papers material by The New York Times and by The Washington
Post which also had gained access to it. On that day, at the request
of Attorney General Mitchell, the FBI began an investigation to
determine how the newspapers had obtained copies of the Pentagon
Papers.
31.1 President Nixon statement, May 22, 1973, 9 Presidential
Documents 695.
31.2 Ne,.;rYork Times Co .
(1971) •
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713-14
-e
31.3 United States v. Ne,.;rYork Times Co., 328 F. Supp.
324-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
31.4 John Eh~lichman affidavit, United States v.
Ehrlichman, April 26, 1974, 1-2.
31.5 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to H.R. Haldeman,
July 6, 1971 (received from White House).
[7459]
32. Following the June 13, 1971 publication of the "Pentagon
Papers," Daniel Ellsberg publicly acknowledged copyi-9g and releasing
the documents. On June 28, 1971 Ellsberg \Vas indicted in California
on charges of unauthorized possession of defense information and
conversion of government property, the Pentagon Papers.
32.1 United States v. Russo Indictment, June 28, 1971.
32.2 Washington Post, June 29, 1971, 1, 12.
[7460]
33. In the two weeY$ following the publication of the Pentagon Papers
the President met at various meetings with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Kissinger
and Colson. According to Ehrlichman and Colson the participants at these
meetings discussed the adverse effect of the publication of the Pentagon
Papers upon national security and foreign policy and considered the pos-
sibility that Daniel Ellsberg, identified as the probable source of the
published papers, possessed additional sensitive information that he
might disclose. During this period, White House staff members were told
by Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Internal Security Division
that some or all of the Pentagon Papers had been delivered to the Soviet
Embassy on June 17, 1971.
33.1 John Ehrlichman affidavit, United States v. Ehr1ichman,
April 26, 1974, 1-4.
33.2 Charles Colson affidavit, United States v. Ehrlichman,
April 29, 1974, 1-4.
33.3 Memorandum from Charles Colson to John Ehrlichman,
July 13, 1971 (received from \fuiteHouse).
33.4 Memorandum of conversation, July 24, 1971 (received
from \fuite House).
33.5 Meetings and conversations between the President and
Charles Colson, June 14 to July 20, 1971 (received from
White House).
33.6 Meetings and conversations be tween the President and
John Ehrlichman, June 14 to July 10, 1971 (received
from 1fuite House).
[7461]
34. The President has stated that in the week following the pub1ica-
tion of the Pentagon Papers he authorized the creatio~ of a Special 1n-
vestigations Unit whose principal purpose would be to stop future
disclosure of sensitive security matters, and that he looked to John
Ehrlichman to supervise that unit. This unit became known as the
"Plumbers. II
34.1 President Nixon Statement, May 22, 1973, 9 Presi-
dential Documents, 695.
34.2 Letter from President Nixon to Judge Gerhard Gesell,
April 29, 1974, United States v. Ehr1ichman.
r:
[7462]
35. On June 23, 1971 Haldeman sent several projects to Strachan for
implementation. One of the projects envisaged 24-hour~a-day surveillance
of Senator Edward Kennedy. Caulfield and Dean objected to this project
because of the risks involved and the project was not implemented.
Strachan has testified that Dean told him that physical surveillance of
Kennedy was in fact conducted on a periodic basis and that Strachan re-
ceived reports on Kennedy's activities.
35.1 John Caulfield testimony, SSC Executive Session,
March 16, 1974, 84-85.
35.2 Gordon Strachan testimony, SSC Executive Session,
July 12, 1973, 59-60.
35.3 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC922-23.
[7463]
No
[7464]
20. On June 5, 1970 the President, H. R. Haldeman, John
Ehrlichman and Presidential Staff Assistant Tom Huston met with FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Donald
Bennett, National Security Agency Director Noel Gayler, and Central
Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms. The President dis-
cussed the need for better domestic intelligence operations in light
of an escalating level of bombings and other acts of domestic
violence. He appointed Hoover, General Bennett, Admiral Gayler" and
Helms to be an ad hoc committee to study intelligence needs and re-
straints. He named Hoover as the chairman and Huston as the White
House liaison.
20.1 President Nixon statement, May 22, 1973, 9 Presi-
dential Documents 694,.
r: 20.2 Tom Charles Huston testimony, Senate Armed ServicesCommittee Executive Session, May 21, 1973, 133-35
(received from Senate Armed Services Committee).
20.3 H.R. Haldeman testimony, 8 SSC 3027-28.
20.4 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2527.
20.5 -Tom Charles Huston testimony, House Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, July 9, 1973, 1357-58
1371-73.
[7465]
No
....
[7466]
20.1 ._Pr.esident N'~xon statement -
l1{7. t.s.:»:' ,,-1· r
j/f' eei?1J LtOmpJJatffol2 ~r
D fO:··«> IU l~V· if· ~··0· ~1,\ . \. I; ,_ ,. ~ . T'~
Monday, May 28,1973
Volume 9 • Number 2 I
[7467]
PRESIDENTIAl OOCUMENfS: RICHAAO NIXON. 1 ?71 ----,
Kun~g, who is now an associate juuge of the U.S. Court
of Claims. .
r- , Mr. Sampson h:J..5been Acting Administrator of Ccn-
~$~' eral Services since June 2, 1972. He joined the General
·Servlces Administration in 1969 as Commissioner of the
Federal Supply Service, From 1970 to 1972 he was Com-
missioner of the Public Buildinzs Service in GSA and the
"first Deputy Administrator of GSA for Speed Projects.
He came to the General Services Administration alter
6 years in Pennsylvania State government, where he was
secretary of administration and budget secretary under
Cov, Raymond P. Shafer) and deputy secretary for pro-
curement, department of property and supplies, under
Cov. William W.Scranton. Prior to entering government
service, he was employed by the General Electric Co. for
12 years. .
Mr. Sampson was born on October 8,1926, inWarren,
R.I: He received his B.S. degree in business adminis-
tration from the University of Rhode Island in 1951 and
has· done graduate work at the George Washington
University. . . .
.A):tive in several professional or~tions, Mr. Samp-
v •
son Was presented the Synergy III Award for outstanding
contributions toward the advancement of architecture hy
the Society of American Rezistered Architects in 19i2.
In 19?3 he was selected as ~ne of the Top Ten Public
,_.~ 'Yorks Men of the Year and he was named an honorary. )
'...__ ' member of the American Institute of Architects.
He and his wife Blanche have four children and reside. "
IIIWc.shington) D.C. .
NOT<:: For the Pre1ident's sbtement upon announcing his intention
. to nominate :Mr. Samp;on, see the pre-ceding item.
[~ne 'Watergate Investigation
alements by thePTesicIt:nt~· !r'Jay 22, 197~
Recent'news acc51mts growing out of testimony in the
~Vatergate investig:ltiom have given grO:"Sly misleading
lrnpressions of many of the facts as they relate both to my
. OWn role and to certain unrebt~d acti~ities invohin~ nJ.-
tional security.
A!ready, on the basis of second- and third-hJ.1ld ho..rs..l.y
tC5timony by persons eitha co'nvicted or themselves under
i:westigation in the case, I klve found my:;cli :lccu:;ed of
involvement in activities I never 'heard of until I rc:ld
about .them in news accounl'i.
'1-1 . . . '1 I r '. -: .• ' .•-,;." r" !,.~.lc~e lnlrr.t"::::;Lo~l$ could. :lL~{.'J.c2.l :0.:' ~·...I .Cl,-.~.... "'~ .1 ...,,-,
r ,_ . ,1' '1 '. 1 . . ',' . "1" ~I [I' 1" ··'1_,l.td ....U-:.::; or t ~n:r- n:ltron:-l Sc"CUrIl'-/ :~Ctl\.':l!t.-:-;\'- . .i. ~ ) ~._.').
totally unrebt..:d to \V<1tcrC":1tei:,ln: become.: cnt:tnr,lcd in
tIlt: C:l.Sc. Th(~ycould lcJ.d ~o fL:rtha comprc:71bt: of scrrsi-
tin: lut!on~tl security inforrnJ.tion.
691
I will not abandon my r~ponsiGiEt;cs. r will continue
to do the job I was elected to d(J.
In the accompanying statement, I have set forth the
fact'> as I know them ;l"'i they relate to my own rule;
With regard to the specific allegations that have been
made, I can and do state categorically:
1. I,. had no prior knowledge of the Watergate
operation .
2. I rook no part in, nor was I a'.v·areo[ "-,y ~"!'-'~G"'>~'
) • oJ ...... _..>'_ j I.,..; ... l.1..,
efforts . that may have been made to CO ver up
Watergate.
3. At no time did I authorize: a;1Y offer of executive.
clemency for the Watergate defendants, nor did I
know of any such offer,
4. I did not know, until the time of my own invcsti(7~~
tion, of any effort to provide the Watergate ddeJ.~d-
ants with funds.
5. At no time did I attempt, or did I authorize others
. to- attempt, to implicate .the CL-\. in the Watcrg~te..
matter. .
6. It was not until the time of my own investig;:u:!on ,
. that I learned of the break-in at the office of MI". ;
Ellsberg's psychiatrist, and 1 specifically autborized .'
the !~nis~g ~f. this information to Judge Byrne,
7. I nertner authorized nor encouraged subordinates to
engage in illegal or improper campaign tactics •
. Inthe accompanyi.ng statement, I have sbught to pro-
vide the background that may place recent allegations in
perspective. I have specifically stated that executiv~
privilege will not be invoked as to any testimony conrern.
ing possible crirninal conduct or discussions of possibk
criminal conduct, in the matters tmd::r investig=ltion. I
want the puhlic to Jearn the truth about ",ratergate and
those guilty of any illegal actions b!Uught to justice..
.
. AUcg:1tions su.n-ouncl!.ng the \Vakrgatc affair bye so
escalated that I fed a further statc::mcnt from the Pr~;dQt
is required at this time. .
A climate of sen.."3Lion:liism has developed in whicll
even second- or third-n::md he;:trs.ay cbrges a:-e headllr!ed
as fact and r~peated ::!3 fact.
. Important naGar,;)] security opcntions whkh the1!1-
selves h:ld no can nection ,y·jth "\VatcrgJ-k have' beco:ne'
entangled in che case..
A<; a result, !'ome n~tion:ll S~Ct2.rity info!011:ltio:1 h.:!S
alrc:ldy been m~lde public through COurt o:-c!~rs, thrOUGh
the suhpoC'!1<.!':ng of documents, ::md throu~{h tC$:imo~v
\,itn:--s;::s have glv;:o.n_~n juclici:tl :\.~d Con~;rC'::'_):0:-:::dvd-
cc:edlrrgs. Other scns:t!\·c cloCut!!en:s :ere now th;t.:'.t:::-:~
\\i~h c!i.-;C!O':;llrc_ Cn!ltim!t'c! ~i';::r~c;;2bol!t those O:l··~:\t;'")..,-
,,",",:,1 (O!;:;,; (,:,;;,.:,: r:::::,', th:\11 :'~"""("( :"::":':, .-.t ~',~ .(::.:.;
:~!S\.) S~r\'t': to pt:;·p~tt!.:: ..: ~'~gr(l'''::~·cF:<~:; :~"d \'~"~\'_.·.Y-::~':;~
recent p:lni,d di~do';;ll;C:; h.1YC r,i\c:n-{)f t~c~ 11.'.t',:r.: ~::J
purpc,.;c of t~ll)SC 0Pt";-;lt;on.:;.
[7468]
1969 "h'RETAPS--'
By mid-1969, my Adminlstnt!o'1 had heg'_m :::.number
o! pjghly ser:sitive iore!6TI poJicyinitiatives. T!:ey were
auned at endi. ..·1g the war in Viem:un, :l.chleving a settle.
~e~ti.'1 the l'ifiddle East, li;-nidng nuclear :J.r:iT'.s, ai1d est2.b-
ll:ih!:·~.snew relationships 2.mona' the neat powers. These
• 1 < ~,::,
l'1VOi':ed highly .5ec.ret dtp!o!1lZ!cy. T!:ej' were closely inca-,
~",l-''''d L 1._ r • - . 1. o.,ld
• ~"tc,- ~ e:2....;.-,Ol secret lr!!or.;lJ.c.:on aaout anyone c ."
c:1danger aU. .
., 1 •_.:actl;; thJ.t h:lDOenea. '::;'::',"5 ;:cc(~ur;ts ::,?;~;1reCl Jil ~
, ••• 1 ~ ... • " I ',_ ,·r· ~m'~ r~:_'1:: -~.::-:_~.
J) .V!1!(:n \''''''~r~ O~V..f1");!~~'.,:D:".sr::rt on 1e~k.")-~i.lmt n~ Ul\. ( \-;._.__ .?"""__ ') _ ~ . ..
"-1"" .1'"1 d . b' . l' to tLe O~ j-~,~;:.~_J. :0 L"_~ C.(,\i:1£il_.I~te~ St!t-)Ir'!!tted a r~.coM"'_ t."~.;,~}--.." .e 2.;1'-' Q~t~· ~ _yO ""Qr.,~ (:;]'\1:1'" 2.CCt-:;j it " .. " ~'I
. ._, ~ ~.,,- - . /-',. e'''' . " . . I ; ~ - c·<:;·· op.·"''''· to- _",....,~.J d . t ,..
~,-",'" J.,:,....1,y , .~ d . .. 1 lr..C~~:_~....:. .'?\ ~l.\... t \,.1,..","1 l \_,'\t-" ..~~'-r..~ l!~ eZ!l;-'::r1ce O~,~:",._.\ ·".;-.L(: Cla..o;:.:;!l.C SCCll!1ty ma~;::n:1.c5. ')' ~,
~j ...• -~ - ..l h d""]om"c;c :-,:_,;,'."._',2.~.:i 0!1 JI!:,\' :"J dl~ a.2"cncic:3 W"r:" rlo'.'!'~l"d h~',II':..~'_ ...·i~.3 no \Y:J.y to c::il)''' .iar-;Y~lI~l! t ~c !!" " .. ~ .....~ .... ~ '-_
The purpose of this statement is threefold:
-Fir'::i:, to set forth the facts about my own relationship
. he Watt:rg-ate matter;
. -Second, to place: in some perspective some of the more
sc:nsational-a~d inaccurate-of the charges that have
fil'ed the h~aC!lines in recent days, and also some of the
m:::.ti:e~ that are currentlv beinz discussed in Senate testi-
I ~ "many and elscwhere ;
-T"ni:d, to draw the distinction bet· .veen national secu-
rity operations and the Watergate case. To put the other
matterS in perspective, it will be necessary to describe the
national security operations first.
In citing these national security matters, it is not my
intention to place a national security "cover" on \V ater-
gate, but rather to separate them out from WJ.tergate-
2nd at the same time to explain the context L'1which cer-
tain actions took place that were later rr..i.sconstrued or
misused.
Long before the WaterQ'ate brea..k-L'1, thret: important. "nat ronal security operations took place which hav~ subse-
quently become enbngled in the Watergate case.
.-The first operation, begun in 1959, Wa3 a program of
WIretaps. All were leaaI under the autborities then exist-. " ,
lng. They were underta~en to find and stop serious
national security leaks.
. -The second operation Wa3 a reasse;sment, which I
n>:rlered in 1970, of the adequacy of internal security
ures. Too resulted i....l a plan and a directive to
gthen our intelligence operations. Tney were pro-
tested by Mr. Hoover, and as :l result of his protest they
were not put into effect.
-The L~ird oper:ttion was th:: establishment, in 1971,
of.a Special Investigations Unit in the White HOllse. Its
pn.-;ary mIssion was to plug leaks of vital security infor~
n:atron. I also directed this group to prepare an aCCUl<lte
hl:Story of certain crucial m.tional security matters which
occurred under prior admini..str:ltions, on willen the Gov-
ernment's records were incomplete.
Here is th:: backgrpund of these t;}~'"eesecurity opel<l-
ticns initiated in my A?ministration. .
iruu2.::,·es unless further leaks cou!d be prevented. This
req :.0::d ;:;~ding the source of the leaks.
b -;;r2-er-to 'do this, a special program of wiretaps W;l3
i!,.3t:i':'_;,~cin mid-1969 2.nd terminated in Febi'1.!~ry 1971.
.F(!h~:- than 20 taps, of \·a..-yin,; duration, were in volvec.
Thev _?:'Jduced important leads that made it pnssible to
t:ih::::~ ::::e security of highly sensitive materials. I au thor-
ized ~ entire pro.;ram. Each indi v :du;:tl rap was under,
taken iz accordance wirh procedures legal at the time and
hi. accord with longstanding precedent.
Tee persons who were subject to these wiretaps were
determiaed through coordination among the Director of
the FBI, my Assistan; for National Security AJf:!iT'S, and
the Attorney General. Those wiretapped Were selected on
the basis oJ. access to the information leaked, material in
secUc.-:r:, files, and evidence that de .....eloped as the inquiry
proc;;-e:::ed. - . . .
Ir.c:"orrrtationthus obtained was made aV3.l1able to senior
om,";" i5 re5po1l5ible for national serurity matters in order
to Ctl.:"'..ail fw:th_e.de~k3 •. __ ~
THE 1970 INTELLICE.VCZ PLA......
In the spring and summer of 1970, anothtr security
preble::: reached critical prop ortio 113. In 1Iarcha W,,-y~
of bo;nbii1g5 and explosions stru~k college campuses and
cities. Taere were 400 bomb threats in one 24-hour period
in Z\ew York City. Rioting and violence on college cam.
plliC'S rezched a new peak after the Cambodian operation
and r.;:e tragedies at Kent State and Jackson State. The
1955-70 school year brought nearly 1,800 campus di!m-
on5-rr::;.cioLlSmd ne;:).r1,-250 C<l.Ses of arson on campus . .i>.Jany
col1e:;es closed. Gun battles between guerrilla-style gcoups
a..--:d ?0Iice were taking place. Some of the disruptive ac ..
th-iue:s were receh-ing foreign support.
CG:7lpIi.:ating'the task of m2intaining securitv W3.5 the
fact 0aL L1 1966, ce:tain types of undercove.r FBI op~r-
atior..s ,;'.:rt bd bten conducted for many years had been
5uspe::d=d. TIlls also had subst~nt1any impaired Our ~bil-
itv to col.Ieee forei;,;n inteUigence ifl..formation ..At the s~m~
tL~e, :he rebtionships behy~en the FBI and othe!' intd1i..:
genc~ 2g~ncies b.d been dekrio:<tting. By ~fay 1970, FEr
Di,ec:cr Hoover shut off his agency's liaison with the CIA
alroge:her.
Or:. Ju...;;-! 5, 1970, I met .....·ith the Director of the FBI
p.rr. Hoo1:t:r), the Director of the Central ImelIi(1'ence
A~e:::c-:-, : '\fr. Rkhard HeL·ns), the Director of th~ D~ ..
kiE~ I:::d.!ig~.r.ce Agency (Gen. Don<1Jd V. Be-nnett), a..'1d
th~ D ::e.:-:or of ,;1(: I\:1uonal Securicy Ag~I:cy (A.JiC!. i\oel
G2\ :::,; .\V·c discussed che urgc!1t need for he,;:er in.telli.
gen:e o;::<-r:t!Of:S. I :lppnin~ed. Director Hoover as
cr.~-=-:. or .:~~~:~l~:-=r:_.;~~c;:C0~l~:lC~::e tD p;CP~ti'i'~rr~\('.)!'":1-
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About the same time then finLllliF-rme t Hi th i!r. IIal8.c4TIun
and Mr. Ehrli chraan and i!r_ I\rogh and said to them tha t I-
-------~---- ~ .-
felt that the President should get tOG_ether with thR D'-lrector
of the FBI, ~he Director of the Central Intelligen.r? R~~-_ r·.':Jc.ncy,
5 the Director of NSA, a~d the Director of DIA and have a
6 cOr:1.:nunitY-Hideassessnent of the internal security threat
7 made Hi th particular er.:phasisupon ~'That~fforts each agency
8
9
were making to collect intelligence and what restraints
they operated under or-dhat rather wez e imposed by their
10 OHP decision or otherwise so_ i:h~t:___i:~~ President HQuld know
11 what; it was that they Here up against ..
17
18
...,
o
o
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This meeting then was held,· I believe, on the fifth
of ·June and at that tir:1.8those present were the four
'- .
directors, Hr. Halde:nan, l-!r. Ehrlichman, ~1r. Finch, and
myself.
S t Sy·ml·ng~on Who were the four d_irectors·?_ena or ll ••. L. 1 •
Mr. Huston. Mr. Helms, Mr. Hoover, Admiral Gayler and
General Bennett.
At that meeting the President discussed his concern
with the acts of violence, escalating acts of Violence, his
---''--(,
concern about the extent to wh i ch there wa s the possibi Li, ty
that the whole system of order was co~ing apart at the
Cpa~s ~nc.l indicated -- I recall, for examo12, that h=..::> _ L: I C.. ~ .. _o,,;,:;. hac
. " . C' , ....~ -L."~ ~._,....-,_,_-._·,·_rl.:"'_~.:-- c,·.·,.l__~'_"''\:C,S~-;: t:-'.2t :-::orr:l~.) .'.~,.'-:: ~ --' - .._~I' ~ - .... '- '-
he corarnent.cd t.ha t the :? r'25 .i cen t of Ve.ne zue La
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.corlcern
who the President of V~nezuela at least thouq~t ~'~~e
_<! • _J.. in'/ol-l-?G:
in stirring up revolutionary activity in the Caribbean and
you know the Pres.ident comme nt.cd to ;'::-. Eelr::sthat it a::J;)p",.,.-"".... --_-
-'c'nat"-e ',lere zeach _1 ng t.he point that ~'ie T.·le-r_pexo or+ - ' ..vv • It • _ ~.r'1:-' _ '-l.ngVl.O.Len
6 and revolution not as a matter of governr".e~t polic'! but
--20
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simply as a practical rnatter and asked nr. Hel~s wh at; he
knew about the situation, and he, as I .,_o .....a 1 1 ':: - . .. ,~~- --, l.nGl.ca~eG tna~" ....
he was not aware of it but he wo~ld.have, his people p=epare
a report for the President as to the extent to wh i ch U c~ • ..:.>.
nati6nals were involved In inciti~g U. S. revolution activity
in the Caribbean.
I recall the President went around and asked one of
the Directors whether they 'thought thought the Government
was doing all that it could to protect the lives of innocent
pe~ple and whether they felt that they were operating under
restraints that made it impossible :t:orthen to do the job
that thev thoucht they had to do?, -'
It is my best recollection +-' •L.na<:: each of -the
in turn indicated that they did not believ~ we were doiriq
~ '., h' • 1all we could do to guarcagal.r1SL LlilS prOD em .._,'-.:.e r,=
that limit~d thes.• ~ J...In ",2Cl...
D. t t.h e s 2~e t i me ti1e ·Prcs.i~.c:1t wa s concer:1ec. c"l~Ol:t
._'.:.CJCr1cics.
I
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Prcside~t that everything was_fin~ ~nd they were
The fact of the matt er was that some mont~::;previ.ousLy j.~r.
Hoover had terminated all Li ai son w i,th the Central Intellic;e::ce
1\gency and shortly,' as I recal'l, beforet.his rae et i.nq or snor-t-
ly thereafter, I am almost sure it Has before, he had terminatcc
all Li, aison Hi t.h the CI]\, , DIA 1 rJlilitary Servi ces, 'I think he
left the Secret Service and White House on. So that there
was in fact no coordination at least insofar as the Bureau was
concerned.
Hi th this backgrou~d then the Corm:1ittee, there wa s
pre~ared guidelines of specifically, because the President
didn't want 5ir.1plyanother 1 you know, indepenc.ent rehash,
'\. -.'everyon~ just putting into the Presldent what they had alrea~v
put in, he wanted essentially a USIB type analysis of the
internal security threat.
Hr. Hoolsey. By USIB you mean united States Intelligence16
17
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Board?
Hr. Huston. Yes, sir; essentially a threat assessnent.
sometime shortly thereafter, and I believe June 5th
that year, I think it ~a:; on a Friday, and sODeti~e tne
follo'ding \vee;-:,the four Directors and I rnet; an nr. Hoo'Je::-' s
~~' t " Cl'-- +.he rC'~",ortand 1".0',' It: ,,·o,d.d'D? hand Led ,0'::: z .L c e . 0 Gl S ,~ ::> \... - ' - '-,.,. ~--
I
Ii
Ii
Ii
I
. ' i t; ,/'s rl'""'l~;d"'Cl t.o ('_-.s~,;:~ll"_,h c".7\.t th2.t r.set.lng L ,'C' ",.- •.- C. L. - -"- "
:~..~ -.~ (:..~ ~") -~; -
lri.l
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Mr. HALDDIAX. All right. ~ry testimony would be in exact accord
with that.
)[1'. DASH. Did YOll help prepare the President's statement?
Mr. H.\LDDr.\x. So, sir, I did not. But I would say that that deline-
ares in a few words the extent and nature of the problem as it existed
at that time. The reason for the 'Yhite House concern and the reason
for attempting to take some action.
)oIl'. D:\SH. I still would like rather than your reading the President's
statement-- ""
)[r. H.\LDDL\X. I haven't rend it. I didn't read it.
)1r. DASH. I know, I said would you just give us as briefly as YOU
can your own re<;ollection--" • •
Mr. HALDDIAX. Sure.
r, )Ofr. DASH [continuing]. Of what that purpose was, what the prob-
lem was'? .
)fr. HALDDr.\x. The problem was, and I have indicated this in my
statement also, I believe, was the wave of violence, bombings, arson.
trashing, and other sorts of activities of damaging property, some of
them' killing people, that were sweeping across the country at that
time.
Mr. DASH. And this led to what we have now been referring to as the
Huston plan, did it not?
Mr. HALDE)IAN. Yes, it did.
r l\.' .11"DASH. And r take it you were "aware of -n of the facets of theHuston plan, what the recommendations were that were being madend as it finally went up to the President.Mr. HALDE:lL\N. Not in any detai1. The inception of the so-calledHuston plan was a meeting that the President ca1Ied-first, :'III'. Hus-
ton, as a staff man, had done some preliminary work on analysis of the
problem, 'and analysis of the efforts to deal with the problem, and of
the shortcomings that appeared to be in existence at that time with
relation to the '-'problem and the etTorts to deal with it as a result of
which the President called a llE'{'ting- of the heads of the various secu-
rity azencies, the FBI. the XSA. the CIA, and the DIA. I sat in that
me"etin'g, as did :\1r. Huston. The President discussed with these agency
heads the nature of the problem, the shortcomings of domestic intelli-
gence, the concern that some of these nct ivities that were underwav or
being threatened dming- that period of time "ere possibly, at least,
and I think demonstrably, as I reca ll, connected with foreig-n act.ivit.ies.
Some. of the organizations that were declaring themselves out to
__ destroy institutions and in some cases the Go\·ernment. were doing-
their training- in foreig-n countries and were studying under forei~
dissident org-'nnizntions~ and there \,[15 a 'feeling that there was n cross-
over her- that needed to be dealt with in terms of better intellicence,
that we didn't know who was \.:lt1Si:l!! those thinzs, who \,;15 dirE'l'ting
them. who was financinz them, nor did we kno'l\whnt they were g()in~
to be directed to. . .
~rr. H'''Ir. ITO\" did 'von rccoive sr,'cinc ('\'idrnc(' of tj,P3t' ('\·r.nr3?
YOII didn't ].:rHlI\'. YOU 5:1\". \\110 was doin!! Wh:11". bllt obyio113]\- \"()Il
\\"('re concerned th:it tlw rn~nt;; occllrrrc1. \\l1at c';idpllce ()c<'l!:-rcd :1S
to \\"110 mirrht hI' il1\'nl\'ocl? .
)[r. ILL;;E:'>L\:\. Tll,'!"e was el"id('l1ce ill term:' oft11L' people "h0 wcn'
. f
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carrying some of them out, at least, in self-declared, both intentions
and in backing. aJl~ the. reasons for what they were doing.
There was some llltell1gence-there was some FBI intellizence in
this area, there \\:1S some Secret S~n·ice intelligence in this a~ca as it
related to Presidential threats and security. And there "I\,lS some inves-
tigative reporting by the press going on as to the back!!TOlmd of some
of these activities, and all of these I rhi nk would add tozether to be the
sources at that time of what we did have. '"
Mr. D.\SH. But is it vour statement that YOU were not fullv aware
of the specifics of the 'Huston plan? •• ."
Mr. HALDOL\);". I was not-let me get into how that was set up. In
the meeting with the President and the heads of the security arrencies
the problem W,lS outlined and the President made it verv 'cle~r that
he expected some cooperation, which there did not-which did not
exist at that time between these agencies, in getting better information,
evaluating the information more effectively. 9-J:1_d dissemin~lting it so
that action could be taken if there was action inClicafecr.-or at least
awareness-there would be awareness of what was happening or what
was going to happen.. .
. The group assembled in his office at that time was designated by
the President as a task force to prepare recommendations for him as
to what ought to be clone, what steps should ?e taken to meet. the prob-
lem and carry out the reqnest. that the President made of this group.
'It is my understanding that that-those agency heads themselves
or by designation of members of their staff did set. up such a task force
under the chairmanship of Director Hoo,-er which prepared an exten-
sive set of recommendations. :JIr. Huston worked with them. I under-
stand on this, or at least they transmitted these recommenchtions to
him upon their preparation, and those _recommendations were sub-
mitted to the President. They were submltted, as was customary pro-
cedure to ·:Jfr. Huston, the staff man assigned to that project, through
~IT. Huston to me and through me to the President.
~Ir. D,\SH. ~lr. Huston ·adlwlly reported to you? .
Mr. H.\LOE~L\X. He reported through me in this particular area. He
was--well. I do not know where he was assizned at that time. He was
sometimes--pali of the time he was [It the 1Yhite House he was on the
staff of the counsel and part of the time he was on :-[r. Buchanan's staff'.
Mr. D,\SH. weu, in reporting to you or throuah YOll, YOll saw all of
the papers that were being rc\·ie\ved. did you not? . .
~fr. H.\LnDC\);". I sawall the papers-not all the working papers of
-the committee. I sa w the recommencLltioI1s that went to the President.
Mr;-.D.\-,IH . All rizht. Did vou read the recommendatiolls that went
to the President?' •
)Ir. H.\LDDL\),"". I am not sure I did or not. Lf.Ldid it was not in any
detaiL I had ;\11 idea it \\",13 a prop!);;:!] for ,\11 l'xp:mdpd intclliaence
nctivit.v.~[r. D\~if. 11-r1"r von ;1\\"are in that propo;;,ll tl.e ro \\",\S ;1 recommen-
dation fOI' both 1':ltiollai .md id,'!"n,tl O;"Cllrit.\". th:lt th\,]",' lw all
incl"r:l:,pd \l:,(' of wirl't:lpi1i!l:2" and ;;1ilTl'ptitioll:" ('!Itr,\· Ol· hl\':I].;:·in ~
:;\[r. H.\LflUf.\:'>. r :1111 [lot :,lln' \,·lH'rlli'!· I \'·:IS or lint. T mil.'" \·pry \\·l,11
11n \"(C\ !><.'('II.
I
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Mr. DASH. IYere you aware of his particular role as liaison between
)[r. Halclrrnan and the ('ornmittl'c To Re-Elect tile Presidcnt ?
Mr. EHIU.ICfDL\X. Only very vaguely.
Mr. D"\SH. Did he ever report llnythin~ to you when he came back
from the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. EHRLICHM.\Y. No.
Mr. D,\sH. Now, "ere yon aware of the fact that by the summer of
1970, )Ir. Haldeman and the President had felt a need for an irn-
proved intelligence system with regard to domestic dissent or internal
. security?
Mr. EHRLIODIAX. The answer to the question is, yes, but not the
Huston plan, There have really been two things talked about in the
course of the hearings, and I knew about one of them and I had only
the merest brush with the other.
:\1r. Dc\SH. The question re,llly is not about the Huston plan. I asked
you whether yon were aware of a feeling for the neecl for an improved
v I intelligence plan todE'nl with. say, internal security'?
Mr. EHRLICIL1fAX,\VelI, I was aware of the feeling of the need, and
I shared it.
Mr. DASH. All right .
. Now, what plan "ere YOU aware of?
Mr. EHRLICIDUX. I was aware of a proposal which eventuallv, I
believe, was put into effect to establish a small .office in the Justice
Department to correlate and coord mate and bring together in one
place what. the vario.is law enforcement agencies, both in and out of
the Feeleral Gonrnment. knew about these terrorism bombings and
the violent-the street violence and these other activities tha't were
zoinz on around the country because it looked then like there really
~ns ~ pattern, ~nd that it. was a coorclinatecl~ planned, and executed
thinz. These dungs went 1Jl waves from one part of the country to
the ;ther, and it.a~ppeared that if what the po~ice knew, for instance,
in the city of New York could be shared with the police in other
pares of the country, t~a,t you would get awhole lot better response
to this kind of In,wbreakmg.
So under Mr. Mardian's aegis, this effort was made to bring- to-
cether the thin Q"S that were known to nll of the law enforcement -peo-
b 0
ple around the country, ,
)[r. D,\sH. All right.
Now, did yOll know n,bO~ltthe Huston plan?
)1r. EnRL1CI-DL\X. I did not know about the Huston plun until J
was inx...ited to attend n meetinz that I think has been previously re-
- fel'rE'd to here in the President's Office. attended by Admiral Gavler
and .J. EdQ"a r Hoo\"er .and !he head" of .the \'~ rions--::'[r. Helms: the
ll, heads of the various mtell1gence agencles, "nere tIllS proposal was
annonnced. r. . .. ~rr. D.\SH. 'Illftt \,a5 thtl ;;ta;:re O.l that propositI ::tt thiS pomt an-
nOllllcf'fl as :1 prnpos:ll th:lt ,,;old:l frO forw::trd! .
L
Mr. EHfU.T("JDL\:-;-. T gathered It. W:15:1.11 ;1ccol1lpllSI1f'cl hct.
~rr. D,,.;rr. Y('s. Did YOIl kllow IYhat .tlll· pn'posal W;IS :lbollt?
~rr. rTlI~LIcr.DL\"·' ;r\l~t f['O!ll \\"!t:lt ] he:l nl at tli;lt m\.~eting. I lUll
110~,,,('ell rhi' v:ntr!lp. .
'.fr. n.ISIf. Did Flit 1;1111\\' ril:lt the prop,),,;t1 Ill,'lwkd rri1lt)\':I~ of eer-
t:li'n rl'~trictil)tlS OI't break·ins. surreptitious cnt:--:;". or wiretapping?
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21. On June 25, 1970 the Committee completed its report en-
titled "Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)"
known as "The Huston Plan." The report included a discussion of the
current restraints on intelligence collection with respect to electronic
surveillance, mail'coverage~ surreptitious entry, use of campus in-
formers, use of military undercover agents, and other intelligence-
gathering procedures. The Report set forth the arguments for and
against maintaining or relaxing existing restraints on the various
forms of intelligence collection and of establishing an inter-agency
intelligence evaluation committee. Specific options for expanded intel-
1igence operations were set forth for the President's consideration.
The Report stated that two of the proposed intelligence-gathering pro-
cedures, surreptitious entry and opening first class mail, were illegal.
At Director Hoover's insistence, the Report included notations that the
,;-+ -_-- -
FBI objected to proposals for establishing a permanent coordinating com-
mittee and for lifting restraints on intelligence collection methods in
all categories except legal mail coverage and National Security Agency
communications intelligence.
21.1 Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence
(Ad Hoc), June 1970 (received from CIA).
21.2 Tom Charles Huston testimony, Senate Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, May 21, 1973, 137-38.
21.3 Tom Charles Huston testimony, House Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, July 9, 1973, 1381-82.
21.4 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 8 SSC 3029.
21.5 President Nixon statement, Hay 22, 1973, 9 Presi-
dential Documents 694.
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21.1 Special Report Interagency
Committee on Intelligence
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June 25, 1970
This report, prepared for the President,
is approved by 2.11 members of this committee
and their signatures are affixed hereto.
,/"""'; .
/s/ J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal B'J.rE'8:~tof Investigation
Chairman
_LS/ Richard Hehns
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
lsi Lt. GeneralD. V. Bennett. USA
Director, Deiense Intelligence Agency
/s/ Vice Admired Noel Gayler, USN
Directol', l-;ational Security Agency
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PREFACE
J
The obj8ctives of this report are to: (1) assess the current
inte rnal security threat; (6) evalu3.te current intelligence collection
proc~dures;· identify restraints under which U. S. Inte l ligertce services
.operate; a;ldlist the advantages and disadvantages of such restraints;
and (3) evaluate current interagency coordination and recommend means
to improve it.
"l
J
J
]
The Committee has attenipted to set forth the essence of
the issues and the major policy considerations involved which fall. within
the scope of its mandate.
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I. r,IILITANT ~;TW LEFT GROUPS
A. Assessxent of CL.:t:-ent Intern:!.l Security Threat
The movem en t of rebellious youth known as the uNew Left, "
involving and influencing a substantial number of college students, is hav-
ing a serious impact on cO:Hemporary society 'with a potential for serious
domestic strife. The revolutionary a ims of the New Left are appar-ent
when th ei r identific2.tion 1,J/ith '.\!ar2\:ism - Leninism is examined, They
pointedly advertise their objective as the overthrow of our system of
government by force and vio l enc e . Under the guise of freedom of s oe ech
they seek to confront all established author-ity and provoke disorder: '
They intend to smash the U. S. educational system, the economic structure,
and f inatly the Government it self , New Left groups do not have a Iarrre ', , - :::>',
enough number of rank-and-file Io llower s, nor .do they have a unity of
purpose to carry out ma s s ive or par alyz ing acts of insurrection, T'hev 60
on me other hand, have the wi Il to car ry on mo r e militant efforts in lo'cell '
situations and an inclination to uti liz e more extreme means to attain thei r
objectives,
",
1. Student Protc:st GrOl!pS. The Students for a Democ r afic
Society (SD3) has, in the pas t y ear , split into ~everal Iact icns, including,
the Revolutionarv Youe:1 i',Ior;ement (RYAI), which has control over 30
.,' -, ~ L rl " 11 ' > (\~ /-, -I ) -" h ' .chapters; and we \\'0::';,,81' 0t.~1,-<e:nr:..!._l:lnCe l' 0:l) wruc: co ns ist s ot 63
chauter s , The VISA Iactiou, dom inat ed by the pr-o-Chmc s e communist
Pro'gre.ssive Labor Party (PLP), airn s to build a I':orker-stucient movement
iri keeping wi th the PLP's a irn of cle','eloping 2. broad wor kc r-Las ed
r evo luti ona r y movement in the Umt.cd States ,
"1'
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This communications c apabi lity ~2.J' have a significant impact on campus
stJ.L il ity' ;_n t~t2 C~ :~;1i~::;:::2 ~~...._.',: ~:,~.::-. .
•.J
The Venc er erncs Br igade (VB), establt she d to send United Stat cs
vouth +0 Cuba to aid in the 1970 har-vests. has continuu l ly r ec e.ive d ;-",·O .. .,j,l:::;..J ... "" ' - ..... - l.. ...... '...J.J.,"_
publicity in Cuban propaganda medi-i. To date, ov e r 900 m err.bar s ot
the VB have visited CU03. and another gr oup of approximately 500 members
are expected to follow suit. While in Cuba, VB m ember s were individ:lallv
photographed and questioned in deta il about their bac kg rourids , Because -
of their contacts with Cuban officials} these individual's Dust be con s ider ed
as potential recruits for Cuban inte TIigence activities and sabotage in the
United States.
1
]
'-;:
{J
:i
....:..J
The greatest threat posed to the security of the country by
student protest groups is their potential for fomenting violence and unrest
on college camp'.lses. Demonstrations have triggered acts of 2~rS0[1 bv
extremists against war-oriented research and i~OTC facilities and h2~'e
virtually paralyzed many schools. There has been a gl'mvir:.g n1jmber of
noncampuS, but student-related, acts of violence which increase teI'.sions
between "town :i.r.d gm~m" and yi hic h constitute a mJ.:dzed esc a hUon of the
scope ancllevel of protest activities. Fe'.\' stude!lt protests are cHl'rentl,,1
related to exclusively GJ.mpus iSS'J2s;'virtually all im'olve political and'
social issues. Increasingly, the battlefield is the community \vith the
campus servil1g primarily as a staging area.
';~
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-,
r-ec rui tmen t aud pa!.~ti~~L;;~l[:':)!1 i.: i<O:'2:~:il- d.r ected ir-~~:·ll:~=.<;['.·~e ac ~~~:~~~..
The> soviet and bloc int"'11i::-2;,r.:. s er vic e s ar e dir ec tin ..7 -.,.,~.,..,_-,.,~...... r t..: l. .... '-...4.... '- .J._= ... _.._. _. ...... .- _...... _l~.;J l.';'._l..:. __ .;., 1. ..: ...... ::,
operations against Amer-icans w ho travel behind the Curtain. In the
U. S. S. R. J the Second Chi ef Di r-ec to r ate of the KGB wo rks ag a inst
U. S. \'isitors) including S;:..i-:2::C:::, on a nESS basis to effect recruit-
ment. This activity is responsive to Central Committee policy and
directives.
2 .. Antiwar Activists .. The impetus and continuity for the
antiwar movement is provided by the New Mobilization Committee to
End the War in Vietnam (N.i\'IC) and the Student Mobilization Committee
to End the \Var in Vietn 2...;.'11 (S~\IC). The NMC is a coalition of numerous
antiwar groups and indi';icL:s.ls including communist "old left" e lem ent s .
The Sr-.'lC is unde r the contro 1 of the Trot~kyist Socialist \Vorkers Party
(SWP).
The NIvIC and S?vIC have announced a policy of "nonexclusionlT
which places no limitation on the type of individuals a l lowed to p3.:rticiDate
in demonstrations. This policy opens the door for violenc a-prons .
individuals who want to c ap ita liz e on the activities of these groups.
Both groups profess to 10110\1; a policy of nonviolence; however, the
very natu r e of the protests that they sponsor sets the stage for c ivi l
disobedience and r::olice conf rontat ion by irr e.sponsible di s s ident e lernents ,
Various incliviciuals in NII/IC and Sf'vTCare calling for mo r e militant
protest activities, a subj ect_ to be cUscussecl at national m eeting s by
both zr oups in late .Iune , 19'/0. .
v 4
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Although antiwar groups are not known to be collecting \~:2Zl1JOns
en(Ta~J"inrrin naramilit2.n' training, or advocating terrorist tactics the 4
.. CJ<- Q-' :J I. _ -- J", ...... : ~.._.
prO-HallQi 2.ttib.!cle of their leclct2rs, the unstable natur-e of rnanv "':E_:C
aavoc2.tes and their policy of "Dollexclusion:' underscore the l.ls~ of ths
anti\var mover:1snt a:3 a COI~(~litfor civil disorder. This is ftii'~l:el'
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The military and edt:c2.ti0!1al instuuuons ar e the nr irne_ ~ 4 ••
targets of the antiwar movement. In addition to vandalism, ar-sons, and
" l' ..,rr,-.': nr'\"Trt f~'~1·l;:"1Q"'-' tl,-. ...··:. ~....rv r- 1Je.-"., stcpp d ,J.. •• ~ ,Don:,)l:,~~-:; o~ _;:'cU;'1..- <l'-' ~~:_.!.::.::;, _,,~~;_. 1.,1.;':' { 'C:.~ _L,,_ . e -up ac.LIVlLV to
. d anl . ~"T r 'l.""'" :- ~ ,.m '"""\r"'I :._ }~ s:» r- / ~..... I '!'"'\ .-r- ,., J-. ...C'~ ~ f" ,....n ,....., .."._r l' C e"""'''''1 ~ ::... . ...~ .sprea, anIl.'",,~ ::J_, i1l_C~Ul: ,_lU'-"b _"1.1-_"l_~c .• ,::,;:;1\ ' ."cIl ~10:::1 wituin
throu0'h sJFmnathetic r:12!l'.o2rs in t+.e m ilitary arid from without rnrnu,'lc'"'::> - -". ... ~.~
such programs 3.S "GI Coffeehouses" and tr.e proposed National GI ..
Alliance. The increasing access by members of the military to the
underground press, the est2.blishmeilc of servicemen's unions, and
O
ru2nizations which facilitate desertions) have contr ib.it ed s icnificant lv;:;> .. .' ,.. ,., • ., .:::> lL_.. ". "L J
to the increasmg mstances or drs ser.t in the mi litar y services. '
NMC and S~..1C leaders a re .constantly speaking before student
groups and endeal,roring to use student radicals to further the antiwar'
movement. They have called for an end to the ROTC and have demon-
strated, often violently, to force universities to halt wa r+r e lat ed rese:ll'ch
proj ects.
The NMC maintains close contact with the Soviet-controlled
\Vorld Counci l for Peace and Stocld'.o'!.m Coderence on Vietnam, A new
org,mization dominated by Kl'/IC leacers, the Committee of Li'lison with
Families of Servicem~I1: D~tai~ec~.in l'-iorth Vietnam, emerged in <.Ta:1ua1'Y,
1970, after con·~acts wlth l';ortn Ii18cnamese representatives. It atU~l;'1:)ts
to present a favorable picture of North Vietnamese tre:lL~r;.ent ot Arnr::1'"ican
prisoners of W2_f.
One NI\IC official is kno~,:n to ha\"e met '\vith a SO'liel intelli(r'C'.,r·L
officer. NI\JC leaders 113.'\'e freCl'..lently tr2 ..veieci abl·oaci. His ther~ro~~""'~~
necessary to consider these inc1ivicL!21s as having potential for engagi.:1g ~
in foreign-cErec:tecl intdligence collection.
'. ~ .
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, - re\'olution~Lry le;tdel:'sllip ro lc of the Negro in the United States. It has
evo1.ved into a number of small commando-type units which plan to
utilize bombings, arsons, and assassinations as poh tica lweapons ,,_
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There has been evidence of '~Veatherman involvement in
terrorist tactics, inc lu ding the accidental explosion of a "Weather r-i.u-
bomb factory" in New York City 01.1 i.-larch 6, '1970; the discovery of two
undetonatecl bombs in Detroit polic e facilities on the same date; and the
blast at NE\V York City police installations on June 9, 1970.
While Weatherman membership is not clearly defined, it is
estimated that at least I, 000 indivirnra ls -adhe-re to Weatherman ideology.
In addition, groups such as the White Panther Party) Running Dog, :0.i-;dD8.
and the Youth Internation3.l Party (Yippies) are supporters of Weather man .
terrorism but have no clearly definable ideology of their own.
Adherents to \-'leatherman ideology are also found within
radical elements on campuses, among those living in off-campus commune.
among New Left movemer:t 12v:yers and doctors, and the underground nr e ss
Individuals '\':110 adhere to the \Veatherman ideology have offered SUDDo~t
and aid to hard-core \Veatherman rn ember s , including 21 \Veather~~n
mcmber s currently in rudmg to avoid apprehension .
They ideutifv themselves politically with North Vietnam,
Cuba, and North Korea and consider pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese orf;2ni-
zat ions as being alig-ned wit h impe:rialist power s , In addition some of the
Weatherman leZlclers·and adherents have tr avel ed to communist countries
or have met in wr ste rn countries w ith communist representatives.
___,_, \Veatherman ~eaders and other members of terrorist gro'___:~"s
are not known at this tirn e to be involved in foreign-directed ir:telli::~2;lce
collection activity. The fugiti\:c and._llD~:jel:groLlndstatus of many oi tl':.::se
people) as w e ll as their in':ol','2m2!lt in act ivi ti e s wh icli ».ould li1-::-::1:;jtil:'::;
them to the ?Ltte:-'ttion of .!~:112ricJ_nnuthor ities , would be a deter rent to ~
COTIl'::lct·S bv i'oreicrl1 intelllc;e,lce 01'~2nizatio;:s.
w ,:) .._
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f;:. c ~1iLie :::;: i()l"' til:': L..L1~.i..~',-"~::':._)~~'1:"·~ ~'"J) :) '.1:';~.,:' t; L} " I ~ ~.. .... ~ ~ '. \~ • ~} ~.~d -' .. ._.. I, '.
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Cove'rage of student g rcups is ha ndl ed primarily th rough
live informants and it is generally effe ct ive at the national level or
at major meetincs of these grouos whe re ove r al l pol icy , ·11·,......,S andn _ _. . J (!","'~
objectives of the gro'J.ps are de te rm ine d .
The antiwar movement's activities are covered through the FD~
by live infor-mants in all organiz:ltior:s of interest. This is supported by
intor maticn Iurn isned oy all me mbe rs of the intelligence commun ity
and other Fede 1'2.1, state, and local ageric ies . Key leade r s and
activists are afforded concentrated and intensified invest icativei»
coverage on a continuing basis and, in s ituat ion s where there a-::-e
positive indications of violence, electronic surveillances hav s been
implemented Oil a selective basis. Into r mant and electronic cove rags
does not meet present requirements.
"":~
JJ
Although several SDS chapters on college campuses which
adhere to \Veatherman ideology have been penetrated by live info r ma nt s ,
there is no live infoI'mant co~:erage at present of unde rg r ound We athc r man
fugitives. There is electronic cove rag e on the re s ide nce of a \Ve2.therm:tn
contact in New York City and on U18 residence of an alleged Weathe r man
memher in San Fr::wcisco; however, no information has been develoDed
concerning the whereab:::>uts of the 2l \Veatherman fugitives. C
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2. Gaps in Current Coverage. Est1.blishec1, Ionz-fe r m
_~..,.- ------- 0
cover2.ge is not ava il abl e with in st,udent protest groups due to the
fact that the stude nt body itself changes yearly, necessitating a constant
turnover in the informants targeted a;ainst these groups. His ide al isrn
and immaturity, as well as the s sn s itive issues of aca.do mic ir e edom
and the right to dissent, all serve [0 incr e a se the risk that tile student
Inf or mant wil! D::: exposed 2S such.
Gene rally, GJ_y -to -day C ove rage of the pia nne d ac ti '-itic.:c;
f I -r t "SL crouus ~'"'l':C''' 'lr'~ ..-f"'1' ...."Ir:-.: •• 11'J~· ....,'·['Cn(\ .....,.l("·'C~ ,.-.,,,,,,..1o St:l:c:::;n nro,e L ~_ "'1-'';:', ','.J.-,- J1 ~c, ~ ::>v.:,c: .'.",~_L 'L',l '!.·Ji",Jl!,J C;_: .• ,
• •. - 1 1" .....L.. ...... ~.. ~' -' ., "\ -11" , , ....... .- ..- I 0 ~. t·. .....~...... LdISJOInted, COU1C 02 ::oLl2!l::'cner!~;.J. .-'_L. ,ranc,:: "llLLC OJ. J,:r,,:,~Cl lra\'cl
b ··t- -. ",,;1·~. "cs 1"- ')""";C'1;.-,,'1" "'_~C.l·-('_'..l ("'''''):1'' ~'i"ll'»'C''''~y ;:, ,:ct2f1r !::~~.l ..cl.,l .:J ~ Co! •• '~"' ..d -: .. , _.l ~,u. cUt', .~.~ . c • "-" ~ l::'
gcncLLlly attl'l:)l,ltJ.b~c' ~.J .s;-,.lc~,ll, clr.':::'~:_::.'llt 8:-:i::·2.C111S: ;:.;',r;s J_r':~·y,g
racljc:il stl.:dC~1tS- C'O";/2r::'~;2 of t~12S:; IJ.tter tJll.JUiJS is r:~iJ:i~-:-:~ll.
... _ ..
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- The antiwar movement 'is comprised of a o r.eat m anv0' ~........~,
orgal~iZJ.tions 211cl people whi c h .;:·2~)resent varied polrtic a l, mo ra l and
~, ic bell·c.:-- '_'lU~"""':J"1~ r,r'~1'''''''~''':'''''' t-.r..n.,·_· ....:...·..-·'1,·)·""1:-· .... "'""'.....'~rll·lde .'eLnnl. ~4_C;L.":). '-' .:. s: l.l.', .d_L,,:- ..·.,c_~ '-'J">1':~l.",_"';:' ~··.:;'._,.,c_,-~ optrmum
coverz:.ge of all antiwar :l.ctidries on a day-to-day bas is .
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Existing coverage of Ne-:;:,-Left extr-emists, the Weather man
group in particular, is ncg lig ible. )'Iost of the Weatherman group has
gone underground and formed floating , commando-type units co rnno se d of
three to six incli vidua ls . The transitory nature of these units hinclers the
installation of electronic sun'eillances and the ir smallness and distrust
of outsiders m ake penetration of these units through live informants
extremely difficult.
Financially, the Weather-man group appears to be without
a centralized source of funds. \Vealthy par-ents have furnished funds to
some of these individuals, including those in a Iug itive status. Manu
members have also been involved in the thefts of credit and iclerltifi/ation
cards, as well as chcc ks , and have utilized them for obtaining operating
expenses.
3. Possible ;,Ieasures to Improve Intelligence Collection.
To establish erfective coverage of student protest groups l-iould-r~Cltlire
the expansioi1 of live informant coverage of individual campus Ch2.Pt2l'S of
these organizations. This woul d entail extensive use of student iruo:!.'nl.a71ts
to obtain maximum utilization of their services for the periods of their
college attendance.
- 7 -
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1
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:Zxtcnsive efforts hav e been undertaken which should
produce a live informant c.?.:JJ.ole of Iu r ni s hir.g info rrnat ion as to the
Ioc.itron of \'/e:::.tr-.c:rman fug itiv e s and planned t er ror.i st ac ts . In the
event a commune is loc2.te'~1 pr orn pt installation of e l ec tr on ic
cover ag e should pre due 2 s imi la r r e su lts . Utilization of a ddi tiona!
re sour c e s to expand and intensify this collection would be ueneficiJ.l.
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1. Bl8.ck P2:-:::::::r P::'l'LY· The most active and dang erous
black extremist group i:-: ti~2 united States is the Black Panther P,-:.r::--,'
(BPP). Despite its r e lativ e ly small number of hard-core member a-v
approximately 800 in 40 chapters nationwide--the BPP is in the 101'e.r ont
of black extrernist activity today. The BPP nas publicly adve r t.i s ec its ::1'0:11:
of organizing revolution, msur r ect icn, assassination and other terrorist-
type activities. Moreover) a recent poll mdlc ates that appr oxirnate lv
.25 per cent of the black population has a great respect for the BPP, -
including 43 per cent of blacks under 21 years of age.
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The Panther naw spape r has a current circulation of
approximately 150,000 copies w e sk ly. Its pages are filled with mes saze s
of racial hatred and call for terrorist guerrilla activity in an attempt ~.
to overthrmv the Government. The BPP has been involved in a sucstantral
number of planned attacks against la'wenforcement offic cr s, and its
leadership ·is 'composed in large part of criminally inclined, violence-
prone individuals.
\Veapons are regularly stockpiled by the Party. During 1968
and 1969, quantities of machine guns, . s hntguns , rifles, hand grcnade s ,
homemade bombs. and am:D"Lmition we r e uncovered in Panther offices.
\..
2. New Left SU~)P01't for BPP. The BPP has received
increasing support from r aci c a l New Left elements. Dur-ing 1970, the
-. Bp.D '£Or)1H:>d~)l1.'nd;inc:::: relacions[,iD w i.th r adlc al student dis s ente r s ;j"~i4 .L. .. ~.................. ~ ~_ ~...... . -' .. a ............... • '1
mjecting the iSSlW of Gm'e:'i'.ment !'repression" of Parr.he r s into th-:> 'o -
antiwar caus e . Stude,l~s Io r 2. D21DOCl'aticSociety (SD3) supported
th E
-nn' '9hn'l ·...-·:t ......~ f r ont ""'\.o·{.·'~n·-·"" f'"")r·'·-'i·-,i'l ,1 --ro.1, c ., 1 '1'"C _!..!:'.t 111 a 1. U;:;. LliiI e'_, ~~ v:1 c,::?·_Ul,::>L ~__ 0\_·~.:,,~.. - fl·':'" "t)r,),r:Oillty Ci~~:'~
black ex' . ("""'~ inc' 1~ ....~: .,..,"-.4 i";-!.:J 1-'nT.) wil l v '.-,r 1 ... ("' i 1,.....C\ 1-:·'1- : i '......"r . _. ,..Iac,( extre:'nl..:,"S, ~,!~L,'_""":-, l.~ ~J.L'~) ,~1 ... "v".:'" ,-,_C::;'':') ·.·,.'~jl .c.,C:'.\' L~1~l..
white radicals in the future ll"lC:!.'C;,lses t:;e th:'-2:lt of e::;cZ1l~JLi~~gt2rrc "i SL
activities .. Itil,Q '_ltd 02 sz'.:c· to prCJ2ct tint r;-~cial strif:2 c:nci sh.lde:1[
• ~ " 1 '1' :.. . -. ~. . 11 ' ,- ,~~ ''':'. 'I.. 'tu r 1'n oJ. i f 0 !:.! c::n:; Cl uY 0 l:~.C c'::':; :~- c'2 t:ll::J ~:~ \'/1, C"'.c !l_hC 1:1 l!1C 1'·:;=-:'3 c.
r, ~,.,""1 ""'\ "T".)
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l;tforn-::lt>:::l:-: nas :)22~ ~"~.:C'!-: :-: C~! C·_~- ~,~':::~I-:'_'_:~I~:':; th,-,_t tr::: D~'-P h~:_3 i,<_ti',:.ted
any large -scale raciell oi.:iorders, li'.e year lS70 ha s s een an escalation of
racial clisOI"(:ers acrosS the ~atio:1 compared to 1969. This fact, coupled
with an increasinc: amount of v iol cnt Panther activ ity, pre sent s a z re at~ _ L4:=> 1::.,"
potential for racial and civil unrest for the future.
l
_.J
]
4. Appeal to j\lilitary. The BPP has made pointed appeals
to black servic81'!1en with racist propaganda. High, pr io r ity has been
placed on the recruitment of '.-eter2.lls with weapons and explcs ive s t r ain i.:c .
The BPP has also c3.11ed for infiltration of the Gave rnment. Th e s e -
activities, should they achieve even minimum success, present a grave
threat.
{
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·1
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5. BPP Philosophy and Foreign Support, The BPP relies
heavily on foreign --corr.Inunistideolo;y to shape .its goals. QuotJ.tions from
Mao Tse-tung were the in it ial ideclogicCll bible of the BPP. Currently
the 'writings of North Koreal1 Prcmie:!.' Kim Il -sung are Iol lo we d and .i »
extensive use of North Korean prop:lgancla material is made in BPP
publications and trai:1in'g. The l",l'.1::xist-oriented philo sophy of the BPP
presents a favor2.ble envil'onment for support of the Panthers Irorn other
communist countries.
]
l
,.J
BPP le2.c1;:;rs have traveled extensively abroad including visits
to Cubct, P~USSLZL, NOl'eh Korel, and Algeria. Intc r natronal. ope rat ion s of
the BPP are directed by Elcll"idge Clea','er, 2. fugitive Jr orn United S~;]_tcs
courts. / Cleaver has established an international s taf I in Alge r ia, from
, _, 0 ,"-T--"l--'''' :~ con ..tn n ilv r-eluved to tl T)"C)-) 1 'wrre re con~rnunlst PI' tJ"::,<~1 ',,A,- 1:::> "::'c~l.'Uj \.,-'<-'-iCC\. U12 u.c_ 1. 12~lClCiU:lr;-"'-;'~~
in Berkeley, Cali{Ol'ni2.. Fe has also cs:,lblis;-;,:;d close tics with A.1·F:!_L:~~~··
an t\_Y'''b (rl1ec·i11a orcrJ_!~iz::'ction) who se leZ1..c!2fs hav e r cuo rtecllv E',L'J'l~l"rl ._ ~-- ::->~. _ --- ::', " .,' - -', ',-- ~,.,,,.,-,,,
'l"_n"!l'"L::1!-jr;;-,.::, to Ell'p r,2r.:C;2~'S co l'::'~'::8 7.'_:2rrllb lTz\'l~l:"~ m,:ric,-lS'iCi ('1,-,.,,,-,• __,.l.' ,_ '_ ~ _" - - __, _,,-,• I.:
. _ .' • L..-1" t \- L' - _in :J. recent CO;(','':;l"s'?c:c:--,: Inc,ca~cu :~lQ .;n~'Ll1'\.Cl'2:ms :.'..1'2 CO::::;t;C~~'L::
Sl
-11
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. _. , ~ , L' ~ ··t' ~, ,\.. , . ', •• ' '::. _I' ~ ,':"' '" 1~·-1 :: ,,: ....o·~~/..~P S sr.,,,.., r ~ ;.. -, " 'Iore .Lc:;:;:., L,~i t; '. \..: _ L"~; -' - ~ - "-- •c.. ,," _.. - - L- i) '-l. U L~::>I~1 0 [ t.1 ~ race s.
i~~.-.~;~)T a s ~-L 0':'u~D Le'(S, to date , not tnstigntcd any civil cli.sor de r s:_ . \ _. .. ...... v.. . ... ~_. ,
however, the follo\\:2~'3 of [his s e m i-u'e l igious cult are extremely
1· i : . I l' ' , , .. ' fdedicatee. mdivic '__'J.LS \'."[";0CO:,ll:l D2 expecte« LO per o rrn acts of violence
if so ordered bv the ~;OI head, Elijah j\Llhammed. When Muhnmmed,
\1,'110 is 0\'2r 70 years of :-~ge) is replaced, a new leader could co.uplcte lv
alter current nonvioient tactics of the or gan izat lon. For example, -
Muhammed's son-ill-1a',Ii, R?ymoi1Ci Shar r ie lt, now among the top
hierarchy of 1'."01, c ou ld rise to a leader ship position. Sharrieff is
viciouS, domineering;, and unpr edictable.
There arc numerous ot~er hlackext re rn ist organizat ions ,
small in numbers, located ac ro s s the country. There is also a 1a1'0-2. 0
number of unaffiliated black extremists who advocate violence and
Guerrilla warfare. One particular group, the Republic of New Africa
(RNA), headquartered in Detroit, Michigan, calls for the establishment
of a seDarate black nation in the South to be protected by a r rne d forces
These groupS, although sr:lall, are dedicated to the destruction of our·
form of government and consequefltly present a definite potential for
instigating civil disorder or guerrilla 'Viarfare activity.
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7. Black Studed Ext:remist Influence. Bldc!\: student extre:;:-:1I
activities at college s. and secondary schoo ls tElve increased a 1::1rmirwly.
Although curre:1tly there is no domir-ant leadership, coordinatio!l or"'"
. specific direction between these i~~divic1uals, th2Y are in freq!.lent contact
wHh each otlle r. Consequently, stlOulc1 any type ot o:tganization 0 r
cohesiveness develop] it \t.'oulcl present a grave potential for future
violent activities at United States schools. Increased infort:1ant coverZ',Cf2
1 ';"·'1· Bl 1 ~)_:.vould be particub:r,y pr~Gl,lc.c:lVe In t "11'5?~:ea .. ~ _act,~ .~tudent extl'emists
~ • ·1 e "r·-·~·",rlln V'O''''I'CC'' .-,y;r) r"'-'rl1l-"'"'e "ctl\'·t·11ave -1.:t,O-i;FlentY r,:::,...;.;--- , l'C'·~ "'- .'-..1 ",".:)- Je.... <L 1 )' on CaG".Duses
:Majol' 1..H,:ivcJ:.'sities ','.-hien n!?td~ cCEccssions to nonnegotiable blad:- .
. 1 i- 1. O"""'J ",,,./,-. } .... ,.. ... "{·o "-'('1f- ~il'P'c:··,:"~r1210-,;--~·.,"_·C'II""''"\in';4n,-'-Y'eml·C'L. .-. ""'\r' ,"j_"srucer:.l C~2[{2.(lr~v.w jl,-l\ol...,. ~i_·l. .,J' ...U__. Cvd ......... 4. 1~J.. ._ .. ~:.!l ... l.~ ~.~L.;.. L.__0l C1.C,"l\·lt.!£._~S ..
. " • Ci" C ~ (\ t'· ? ')7 l' . ,.. ,D'lri"c;- th-" scnoo£ '.'2:-'1' LC"':- lu. [;21'8 '.\·ere '-'_. co 12c'e CllSrJ ..lrl.PI1C(:c;
l''''\'il:: """~ir;lovert:Jn2j. Tl:8:'e "t:ere :530 .:;~~ch cl:sturl'<~t:.c2~ iD :':'C'O~'lr;...,r ..
.. C!. .I.;::.. J.. (. .... .._, 1,.. ... _ •• , .. ...... - .... ~''"-.' ~.I...._.,_ - •
s~hools cmni:::ll'C:c1 V:ll.i1 O::lj' 32'~' C!dnng the preVlOus school y2::1.1'.
~ _, , r~'\' . ;_'; ~" \ ", • ; __: '_!. . j • 1 "
., .~~.... ' ( .... ~~.- ~
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J extrc:11ist r:l(",<;~:'~;;,t~-:;,; c ; ,---: __ : .< :.::::';,:;~gn. ~_s~'·'!'.lr':~e spec ia lly, ith eaar d '-0 "1'"C!..- ",,-~:-L')~""::;-::: ;::.,:,; '-'-'7 ., -v !"'iY,,i--:""~ "',-,"'0\'1'''--,,: ,,:.,\\,,1! r ::>'_.l.ll L U.L •• c; •• ~- ~ ••• ,._L~ -"'-J~~- _v '------'- •• --'- l'--'~':''--'~':''-'~ :!l c:.e
Vi'.it2::~ St:::.t8S. 50:112 f!J:'2~=j~ CC':;-_'-~'~2.3, ::_:r:tl ?C_SCuba, pro':i.C:::: 2. t~:::::J:::':::'C'
safe haven for these incliviciu::.ls. l Information has been r ec eiv ed that - I.~
passports and funds for travel have a lso been fur nis hed by countr ie s j"_
such as Cuba, North Ko:re2" and Algeria. Conununi st intelligence
services do not, at pr-esent, play a major role in the black extremist /
movement: however, all such servic es have cstab liahed contact with I
inclividClal 'black milil2nts. Thus, the penetr~tion and manipulation of I
black extremis·t groupS by these intelligence services rernain distinct !
possibilities. )communist inte l Iigence services are c apaol e Of us in ; t.ie ir
personnel, facilities, and agent assets to wor k in the black extremist
'field. The Soviet and Cuban services have major capabilities available.
C"",,';c,,~!'1" ~~"'" ,...,,)ef- i?~");'r+C1nt 'OI·~·;·:J'n aspect of 1-' ~ 1 I 1_ '.. i ,. " '; __ _ .. ' .-, _ _",' -J _",-!.l. c; ! '-." . co.._ en ) ,1 (' ,_... .._" - _ ............
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\r- B. Assessment of Current Intellig~nce Collection Procedures
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There are some definite gaps in the curr ent overall
intelligence penetration of the black extremist movement. For exarnnle
..' ff ic ient l' .. L ,although there appears LO De sur lCle:'.L lVe llliormant coverage of the BPP
at the rank-and-file level, adclitional penetr::..tion of th,e national le2.c1e1'-
ship of the BPP, especially at a Central Com!'!'litt2e level, is needed.
High echelon informant co:;erage could conc2ivably prevent violence,
sabotage, or insurrection if such activity \vas planned by BPP leacie:cshiu.
Insufficieflt coverage of the nationJ.l leadership of the B~P is offset .
-to some extent by technic2.l coverage of BPP he8.dcj_u2.rters and various
branch offices. Per-etn tion of leadership levels has been hindered in P:l:'t
by current BPP policies which pre'vent rank-and-fil~ members from
advancing to leadership roles .
Improvernent in COV21'''-ge of BP_P financ:ial activities cmeld
be made, particula:-l::; ','fUh regard to sou'rc es of funds and records .
Information rec2i~:ecl to cbte inclic2.tes that fin2.r'.ciz1.1S'-'P~)ort for the DPP
has been fUrl"lished OJ r:;o[:-; foreign. i,:lCE-v!.C:il8.ls 2_,';ct c:,),l"lestic sot:l'ces. T~l_"
a deeper rJenetr;::.tion "-!Id correlatlon of fo:'ci~t'. 2nd c;o:cnestie inLon:I:::.~ion -
• ,.' c· 1 c ~ l' ., C:"LQ" in~c~o" "-C)~T) j" Cl'ec C1"e Cl 1 S e s S 2. 11d a _ L0.:. U 11 L c: L c; 1 L ~-, cl. L.:: :! 0;, D 1-' L 1 ~ :-::]: ....C '3 S • 0 .. ,'" "-I '.-:(; ,,"
BPP firnnces D3.Sbeer: h:l:11P2::"8cl by fact that BPP leaders hancllei;;~~~~c::~{
m.-,t1-c.l'C:: D""·c.:"r,~,ll·'1: <. c..;; _~, " Co.l. .~~""':. -, •
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cov er ag e O! the NOr is substauti a l, enabling its ac tivit ies to be fc llowed
l ........... c ·1·.. ·' 1" t .L. 1 'on 2. cu r r enr .'::2~51:::. \~;~",'2::-2~e OJ.m i itan; 012C,-;: SLU(lC\lt g r oups arid
indiv idua lo ts 1-'2r" 1in'i~-·d ~"'<:"': .:.0 ~,r t'-:) sens it ive 'err,',:::; ;'--'01.··· ~ ,\.. 'v ........... .J..0 U ~'1 "'a'_"'''''' - ...., ~ .. - .• ._ v~ ... ._ ..... a _r L...._ ...... ::.... '-J .:...•••• 1. ::'l~... -:..~1
effective source of such cov er a ;e would be reliable, former membel's
of the Armed For ce s pres ently attending college. Live Iruor mant
coverage, particularly with respect to the activit ies and plans of
unaffiliated black m ilitant s, needs to be inc r eas ed. More Sources both
in the United State s and abroad in a position to determine the amount of
foreign involvement in black extremist activities need to be devetoucd.
Maximum use of communication inte rc eptions would materially' 'S
inc reas e the current capabilities of the intelligence community to develop '(
highly important data r egar ding black extremist activities. ~
~ ,
1n:c: rrna nt
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TOP SECRET
III. Ij\'"TELLIGEZ';CE SERVICES OF COliE.rU~nST COU0JTIUES
A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat
The threat posed by t:-:e communist intelligence services
must be assessed in t wo ar e as: (1) direct intervention in forrientinv
and/or influencing dorne st ic un re st ; (2) extensive espionage acti'lit-Ies.
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Taken i~ complete context, these services constitute 3. g r ave
threat to the internal security of the United States because of their size
capabilities, wide spr e ad sphe re s of influence, and t.argeting of the '
United St2.tes as "enemy number one.·:_I-The-J.argest and most skilled
of these services is the Soviet Committee for State Se cur ity (KGE)
which has roughly 300,000 personnel of whorn some lO, 000 are engaged
in foreign operations.
1. Intervention in Domestic Unrest. There have been no
substantial indications that the corrimuni st intelligence services have
actively forl'.2!1ted domestic unrest. Their capability cannot, hcv cvc r
be minimized and the likelihood of the ir initiating direct mte rvennon '
would be in direct relationship to the dete rio ration of the politic al
climate and/or imminence of ho sti lit ie s. The ingredients for a first-
rate capability are present, including both the pe r sonne l and the
ingrained philosophy and know-how for using such tactics .
"~:...J~t
j
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.;;:...,,
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. . Communist intelligence has shown a real capability to
foment disorder in a nurnbe r of t rouble spots. The dissidence and
violence in the United States today present adve r sa ry inte l l ig ence
services with Ol)portunities unpar a l le led for forty years. \Vhile
Ioste r.ing c.1iso:::cler and rcbe l lion thr-ough co mrnun ist pa r t ie s and
fronts Ts -2: potent weapon in the co rnmuni st a r se na l, their past
suc c e ss has been ev ide»t in cl::lndcst.Ln.~_yecrLlitment efforts on
" rJ,.....~ rr [·1·~_:)-. 0': 'l'~..,..~, ....~ ~ .. ~\ ~ (Kim) p:·~in..,,· C· ...· T) .•.•. .-..._......-C;1rr11iuses ..,U,l!1J I,.~::> - "-,,,.~.Jc. 11. _•. .:.c ... \. .• d _- .1_,vJ' r..ly l.Y..ll'·"·~<_.... ... ._-., .... .., " • 1 .I.. .:_.. ..'- ..._t......, J
a:1d Danalc1 ;"I~~.c18:ln '.'ieye ;::11 stL:c[ents 2.t. C3.n:lln(i~~::: (Lll'in; the d2pr2s,:,;!o:-:.
pe:riod of the 1930's ;:'ilC: '-:2:'e in he ·,anguJ.l·j of ';:h::.t ',','3.::> t[:e?: th2 ?~c,,\..
Ln1Ct Tlicir -·-?cruitE~'?".: :1:1:1COOi)c~·J.tion \;,-l~h S()';iet i~ltelli·7e"('p .. ~.",,;I-c.-:'..... -' _ _ _ ,::, .-~"-.; ··- ....... !,..~-...;.._L
h r") .. ·~·.--,1 ~n:..,....'l.:,....~···..,C~ """1(1,...1'""" COI"·t"·--r'-"Y'l.l·...;:·:.,r·l -UT, ~:,.. c'- 'f-.. a\'o con .L', r 1c 1;:).1 ". c c: 1 l _"', _- , . :.. ,._, ., ,l.::> U i., ' ..J J.l: v ~ '. - ~ .:.:C1] r L y l!l
those sectors \~il!cr2 t~:e~; {"l:ld 8_1_:tll0ri:-:.cd ac~.:ess.
,I - •., ' 1 ",. ,
1: ..•. : ; ~ l ..._',.._L .
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TOP SECHET
rr.ombc r s 2:18 1,,;:,,::,:;:'3 :_,:' ;.:,,:;t=:::'~~'.·;·,';)S. F.:Jl' in sta nc e , about 000
mernbcrs of the Vei1.C2:'~i:~()S Dl'i;;ade, a g roup of Amc ric an youths)
'·1.~ .~ "~1~-,1r.':"'-·-1 "'"1 ........ ;.~-~ ~ ..... :;."\ .:...~. r-.,~_,,.~ ~1;11'" tr ave l 'a s f i .r2C<2[1[.) CC):! :JLC','::', __ :'.1' .. : .••• ; -:~ c" "''': •• ';C. i t i o ~u..':.. \\2.S lrlanCea
bv tile CGL:~l.n Gl)\'eL,:HC:ilC. \,,'!lile in CU02., r:ley were exhor-ted to
a~t.i.n;ly par tic ipat e in United St8.ces r-evolut iona ry acti·v-iti.es upon.
their return to tile United States. The o rgaruz e r s of the; Bl'lg-ade
were in st ruct ed to direct any questions to an individual assi§l:ned to
the Cuban l\Iissi. 0;1 to tne United Nations 'who has be en ide ntif ie d as
a member of the Cuban intelligence service.
A sabotage manual, prepared in Cuba, turned up in the
hands of individuals responsible for recent bombings in Pue rto Rico
and New York Citv. \Vhile the note nt ial for wide sp read well-oro-an iz ed....L. ) - :;:, .1,..1. c....o r::
incidents of violence generated and controlled by the Cuban intelligence
s e rv ic e is considered rn in irrial , isolated occurrences of this natur-e lYlUS"....... • _\". ...... .._ 1.A. "-
be considered probable. The Soviet services appear to have assumed the
passive roles of observers and reporters.
The communist intelligence se rv ice s maintain cont act s
and exert influence among a variety of individuals and o.rgan iz atrons
through the exploitation 0: ideological) cultur al , arid ethnic ties.
Most of these liaisons are maintained with so me deg ree of openness
with incliviclUD:ls C'.5soci2.ted with the Communist Pa rty , USA., various
of its f iont groups, othe r pro -Sov ie t organizations, nat io.ial it.y gl'Ot.:DS
and fore·ign-lang1.12.ge l1e"\!lSpapers. These contacts 2.1'e exploited as· ,
sources for and propag2.ncia o'-ltletS' of COElmun.ist intelligence senricE.;s.
Regarded individually, theSe efforts cannot be considered a major
threat to OLlr internal security; 110'.'10\'81'; in total, they represent a
_.siz8.ble elemei1.t of O;_H P:J9"L'..cior:. '.,,'hich can lJe in£lu2nc9d In va.ryi:lg
degree;:; by communist intelligence service operatic:1s.
2. Intelligence' O~):;r2.ti0'1S. Pel'sis[c::.t ~),;1dpel'vJ.si';c
int 0 11 io-pn C(\ cp:? rifl~lS \:,~~c f~-}~~-:.~,·e-[h -i-r ins (1 I ra LiOll :~_:ld c!Lre e t-i ,;~1 CU ,') n 1; p -~ "...... _ -;:'7'-" ......,. - -' - -'_" ~ ••1 '._).1..!.. ,~lt
by cornn"_!.~:1i5tintclli;:;:1ce s:::rvi22S rcprC'3(::rlL 2. m~~;CJl' ~hi'2:;_t to the -.
intern8.l s2curity-. The Soviet iiltdlj:;etlCL~ Se:L":iCl:S (575) ~Ll-C the ITt:)':;'
f
.~..,.;'''' )-Ir' .; ..l--.'·i~,J·f···'lr''_·' I'"\r:-··-.~::·"\·~·t) l'r~ i;"l~") T:'"'~ ...; :::'i-o'")~'f""" (l~- ':'\j f" t/"_ ,-, -.~Ot LllCl.J J.~: Jf1L:cL.;-:o'" .~~ ~J. ~.J_, •• I....._ ~. ~.l •. '.' '--"__~L,.::-O. ,h L:.C' 0"':"; ':::':.:'-,';,::[
of
":'""l" J ~ 'l,-. .... ;n·r"\0(i ;"'0 'f""')' T:·111..r) ...~ (.;.- '( ·1:' ??(': ')"'r~) ;rr10·~~ ......Ol~ -" ..................L 1... l1.l ...l...t .~.J ,,-_':)01
0
~l ......... l ..._1 ..... \._j1.J..,-_.l.., ~.J!", ........L"_') .....J_V L,_J,..C .. , •• h~l :-)l .. !~:)...:.:C\,·;Cl
intelli.'«:rlC2 o[fice~"s. This nll;r~l}2l' \.~..illl~2 al.~-:~rn~~\n~t~)(I~.:w~~(:~:11-1-,'\ ~0\,~:.):_'
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Par?:.llel\P'l the ope r at icns of the SIS and often coor-dinated
by them are lI:~ 1:i=2i~~:.:.::.:,; :::< ·~<::s of the bloc countr ies . Bv la st
count} more than oue-rhir c of t he of~icial r epr cs e ntaion of th;se .
COl~ntries in the Unit eci S~~~(e.3w e r e identified int~lLC::'2,'.c2 per sorme l. '-' _. ....... .. ..~~._. ....
Tl12 ~:::'C:c~: ;>...:::_::sd by such num er ic a l concentration is readily appar-ent.
Specifically, [he: cL-:.:ll2.gethese ope r at ions can inflic t in any given
circun:stance can be extr eme .
In addition to their efforts at collecting extensrve intelligence
data th rouah both overt and COV2:-t means, their chief and on-votnz airn,:::, . ;:, .::::> ... •
is to srain hi;:::h-leve 1 penetration wi thin the U. S. Governmen tin/"' Iudi '10"
.... ' ... .J ' - u..l t -,
U. S. intelligence services. -
The recruitment of U. S: military personnel is high on the
list of adversary intelligence services. In a recent instance, a Soviet
diplomat did his utmost to recruit a U. S. Air .Force field grade officer
with access to sensitive information. Of particular interest, the
Soviets appear to consider the U. S. Air Force as a prime source of
information relating to Communist China.
In addition to the legal representation of SIS, it is belie"\'ecl
that 2S many as 20 SIS illegal networ ks mJ.Y be operating in the eastern
portion of North .Amei'ica. Our current lack of definitive knowl edg a
regarding both the incLividuals involved and their targets rn ake s a
threat assessment difficult; however, one such network) exposed in a
friendly foreign country, determined that SIS, through the effor-ts ot
the illegals, had access to ccnstruction plans of an atomic submar-ine.
Two of the four agellts surfaced in this operation wer e Ame ricans ,
Information de\!eloped by aU. S. Air Force-controlled
, '1 -- t ('~,.,Li'1r;· '}rr"l'nc:L '" bloc 1·n·;:·11i"·~·'11Cese r v ic e h C' .'.---eono e agen op.::. aLl b '"'::"-- _",oL LL - \... : L~_ ,.;::>~. .:H:.J." ~ .a_~ Q,l\ en
indications that the bbc service has shown -'::iillins-n2ss to pr ogr e s s
to the event'J3.1 estabEs!Enent of an illeg~,-l U. S. -bas2d 0p2ratloil.
- 10 -
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The Chi ne 53:': U) I:1 :,\!'.::~~~': (C \1 ic om) intc l l i~cn.~ -= 5 e rv LCe
, I .. ':
l?.ckir.~_·r2. h:::::~.~U,l:32 i: :1:.~' \'>i:-::'~ .5:~_tes, is c on s ide tablv ha ndi cauned..... .}, .. "-
in any exten s iv e imdL~encc unde r tak ing ; howev e r , the Chicoms do
hav e a C·~n"r.:~r1-b.,s.:o.·11·""r"11i.7C\·1~n apparatus di rect inc ope r at ions. ~ ~ l,;....... _"".L \...0,. 1 U _'" .......1..., l :.. ... '- 4. __ :::- '- l .......~ ....-l ,L. ... J.. ...... _._" ..... L 4 • '::> ' ......... c....l.. _ .....I. 1:::J
acainst the United S~~:tes. Arnon« the la r a e ethnic Ch inc se rio oul at iono ~ - • ~
in the Un it cd State s a r e 3.' =) 00 sc ie II t is t 5 e rnp loy ed in S2 n s it ive
pos itioris , many of whorn have rcl at ive s in Communist China, Current
intelligence pinpoints the United l\:>"tLO:1S Secretariat, where th e r e are
a number of pro-Chicom employe e s , as being the hub of their domestic
activities.
-
...,
-.
.-
.....
- - -.- -
The potential for increased ch'ico'm: activity in the United
states is a cons ide r abl e factor, but is dependent mainly on the es tab-
lishment of legal Chicom e stabl ishme nts in the United states .
1
:1
1. Scope and Effectlve:less. The scope of overall int el l iaeric e
efforts is oncompa s se:::lb the (;1r-2e:old goats of pe net r at ion , into llig:liCC::
and prosecution. Domestic imple:nentation of these gOJ.ls is cblilliited
by agreement among United St:::.tes intelligence agencies. It'.telli;o'lcc
. compollents of the United States mEitary ser':ices 8.r2 immcciiaLeiy
concerned with protecting the integrity of their p2rs~nnel 3..!lc! inst2.1-
lations. Although this is priffiarily ~ defensive stanc:e, the)! [13.\"e
fu rnished a potent offensi':e '.':eapo:! in the controlled uti 1ization of
their pers'Jnnel in dCHlble agent oper::.tions directed 2.;;ainst hos~;le
intelligence services. Central Int.=;lligence Agency, with basic Iorcig'l
respoilsH~tEty, nevertheless .. usC's simil:.lr tools, n-;enti.oned \)e 10 '.'.', to
ach:",rn th" C-'"1n'iC>01V';' t'ne. cr>'icf"'-io"" of l'n~ell;I'r-'1CC prin"ll'l'J" ,.",l·lt',j_ ! .L t.... " etc_; .-'"_.L :._.. ._.. •. _~• A G 'J !......-.J L... ~ l .:... l ~..:- \ ........ :. '" _) _ \.....J. (' t:..:_
to hostil-4 intelligence sel"':ices.
(
~l
·1..-
?-..le tho':: s \..::-;.::.(;I [l ~;~2 S e :;:T_~';=~~'.'0 !'S, C E~:')10:,,;c~l in \':l L'~'-j t1s
dc[~:rp0C: b"tT -rr S it1~-"")11 :~j;"'\nn_\ ."")(....°1'010 .... (1..-:.""I{l .... ~~.- ... '"'t- U"''''1 1.('\01- ...· '::~l.·)r. Of;..."~ ~ Y 0 •• _, -_ "c-,-"_' --,:;.'_ .~-,,:::> ,.<J_ .. l,vlll. ,J".h L.,... 1 ~t,~ .... l_l'_
tr:l Sl"S rJ .....n· Y'\_J:lP tr· ...!..: ~':"'" -. ~~\ r"r'lf> r -"\r'c" rlr 1l~)~0 ~!_C~..?t,~~ ,A\r';~ _,,:-! !_i 0:.', ....-·, ',)','.',-:::' :,:'.Jl.c.;. • ~ ~ 0 ..~ .... • ~J _ l • .::: _ ,-, _1 .." ~.::>; .... _.c ':.. '- • '., - ,:), ....) -" _ _ • " - - V t.J _ -- . .}... ~ _, _ .
technic?.L, 2.Gd r:lOtO:;T'~~;hic s(!.r-.·c;~~~an;:::.;-"s;r:~:\:2.mir.,,-::on ar'.cl ::'!"l.1.tVSl:'3
(' .
. , ..
5!_: l ~·.·.~L~:, t)0:~1~."::'1't2
1,
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inform,Lti::n rcc>::i-:::<: ::-~:"-" __ ::' :::-:'so. periet rat lons , COll:'~'?':: t.~'i::lcol lat eral
investl·:ratioi1s} has dcve Ioned V:.lL ~:.: il:~'::~II i;:e7:ce 2.i)ClU t motiu s or::,':·I'J.;cc!i,;::J , L. • L.
intelli'~2nce pe r sor.ne l . Z'\,~d2.'~'::"lt r e two rks . S::,veral of the cases~ -
r~::s1..;lt(__'din sv c ce s s.vl l:.--:;'::-~-(__~L~'.'::- \Vith the current lack of an
effecti \"9 Sov ie: defec tor -in -pl ac e , the ideal psn et r at ion , Doth the
rau ;e and eifectiveness of the co ve r age have be en lessened.
.,
.1
:J
Cur re.it cove rage uti! iz lng physical su rve il lanc es , l irn ited
technical su rve illanc es .. and the development and operation of double
agents depends, in part, for its eff ectivene ss on the resources in
terms of manpower and rnate r ie l wh ich may be committed to any g iven
operation. The double agent, while pr-oviding current operational
information, chiefly about hostile equipment, tactics, 1:;03.1s, and
officer identification: rarely gains an insight into the adve r sa r y
se rv ic e at a level corr.pa rable to that of pene tr ation . Th is coverage
on Soviet and bloc services, in its present form, is considered only
moderately effective. This evaluation refers to intelligence cpe r at ion s
directed under legal cover. 1;1 the area of illegal ope rat icn s , effective-
ness, which In the past was substantial, is cur r entl y rnin im al ,
J
2. Gaps in Current Cover::tge. The m ajo r gap, by Ia r, is
the lack of high-ec-h-;:; iCin_-iJ2n-etr:uioI1- of [Ee SIS. The presence of suc h
a source increases the eff2cti':.·'2ncss of all other p:'ogr2.lTIs 2.rld, con-
verse ly) the absence of this inside information re legates U. S.
intelligence agencies to time-coi1~uming 2_ncl r::anpJ'.';er-clr:li.ning teci1:1ic:'.l"?-
-l
'I
,1
,--'
As of JGne 1, 1970, 1,050 Soviet 2.nd bloc officiz~l p2rS'Xtnel
(excluding dc.;penclents) '.n1'2 statio'lecl in the Uni t2d State s. One -thi r:c1
of these are k.'lO'Hnor sus~2cted intelligence officers. Of the SO'.'l2[
entourage, 220 intelligence officers h3.\'e beer. identified. This docs
not include an. unkno',;m nl.!:T:'::le:rof illegJ.ls~ J_<::>-;;1tS, ::-~nds8\_1.rCE:S. \',~,-i~c
in a ?)vcn inciciCllt tile L~ll :::2S0',1:'C83 of the F31 co:..~ld be rJ!'c'_::z~:t iii.~0~ _'
plZlY, there are less th~t:--" 300 Sp2cial AgCi:t:.:: :-LSSlg-:12d ftill Li:l'.~;~l;2Lnst
tll;S fornirh~'l'"' a~'''r;j ·~l'n.l:C: r8t·_:o 2.r·:c~!'()_;.-i·"-L·.·,f:,·.o:. L';,,,,~l'J:-'-1 c,"\'!n>'.~.~~r.-)r-~ ..I.. _ J. _\..~c. ... ,}_.._, I... J. J... '_... • "-" __ _ _ J_ ."..... ..... 1 ~11..... _J U ,- ...... t..::::J"-' \,_ I..
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answe r Io r completely e ire ctive cove rag e , any expans io.i in thi s a rca
would ce rtainly al lo w a broade r selecti ':2 proce ss and re suit in a
proportionate irnp rove ruent in effective cove rag e ,
Penetration of cornmun icat ion s is one of the most effe ct ive
mechanisms in the courite r inte l l ize nce arsenal. There are cur re ntl v~. .
only eight telephone su r ve illanc e s on 14 Soviet establishments in the
United States and only eight on the 35 other Soviet-bloc e stabl ishrncnt s .
There are no surveillances of this type_onJhe residence te Iephoue s of
any Soviet-bloc pe r sonn el in this country. By contrast, five Soviet
technical periet rat ion s of U .8. embassies we re dts cove re d from April,
1967, through July, 1969.' On2 device was discovered in Bucha re st
in the heel of a shoe worn by the U. 8. Deputy Chie f of Mi s s ion , who
conducted business in the Embassy in a roorn -with in-a-room. Testing
showed that the device was strong enough to transmit through this
defense.
Communications intelligence could be increased if member
agencies provided greater targeting directions which would permit a
more meaningful cornpute r scanning or -very large volumes of traffic.
Additionally, certain diplomatic and attache trafflc wh ich might p rov ide
valuable Intelligence is not de cipher able by no r m al m eau s and requires
clandestine assistance in procuring c rypto mate r ial s in order to be ,-
readable .
Ma npowe r cons ider-at lons pr ec lude comprehensive cov e r age
of official Sovie t-bloc vi sitor sto the United States and visits of Arne r ic an s
. to Sovit;J=.bloc countr ias . Both of these areas have Pl"O,,'Cn fertile f ie lds
for SIS inte Il ige nc e act ivit ie s .
---- ... ~(~
There is cur rentlv a s:;~'i01JS vo id in kno'.;;lcclz;c of SIS il~C'Q::1l
ope ratious it. tile Un ited St'ltes. Soph ist icntud CO\,21'2.g:;::; havo , in L~;C:
P2St, proven most ef Iec tive in. d2'.'e~opir.g- t~is type of llltelUger,ce .
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IV. OTHER REVOLUTIO~~A"R.Y GP.0UPS
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1. Corr.~-.c;:_:S: P~~rt\·. The CQr-:-:munist Party continues
as a distinct threat to th(? inte rna l security b~causc of its ext re me ly
close ties and total comrmt rr.ent to the Sov iet Union. There are ruan y
thousands of people in the Urute d State s who adhere toa l\Iar:.,:ist
philosophy and agree wi th the basic objectives of the Communist
Party although they do not identify the mselve s specifically with the
organization. The Party rece ives most of its Iinance 5 from the Sov ict
Union, adheres to Soviet policies explicitly, and provides a rr ajo r out-
let for Soviet propaganda. The Party wi ll without Cluest ion cont inue to
implement whatever orders it receives ,from the Soviets in the future.
There is little likelihood thatthe Corr:munist Party, USA)
will instigate civil disorders or use terrorist tactics in the tor eseeable
future. Its strong suit is propaganda. Through its publications and
propagar:da it will continue its efforts to intensify civil disorders, and
ioment unrest in the Ar mcd Forces, labor un ion s , and rn inc r ity g roups .
The Party is on the p,eripi1ery of the radical youth movement and is
striving to strengthen its role in this movement and to att r act new
members tnrough a recently formed youth org?niz?:.tion, but it does
not appear this gro'.lp wil l achieve any substantial results for the
Party in the future.
2. Socialist \Vorkel's Party and Other Trotsky·ist Groups ,
These organizatIons nave ancstimatecrr:r1e-n~'oership of 2, 5-0C. '1 he
.major T1-0"~\"·1·~t o~-(T')niz~~inr. the SO"l'01i",+- \'-'0"I'81'S Pa r+v has_ c.l. LW-'l..J;:' _ ol-~" ..................v.l ., L 1.-, ...... ..:,l,. _..J\" '1 ..I.. r-, . - LJ, 1 ::>
attained an influe:1cial rcl e in the antiwar rr.ove ment thro':J~;: its
youth aff il iate , the YOU:1g Soc ial ist Allia:1se 1 which dominates L"t2
Student i\Icuiii;;:atio::. CC:-;:~':l~tt:~ t8 End the \\'2.:.' i:1 '/i2tn::u:r. an::: 1,';i1~c:h
. h2.s mor'c :'h8.l': clo'.lb12ct :ts si_z~ 01'. colle,r(:! cz~rG·L·J:_!32S i:~ the J)2.st ':2,:::.1" •
.. _, .. W
T I,0 t c 1~'Fi :-t (r (.0 '1 ')- r~,'Cl ". '1 ,- '- i ('i'),'1 ;'C(I in.' '1'1 ') ~0 r c r.]- f r ","L, t ir n" ".~;, :...t...\:,)_ .. _"_"') :::;" ... r--'~ .1,..1.'1"-,, ~I ... _L ...._.. : ......._ ... ' l~-\. ..J . 'J U \J .. ~L....... J.~:::J ".il ..'
authorities t:JCil on 2.::C: e;:f c2.m~)~s-'s and i,::.l:C C011s1S('2ntly S'':9~J:lt"tc':1
C1'1,'L'1 r!::::;o".'l:"-C::. ~:, rOn; - +-i-~'·" ~·n..)\' (If' 1,r.r >" .... :;:::.-, " !Y)r,~ ...) .. U"ll'')''~ ~o....... _ _ '- , ~ I.. •• :...::::) .. _ l , l. _ .:' •v . l ) \,.. t) J o,..J....... l..... - • '--4 J' J.. '- L
ins!.i:;:ltc ir:.s",:·t2cti,_;': O~' ~~) C(·:-:l:-:--:H t2rr'Jrl:::t ~lcLs. Til,' pr<~::-L::-;'"::::2
of these grc1.\~:;. ',':,11.1',: er::p!'.2s:zi:1~ ~;'uc.icnt U,1:'C3t} is als(', ::.~:n~:! ::..
-,
l. !..'; . ~ -
! ,OJ _ •.
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3. Pro-Chi:le5~ Cor:~n~ucjs: (Chicom) Gro~,:),~. Tue r c
are aD::>r()~drr,atC1v ten or2:a(lizar~G!l.3 in the united Stdtes v.h ich Iol l ow. .. .. ._.
the ideolozv of Red Ch ina and their total me mbe r sb ip is e st ir-atcd
at I, 000. l·,Iost of these groups 2r2 s~'e~i::g ties with the Ch icorn
Government, but there is no ev ide nc e to date that any are r ec e iving
substantial Chicom suppor t , The se g roups a re extremely militant
and, tho refore , att ractive to youthful act ivi sts , In fact, the
Progress L'I;eLabo r Pa rt y , tile p r inc ipa l pro -Chicom o rg an izat ion ,
controls a faction of the Students for a DemocratLc Society.
These groups generally advocate r-evolution. So me have
marked potential for te r ror ism and sabotage, although it is l ike ly
that such acts would be isolated instances of adve n tu r is t ic v iol snce .
All of these organizations stress the use of propaganda to Jorne nt
unrest in the Armed Forces and among labor, minority, and student
groups.
4. Puerto Rican Nat ional ist Extr e m ist Gr oups . The
radical Puerto R'lc3.n IT:::lepender1ce movement has spa wne d app rox irn ate ly
ten violently antf -Am e r ic an groups committed to Puerto Rican se If -
determ inat ion, Revolutionary violence is a major aim of the e stirna ted
1,000 rne mbe r s of the se groups and if sufficiently strong, they would
not hesitate to moun: a;-1:12d insurrection. Since July, 1957, some
130 bomb iug s in Puerto Rico and in the New York City ar ca have be e n
attributed to these 8xtrel1". ists. American -owned busi,ness;:; shave
been the n'J.i.n targets) blJt the re has b~en 2: recent upsurge of violellc;:;
against U.S. defense f~lcilities in Puerto Rico.
The le8,c!L:,r; Q;l'OUpS h::t':e reportedly ?:eccivecl 3L1cn'Hb
training 2nd money f!"O,,-;' the CUU8.!1 Gover'n:nei1t 2.ncl in one ins:2.nce
,funds \;;ere rcc2i'.'2d [rom Comn1Lln~st China [er use in ;)~_1JOLlg2
activities. 0::8 QiO',',O. o~'::2:1iZ:2d :::'"cl lc:l b,; Cl!b'::'l1 eS';;:0[,:::'::;::: :lczer.tS.... -' ~. ._, _... - ....' ,
is reported to )1a'!c C()!:'.E~Jt,;-'~l n'..lT,-,crou,s borr.~:;jn~s il1 Pl.lerto ?ico
and New Y(;r~ City in the p~:_s:18 :n'.o!:chs.
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t iou rt:~.l..:·cEn; U:o PJ.l'ty's -re c c ipt and exp2i1diture of Iurids .
.,. Coverage of the Trotskyist ar.d pro-Chicom groups is
less effecti\'e. ACCeSS to their top ~e3.jer5hip 12':e1s is l irr.itcd
because the s e ;r,]ups a r e neav ilv ,s?lintered and often hav e very
small memberships. Current l ive informant coverage can furnish
information on the general activities of these g roups and it should
serve to warn of policy cr.:lf'.g2s in f avo r of insurrection or sabotage
It is doubtful that advance ,,\'arning of isolated acts or-violence would
be received, howeve r .
_j
J
-,..
)
J
Inlor mant penetration of the Puerto Rican independence
groups provides information OIl the objectives of most of these
,organizations as well as the identities of their members. Howeve r,
these sources have limited ability to pr ov ide advance information
regarding violence committed by the se groups or by individual members.
2. Gaps in Current Cm·eraC;8. There is very limited
coverage of forC1gntrJ.\'e1 by me mber s of the CommuP..ist Party.
Better cove rag e is needed of the hi~h-level rne etlng s and sources
of runds of the Trots:(yis t and pro -Chicom groups. The limited
penetration is due in part to multiplicity of tne s e groups and t.heir
genes ..ally srrial l memberships.
Closer coyer2.gc at the policy-making levels of the Puerto
Rican independence grou~)s is needed to obtain more C0!11p1'2!:<.:;nsi'.'€
information on p2rsons mvolved in terrorist act ivi t ie s . The s1112.ll
rnem':Jership.:j 01 ITI2.ny of these org?;1izatiOrl3 is a major reason for
t112 liriii:E':'cl CO'/21'age.
J
3. Possit)~(c; :,t·:;asllrc.:; to Im;JtO\';:; IELelli;;-::ill'2 Co~lc;C'~~c::,
The S8 led ive use-ot c [',_;c ; :'.J ;1~C·slu,~·eT~:::(~c s-;;':'·JliT2:'-~n:~-:':;~:-l::[ly \.'l'c:1:'::'-C:;
tI1
"' 1·ni-nllir';·"t1C~"" r'O~"0-;-'''-''-':'' _)f t',,--.. ( ..,r"li"""-_~""~·-l:·'~l·l~: Ip~··;.l"'" J'f ;-f1:;~u !)l~l-;·".: : .....,. 1:..-.., ...... "'~_ .. ~~::::-o...;. Lv' ~~ "::O~ l L Ll. rJ:.J~-~.' "J _ •• -"::> I ~ ~ ~~ .-::., 1 "._~'_l,-!.
A P:ll'ti.":'JLl..::: b2n('fi~ cf 2L~c~:-o!1ic su',',:cill:,:',C2 in the IJucrt·) RicJ.:~, Il,"\L~
CO
l~lo' ~)(J r;'l::'_") C~P\"'"';'.-""il-;·,n(~L J~ 1,,:'-·::--1"':1;(':"1 ir~;)~-'~lf·-i·l f l)CI~'~(lt~~ ill-·-._l: .. -,~; l'l.... ... J._ '- .... _",_, l _ ....... __ , l.
J
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PART TWO
RESTRAI0rTS O~ I:-;TELUGE~CE COLLECTION
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The Committee noted that the President had made it c le ar
that he desired full consideration be given to any regulations, policies,
or procedures 'which tend to limit the effectiveness of domestic intelli-
gence collection. The Committee further noted that the President wanted
the pros and cons of such restraints clearly set forth so that the
President will be able to decide whether or not a change in current
policies, practices, or procedures should be made.
During meetings of the Committee, a variety of limitations
and restraints were discussed. All of the ag encies involved, Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), the thr ee m ilttar y counterintelligence
services, the Central InteEigence Agency (CIA), the National Security
Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), partici-
pated in these considerations.
In the light: of the directives furnished to the Committee by
the White House, the s-ubject matter's hereinafter set forth were r-eviewed
for the co ns icler-a tion and decision of the President.
,-'
1. SPECIFIC OPERATIO~AL RESTRAINTS
A. Interpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence
Prelimin::..r:,r Discusslon
NS.A develops s izn ific ant domestic inte l Iig enc e infor rr.at ion
I-n the cour-se of r'1011;ro";"""" TO'-";'~Il c o m munic ati ons trnff ic 1:;,"'-':-"'0--. >'~ ;:,- , __ ,.1'_::, _ ... <..; ... ,-:>_ L l :c r't.L _, 11_". l"V\,.r~,\....l_.
this inlor rnat ion is C:Jl. c:2~_-elo9Cd 0:1 a sy st er.i.rtic ba si s but 2.5 a "£2.11 out" .
.from other tll-g-cting l'C5lJOnsibiEl.ies, NSA cur-r-ently inter pr et s its
ju r-i s dic t ioual mandate 2.::3 pr2cl'..:ci::1~ the pr ortuct ion 2.7"!d di s sern.nntion
of in te l lrgenc e from cCl:'!~-_\':i'.:·-:::'ti:):~3 b2t',1:~en U. S. c itiz c ns aI1d::'3
ur ectucunz ~D'Jr'l'I"l'C' +-"'~"_'",.;";-1'; an"";-'<::~ CO'-"1~1"'1iC;->tl-0r.c: of U S natic.ials.J. J.. \...0 ....... u L,::) ;::, i ...............'-' ...........~ .....I.. - • '.::., :::;:t ~ J. ......... _ , ~ 1. ~ - ~.. - ~ l • ..... L ) .J 1 ....... \..- ". ~~'. - ......
r-'
.!.. •• 8 Cl_,._-..~·tl'_l.,_ ~
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Natur'e of Restriction
J
Acc8rd.i.ll; to NSA interpretation of NSCID-6, which is the
basis of NSA nutho r ity for de'.'elopment of communicJ.tio:1s mtel l igcnc e,
the proc ess ing of "foreign communications" sharply limits its authority
with respect to those cornrnun ic at ions in whic h aU. So citizen is a
sender or recipient. While a c2.se-by-case approach is used in producing
such data, the conti.nu2_tion of such a procedure would inhibit the
production of domestic int~lligence and any expansion could result in
en cr oac hruerit on the jurisdiction of the FBI, as set forth in KSCID- 6.
Broader interpretation by Executive clarification of "tor eign" to include
any communications of any individuals using International facilities
regardless of the nationality of the sender or recipient could rectify
this situation.
1
i
;
r-:
J
J
J
Advantages of tl3.intaining Restric tiO!1
1. Extr em e vigil3.nce would be required to prevent expanded
coverage from straying into an :::.ppear;(.nce of censorship.
,J
J
2. Expanded coverage i'11this area, if disclosed, could
result in unfavorable publicity arid a move u.nderground by those '\V!10
now take calculated advantage 01 the supposed inviolability 0: nor mal
communications,
-1
j
J
1
J
3. Signific2.i1t oxpan sion in this ar ea "1/1) uld constitute 2.
breach of the intent of or ig mal National Sccur ity Counc il Intelligence
. Directive Number 6 e stablf shmg jurisdicti.on.
4. Exnandad ooerntions wou ld n~cJUire s ne c ia.l occr ati.iz... r:- ......... .........
procedures, inclucung 2. continuaticn of current r egu l.rt ions and prcc ecur e .
.as a "front. 11
,:.
c:, , [ ,. r ~ 1-" -'::'1 "I. -=' ...) C ' iT~": :'," '."",,,,::u...~_,J • _ ..... - • I...:,.. l,. '- _ .....J... t. J •. -_..'
..=;ign:fic::n;: C~2.~~~~2rto l·<~:·)::='or ig ir a! i11trlli'~cn~~('(:ir:.c~i-.'c -:..a s wr itt e n.n ~t~:·i:J.ii\, inc r en s e d ;::n;:: i1G\'_' 1',~~;:·0sei1ts:.l
t : _ ._ ...__,_O .........
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2. A r e laxation of tnc r est r iction nO'H iii. effect would
sl "'1' 1°' inc r ea se the a: ount or . r--.l1;(";"",~n:::> inter l .... ~· - lo-,Cl : .• r-1.:•• p.) H .J. ~ __ .::J'~ _I. ,.u:1 ·_L.L c l!l..o; .• _:.::,~"'I,_,~ _,_.I. .• D_u.dOll ;.)<::-",-rJ."oon
foreign iuvo lv em ent in U. S. af lai r.s . and would pe rrmt more proc e ss.ing
an d thus a more timely £10\'.' of such infor rn ation as it is obtained.
DECISIO:r<: 11lterp::-e'jo/e Restraint on
ComITiurcic2.~ions Intelligenc8
Interpretation of Intelligence Directive--- Number 6 should not be relaxed .
.,
-.,
:
;..-
• t-!:c! ~
J
!
I
,
J
:f
1
J
I
J
,
J
Present inter-pr etation should be broadened
--- to permit and program for coverage by NSA
of the comrnunications of U. S. citizens using
international facilities .
Present interpretation should be broadened--- to permit and progr-am for coverage by NSA
at the request of the FBI of the cornmumcaticns
of U. S. citizens using international facilities.
Mol' e infO:rITI2 tio 11. is needed.
---
I
I
i,.
I.
i
- 2:) - [7521]
--------- - -..:------------.---.-~-.-'~-~-.--..- .--
B. Electronic S;_ln-eil12nces 2nd Penetrations
PI'elirnin.:::-r:; Di.scUS5ic!~
1
j
The lir:li~ed r.cmbe r of electronic sur ve ill a nc e s and
penetratiolls substant ial ly restricts the collection or vn luable
intelligence infor ma t iou or matc r iat impor:2.:-'.ce to the er.tir e
intelligence community. :,iSA has uee n pa:-ticularly hard-hit by this
limitation, for the abser.ce of electronic p'cnetr2_tion of Ior etgn dipLo-
m at ic establishments h2.S seve r e ly curtailed its c apabi lity for the
exploit2.tion of potentially available commur\ications ·intelli~~er.ce.
Additionally, other 22;er.cies a r e de pr ived of access to high-le';el
political, diplomatrc , and military inforrr.ation, as we l l as va luable
data regarding hostile ir.telligence operations,
"1
j
.i
] Nature of Restrictions
]
ElectroniC surveillances have been used on a selective
basis. Restrictions, init iate d at the highest le ve l s of the Execut iv c
Branch, arose as a r-e s ult of the conc;emna:ion of th2SE-!techniques
by civil rights groui.Js; Congressional concern for invasion of pr ivacv ,
and the pos s io il ity of their adverse effect 011 c r irni na l prosecutions.
1i-
]
Advantages of j..·Iaintair.ing Restrictions
i.:
1. Disclosure and embarrass~lent to the USing agency
anc'/'or the United Sr-C:;-l'oS;C: a lwav s po ss ible since such l-"'c)1',';rl'-"'Sl ... 1,-, • _ J.. \........ -' ... ~ , c.. J .:J:::J .. ~~ 1e u l • '"'..... ~! l. ..... - _ t ... c:
often r equi rc that the services or advice of outs ide personr.el be
used in the pro~ess of mstal lat ion,
1 2. The disclosure of electro:lic cov e r ag e of dil)loTJcic
establishments coulc' r e sult in st r a lned re latioas bet',t:een th e Un ite d
i
!
; <.
I
j
I
J
St:1t8S and the tarr ct rnl'''~L'TTL.-... .:..) \_. '-' \J ,,"1 ~ _... ).
i abroztcl
-, .'
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AclnHl~2.ges of Re laxing S.e.strictio(1s
L The U. S. Cov er nment ha s an ove r r iding obl ig at icn to
use every ava ilable s ciant ific means to detect and neutralize forces
wh ic h pose a direct thr e at to the Nation.
2. Every rnajo r intelllge:<.:e service in thc world) inc ludi ng
.those of the communis! bloc, use such techniques as 2-D e s sent ia l part
of their ope rations, and it is believed t:;e general public would support
their use by the United St2.tes for the same purpose.
3
0
The Pr es ident historically has had the authority to act
in matters of national security. In addition, Title In of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19.68 provides a statutory basi.s.
C.-
4. Intelligence data from electronic coverage is not readily
obtainable from other techniques or sources. Such data includes infor-
mation which might as si st in formulating foreign policy decisions, }l·~i
information leading to the identification of intelligence and/or espionage
. principals and could we ll include the first indicat ion of intention to comr:11t
hostile action against the United States. ;
5. Acquisltlon of such material from CO:MINT without
benefit of the assistance which electronic surveillance techniques can .
provide, if possible at all, would be extremely expensive. There fore> tllis:j'
approach could result in considerable dollar sewings cornpar ed to co l lection
methods.
TOP S:::CTI:LT
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'DECISION: E lee [rollie Sur-.;ei 118..."1(;:es
and Penetr2.tions
Present procedures on electronic coverage should--- continue.
Present pr oc edur es should be changed to permit--- intensification of cove rage of individuals and
g roups in the United States who pose a major
threat to the internal security.
Present procedures should be changed to permit--- intensification of- cove-rage-cf .Iore ign nationals and
diplomatic establishments in the United States of
interest to the intelligence community.
More information is needed,
NOTE: The FBI does not wi sh to change its present p rocedur e of
selective cove r aze on maio- int e r nal secur Itv thr eat s ,,~.....l ......L 'I .~.:. c ..~c.; .... 1 r c J .!. _~l~::" .. t c; \.._ Ly Lt l I v" L c; .....
it believes this coverage is adequate at this time. The
k'BI would not oppose otne r "1(rC\"'.~i~s "Oe:-;'lcr author itv ..,:.J,. .'Y ..1.l ..... .1.;,1 I.. i: ..I::;, .......... 1 ....., ,1..v\..,.1. .....~-- ,,::)...... ~l\,~::;, c.... ,¥.l J.;.. ... j \..).1..
the AU"Tn?V Ge ne ra l Io i CO""'1'''1''1'O r eoui red bv the rn and tl''.:::l:e-~'-' ¥v_ "'-.1 '-' ... ._,o c.;;. J. I....,. ...... ~J...... ._. ... l~ ....._""- J t.:
after instituting such cove rage the m se lve s.
- 23 -
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C. rvlail Cove:rage . '
Pr e Ii m ina ry Discussion
The use of mail covers can result in the collection of
valuable information relating to contacts bet wee n U. S. nationals arid
foreign governments and intelligence services, ClA. and the military
investigative agencies have found this information particularly helpful
in the past. Essentially, there are two types of mail cove rage: routine
coverage is Iega l. while the second--covert coverage--is not. Routine
coverage involves recording inf or mat ion from the face of envelopes. It
is available 1 legally] to any duly authorized Fec1e ral or state investi-
gative agency submitting a written request to the Post Office Denartrne nt
and has been used frequently by the military intelligence services.
Covert mail coverage, also known as "sophisticated mail cO'lerage, rr
or "flaps and seals, " entails surreptitious screening and may include
opening and examination of domestic or foreign mail. This -t c chriicue is
based on high-level cooperation of top echelon' postal officials. Insofar
as civilian use is concerned; only mail designated to diplomatic
establishments in the United States and airmail addr e s sed to specific
foreign locations has bee n c ove re d,
Nature of Restrictions
Covert coverage has been discontinued while routine
coverage has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth of public ity
ar ising from disc lo sur e of routine mai l coverage during legal
proceedings and publicity affo rded this matter in Cong re ss icnal
hearings involving accusations of gove r nmental invas icn of privacy.
Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions
Routine Cove rage:
1. Although this cove r ag e is legal, cha rge s of invasion
of privacy j no matter nov: iH~'fol:l:cl2c1, are po s s ibl e,
20 This CO\'e rage dcpe nds on the coope r-at ion of r2.r_k-ar.cl-file
'rostal employees and is, t 1':2:-e Ior e , more suzccpt ib le to co mpr orni se .
- 28 -
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Covert Cove rag e:
1. Coverage d ir e ct ed against diplomatic establishments,
if disclosed, could have adverse d iplo mat ic repe rcus stons.
2. This cove rage , not having sanction of law, runs the
risk of any illicit act magnified by the involvement of a Government
agency.
''''
3. Information secured from such coverage could not be used
for prosecutive purposes.
,. Advantages of Rela....dng Restrictions
Routine Coverage:
f<11 1,..0,,-..
1. Legal mail coverage is used daily by both local and
many Federal authorities in cr-i rru nal investigations. The use of this
technique should be available to permit coverage of individuals and
groups in the United States who pose a threat to the internal security.
.. Covert Coverage:
1. High-Ieve 1 postal author ..ities have , in the past) provided
complete cooperation and have maintained full security of this program.
2. This technique involves negligible r isk of compromise.
Only high echelon postal authorities know of its exi ste nce , and personnel
involved are highly tr a ined, t ru st v.orthy , and under complete control
of the intelligence agency.
L,
3. This c ovc r ag c hJ.3 bee n cxt r em c ly suc ce ssful in
producing hard-core and authent ic inte Il ig e nc e v.hic h is not obtc.inable
Ir crn anv ot hC1' sour.ce .}'"""",...,.,'~,~,,,)12" is ...,C"'-'.::'I, 1"nvolv i110" ,lho inte r cc: '-l'oni .. J _, :J ~'C: • _-, d '-- . _: ~.: ~ __ <_::, ,_, .. - " ~ ,:0 -' h.. _." L~ L C ; J - _ ,:
of a letter to 2. Sov ie t est abl ish me nt in 196-;'. Tl,C wr-iter orrel",,;~l io
sell info r ruat io n to U::-~Sovie t s :~:~denc lo se d ,~ sample of inio r mat io-.
av ai labl C> to 'col' '"'"' 'r"1 1;"Sl' - (l[\!-e··......, ;"C, -1 that t' ni"l \:'--l'tel' could >""",,c; _ <_' 1. '- ' "L. r. J. _•_. ~. c; L ~.""" , '; _ u . cl L " ~ ,,_ '-'- J,.~. •• - , '"
~:i'~"~~'J~>'l ~ -'~.~:":~~'.i.:~~·n:.;!:"~+-ion it~'hic:-, !ni':~hthave been. n10:"C (·2.rn::.g~1:'~~
t i<~~~~~~~_! 1~ - ._ _ ~ '. _' ~ _', _. )
O• I" i- 1 ' : ..." ""-""':' -~. (~.-,: 1 ~ i' :. ,. ... .' -\' " - r, ... ' : • _ ...., • • ~, •J... :. .... lL'-'~~ .....J U_ ......\,._ .. l_ ... _~) .:.•. __ , '- ..1 .... 1 ....... '- .. _. __ r ~ •• -} .... ~. • ... ...,'_-
Op", r -,'"':l ,~ , )", I "S 1':-1'"1, ' f i,., -;, C> ~ 0 ' ; - ; , '') I'r; C> .' - ; ," i ro" .. 'lO"" rJ f I' 1 1 ') "') 1 ~ r.-,.., :I" -LI!L .... t....· .....'-_~4:J·~:. 1.1_.1 ......1....,· .... ~ .. ~t: til ~~I .. , ,# ....l'-'l:L .. I.. ........ ,:.L ~L \ ... lA.. ...... Vlt.._ ,-.. ;:;~ld.::::'1
Op21'~tLn;,; in. the Uili[(~d S:2,~:::S ~l:~:!,;l·SC';:iC;;: CO!:tl'ol.
.. ,
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Pr e se nt r e st r ict ions 0:1 both types of mail--- cove race shculd 1)0 cont inue d" _.::!._:, ._-Iv,--_ ~ }.._. .. t.._ Io.o.~~.
Re sr r ict ions on legal coverage should be--- r ernoved.
Present restrictions on cove rt cove rage should
be r e laxeri en selected targets of priority Ior e izn
intelligence arid inte rrial security interest.
Mor e information is needed.
The F'BI is ·o:-;~J'J.s9cl to ir:1~")1?:~~::::.t~:1~ 2..: ...~7 co .-?rt r'l_i}. co-(-?:.'_~~ .:'_ .. "v ,
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NSA has a par t icu la r interest in the use of surreptitious
entry as a tool for obtaining cr::ptog:-2;J1ic materials nec e s sary for
deciphering important diplorn at ic and ior e ig n intelligence service
traffic. In many instances enciphered rnes sag es of this kind can be
read only if keying mate r ia l s can be surreptitiously obta lned. NSA
could exploit the communications of many additional foreign governments
if a surreptitious entry program wer e reinstituted.
Nature of Restrictions
;
!•
!
Use of sur r eptttious entry, also referred to as "anonymous
sources: and "black bag jobs, " fL'1.S oe en virtually eliminated. It invo lve s
clandestine entry into areas occupied by an individual, organization or :_v.)-; l;-
diplomatic astablrshme nt to collect intelligence mater ia l. In the foreign
intelligence field) it includes the collection of vital c ryptog raphic
material whic h enables the decipheri:1g of mt er cepted diplomatic traffic.
Advantages of IVIaintaining Restrictions
1. The activity involves illegal entry and trespass.
2. Intor mation which is obtained through this technique
could not be used 'for prOSecutive purposes.
3. The public di sc losur e of this technique would result in
~\'idesprC'2.d publicity and emb3.rrassmenL .The n ew s m erlia would por tr ay
the mc ident as a t lagr ant v ic lat iou of civil rights 3.nd/ or diplomatic
jmmunity.
,
\,
of car clc lty t!'~i:1Cc! ~ln.d s2l·.:::ct2ci r:'l·::::OlllE:l 1.:::der stric: supe rvi si.. c. Tl:,;
tec.:hrlici.~8 is i;'I::)~C::>::-:';_2.: v·:~.; ::-it::::- r:_:ll S(_~Ur~L:: i:3 a s s ur r :'. 1t 1'.:..:; : .~2~1
used in the past ·.',-itl1 h::;:~~:: ~l.lC'cc·-,::;:"-.:ll·CSl:l~S :-·,'(1 \:.':.U~.....u; ::,c~·:c;~·Sc'C:~: .:~: ..
1. OY1C\''''1ti'Ol'~ c: thi s L:,)t:J '"11-e -)'::>'·~·ol·;,,''-:'d ~~" 'i_ s'_'.'::11'1~ ... ;.J.. ....... 1.:) ~ ••• _~ \.. !.~_._.. i .....1 ._ !..1 ........ \......' - - l ..._
l"Ci~.J S~·'C;. '~)~
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2. Eenefits accruing f ro rn this technique _in the past have
been innum er aliie. In addition to icic?;:tlfying espionage agents, inc luding
1-11"'0-;)1S vita: c ryptog rauh;c 1-'1Fo;~"";'~'"'nj:::1C: ~)'")?'1 obtained ~;I·l-I.n·0"(-_ ..~~_....l; .J.L.A:.~.. J o-, ...../ .u........ .J.. - r c , .........._J , ........_, ~ ......_'" _... ,-,I...l. 'r L l _.L
c ryptogr aphic material wh ic h often CZ'_!1 be obtained only from these
operations, much s igniftcant diplorna t ic traffic cannot be dec iphe rc d
even with the most sophisticated ecu ipment. Such c ryptog raph.c
mat e r ia l has been valued at rni Il io n s of do l lar-s in terms of the saving s
in cryptanalytic resources and in te rrr s of the high-level intelligence
- information whic h it produced. j
!
t
3. In the past this technique; when used against subversives,!
has produced valuable intelligence material. i
DECISIOK: Surreptitious Entry
Present restr.tctions should be continued.---
Present restrictions should be modified to permit--- procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic
material.
(' Present restrictions should also be modified--- to permit selective use of this technique against other
urgent and high priority internal s ecu r ity targets.
Mor e information is needed.---
\
\,
,---..-.-~
I ~: 0) 7:--1 ~- ,-..
_'- ~._. .-. __..~ ... _ -. _. c. _-
in tile !:L'.=-:~lJ2:- or I~Cj::(.:C ;-~ZLl~_::::-.; t:--:'·.=~S2 ~rc!~='~~S~:i_~:'::3~~rlc:s to ::i:':
opc r a hCl!::11 h.tz ::E-(.3 .
r; .)
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E. D2\'21opment of C:J.mpus SOt!Ices
!-:: t<..~J>... ,- .' r'- ~.
Preliminary Discussion
Public disclosure of CIA Ii nk s with the Nat ioria l Student
Association arid the subsequent is suanc e of the Kat zenbach Report
have contributed to a climate adve r se to intelligence-type act iv ity
on college campuses a nd with studer:t-rebteci groups, It should be
noted that the Katzenbach Report itself does not spe c iftc al ly r est r ai n
CIA from developir.g positive or cour.terintelliger:ce sources to work
on targets abroad.
c·
Restrictions currently in Iorce. umitce rtain other elemer..ts
of the intelligence community access to some of the' most troublesome
areas: carnpuse s, college faculties, foreign and domestic youth groups,
leftist journalists, and black militants. It is recognized that these ,12:e
prime targets of communist intelligence se rvice s and that the opportunity
for foreign communist exploitation increases in propo rt ion to the we akne ss
of a U. S. counterintelligence effort.
Nature of Restrictions
The need for great circumspection in making contacts
with student s , faculty members, and employees of institutions of
learning is widely reco;;nized. Howeve r ~ the requirements of the
intelligence commupity for increased information in this area is
obvious Ir ornt he concern of the \Vhite House at the absence of hard
information about the plans and pr ogr arn s of campus and student.-
related m il ita nt orgamzations. At the present time no sources are
developed among secondary school stude nt s and, with respect to
colleges an~i.llni\'ersities, sO'11'c25 are developed only among
indiv idua Ie \':110113.\'e reach2d legal age) with few exceptions. This
policy is de s ig ne d to m im m iz e the !!ossibility of embJ.rrassn:cnt
and aC-l--e'r':::o publ ic ity l'''cl'''':l'~~ C'l,·.,"'C':::-::'-·o·-t- i~rriIl"""'l~lC)..,t' 0" ~('~C~U'I'"~.. \' aJ \_. d ,.l J, J,. _ _ ".....L '-\ ~ ~.::, ........... ~ C ...J 1 .....1 .L L ........ ~ \.: l '--!. ~ 1,,-. --::.. 1 ...... .:...".:. L
freedom.
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Ad v~:.ntages of l\lainta ini n~ He st ric tio!:s
I
1. Studc nt s , Iac ulty me mce r s, 3.l1d othe r sconnec ted with
educa"t~cr:J.l i~lSt~~'"~t;.:~':5i:': :_.:"~>:"i~~Ys~:~~si:i':::; t:· and host ilc to v.n rds
any Gove r nme nt activity wh ic h smacks of in[rin~eiT'.ent on academic
Ir ee dorn. They are pr-one to publ ic iz e inqui r ie s by governmental
ac e nc ic s and the re sult in« r. .bl ic itv c a n 0"["eJ1 be m is le adinrr 1'·1;:,t::: .. _ ...J ,- ... l l.. _coJ ........ ,~, .:.)·_...••. L _v C.. ~l 1 • J".C ..... l:',:) ..l
po rt r ay ing the Governrnenr:s interest,
20 Students ar e frequently immature and unpredictable.
They cannot be relied on to maintain co nfide nce s or to act with di sc r et icn
to the same extenf as adult sources.
Advanta.ges of Rela-xing Restrictions
1. To a substantial degree, militant New Left and anti war
groups in the United Stnt e s are comprised of students; faculty members,
and others connected with educational institutions. To a corresponding
deg r ee , effective coverage of these groups and activities depends upon.
development of knowledg e able sources in the categories named. In th is
connection, the military services have c apabi l it ie s which could be of
value to the FBI.
2. Much of the violence' arid disorders which have occurred
on college campuses have been of a hastily planned nature. Unless
s ou r ce s are available within the student bodies;, it is virtually impossible
to develop advance mfor matlon conc e rriing such violence" .
3. The d2'/elo9:nent of sour ce s among students affi liated
with New Left elements affords a unique opportunity to cult iv ate info rrnant
.prospects \':110may rise to positions of le ade r sb in in the revolutionary
movement or otlie r wi s e become of g re at long-vange value.
4. The extraordinary and unpr eccdented \'/2.ve of de st r uct ion
"which has s we pt U. S. ca:~l~J'.:s-:;sin the V'..3: 52,/21'2.1 months a nd wh ic a
in SOl""(; r e sncct s "':")l'-"C:::-""LS " vir tuu] r.1'.ort lCOO"'8,'H,"O';" ,,:1" C~":::'I")l-'.. ~4 V.1 "-...... ..... .._.1 "_.~- . - c'- ...._ \.. _~_.. ...... 1. _ 1 J._ '- ~ ~ 1. ., "-........... ~ _. ,-' \...... ••
pr ov ide s a clear j;jst..i~:c:t:iO;l to!" t!:.c dr·:':clopmE:'nt of campus il~for:,~:-c;l~S
in the interest of na ti or-a! se cur it y ,
" -.- v J -
le-~) :~~~',":'. J ~~' I.'
H:\ N DL::~ '.L \ C (y. ~;,'~T C~·I:-\ >:\ ;";.l":) 0 :\~L'.:r
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5. Contacts with ~~Ld2r,t3 will rn2.~:~:it possible to
obta in information about travel abr oa d by U, S. students and about
attendance at mte r nat ional conte re nce s.
DECISIO~: Developm~;1t of Campus S·:)urces
Present rest r ict ior s on development of campus--- and student-c e lated sources should be continued.
Present r e st r ict ions should be r e laxe d to permit
--- expanded cove r age of Violence-prone campus and
stude nt -re lated groups.
CIA coverage of American students (and others) I "'
--- traveling abroad or: living abroad should be increasec{. (_:
l
More information is needed.---
NOTE: The FBI is opposed to r ernoving any present controls arid
restrictions r e lating to the deve loprnent of ca mpus 30urc~s.·
To do so ..voulri seve re ly jeopardize its inve st igations and
could re sult in leaks to the press wh.ic h \'/01.110be c1:tma;in::;
and wh ic h could result in c::2.rges that inve st igative ag e nc ie s
are tru e r Ie r ing Y;ith aC2cl2~.ic fr e e dom,
TtJ? ~:=C:?~£T
H!\~;DLE \'1.1, CO?":I~<'::- C?.\~;::l:LS oxt.v . [7532]
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Prelimin2.n' Discussion
The use of undercover :!.gents by the military services to
develop domestic intelligence is cur r ent ly limited to penetration of
c rgan iz ations ',1,'1::) s e rn em be r sh ip ir:l.ide s m ilitary personnel and who se
ac tiv it ie s pose 3. direct thr e at to the military e stab li shrn ent. For example,
although the Navy has appr ox imate l. ;34Naval ROTC units and nurn e r ous
classified Cov er nrnent contr-act pr c.ects on various campuses across
the country, the Naval Investigative Service conducts no covert collection
on college campuses. The same is true of the other military services.
Nature of Restrictions
- ----_ --- - ----"
The use of undercover agents by the military investigative
services to develop domestic intelligence among civilian
targets is believed beyond the statutory intent of the Congress as
expressed in Title 10, U. S. Code, and in current resource author iz a-
. tions. The Delimitations Agreement (1949 ag r eern ent signed by the
FBI, Army: Navy and Air Force wh ic h delimits r e spons ibi lity for
each agency with regard to inve st ig atious of espionage, counter-
espionage, subver s ion and sabotage) reflects the current missions
of the FBI and the military services. Further, there is a lack of
assets to undertake this mission un lass essential service-related
counter intel liucnce mi.s s io ns 8.1'2 reduced. There is also concern for
mor a le and disc iplinarv r eac t io ns within the services should the
existence of such covert operations become known.
Advantages of ~.'Iaintair.~n:; Restrictions
1. 1£ the uti liz ation of nulitary counterinte l l ig ence in this
n1issio1}j_~ contrary to the intent of the Cong r e ss , discovery of employ-
m ent may- result in untavornb!e leg is lation and further reductions in
:1pprop riations . _ .._._(
2. L2C~~i!:~ dir ect St::l":ltOl"Y J.l,t~:(Jrity, the t:.:;;e of the mtuturv
services in this m is s ion cou lci 1'(.",-:::..::1: in lc~,;~~t.ic r ion c:i'~'-::cted (',g2.i!:::.;tthe '
EX'3C~l tiv e BY-;:>"!1ch.
~. r-
3. The t!SC~ o; militar. ;J2rsont~cl LO rcp0:~t o: ~:'i\~i,~~~,::
, .~\' 'n, - '~~"-'1 ," \:,#it1 ~"PCI':~.l': th:_\ ::,[:I:~I' -,~il~
" - - ..- ..~ -
• - 1 • ~_
~." ... -- ..--~.
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•4.": • :-::~~sion of tile military s e rvi ce s with
r ez ar d to co ll ee e C'lr'1""C;:":'::: i::: ;'.J' ..... , .• ; ' .. :_. ;;. ;.,.~.-;'::' ,.; 'In-- surnif ic ance~ ........l \...~ ...... _..... t ~_ _ _ _ J. _ "" ;. ._ "_' • _......... ....._..... ..... =c > ~) - to - •• ) ........... ~ 1 • ~ ..... - ,
it wi l l r equi r e co ro lla ry u.c r eas e s i:1 r e sour c e s ,
5. Prosecutions for ·;iu::..t~ons of law discover ad in the
course of military penetr-ation of c iv ilian or ganiz atrons must be tried
in civil COU1·tS. The providing of mi litar y witrie s ses will r ecui r e compli-
cated interd2pJ.rtment::1.l coo r dinat ion to a much greater extent than the
present and will serve, in the long run, to redu.ce s ecur ity ,
6. Disclosure that mi lita ry counterintelligence agencies have
been furnishing iriIo r rnat ion obtained through this technique to nonrni Iita ry
mvesugauve agencies with respect to c ivi lian acti vit ie s would cer tainly
result in cons ide rable adve r se public ity. The Army's r ec ent experience
with former military mte llig ence personnel confirms this estimate.
Since obligated service officers, first en li stee s and dr-ait e es are drawn
from a peer group in which reaction is most unf avor abl c, morale and
disciplinary problems can be antic Ipate d.
AdVc"U1 tages of Re l;:L'{ing Restri'ctions
1. Lilting these restrictions would expand the scope of
domestic intelligence collection effo rt s by diverting a dditiona I manpower
and 1'e30'.1rCes for the col lec t ion of info r mat ion on co lleg a campuses J.nd
in the vicinity: of m il itary mstal laticns ,
. 2. The use of under cover agents by the nu litary counter-
intelligence agencies could be limited to localized targets wher e the
threat is gr eat and the likelihood of exposure minim:ll. :'.'loreover,
controlled use of trusted personnel leaving thp. service to return to
college cculd expand the collectiol.1 capabilities at an acceptZtble risk.
3. The milibry services have a Certain numb::!.' of p~rsonnd
pnrseing special acad::n:.ic cou;:ses on camp'_lses ant, uni'.'crsities. Such
personnel, \vho ill :112.ny ir:sta..r1ccs ha~/e air2J.cty been iTl.vcstig~ted [..:)1'
securit~, clearance: \,ioi.lld ;:ep.::esent a \TaLu~ble pool of pote:tti:J.l SD'l2.'CCS
for reparti,:,; on subversi ,;e actl"vities of c:.r1:1pUS 2nd stUct0:.t-I'elatccl
groups.
- 38 -
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DEC~S~O?-T: US2 of ?<fliEt2.ry
Ur:c:~rco-ler Agents ..
'-.
Pres ent.r es tr ict.ions should be retained.
___ The counter inte ll lg enc e rrus slon of the military
services should be expanded to include the active
collection of intelligence concerning student-
related dissident activities, with provisions for
a c lose coor dinati on with the FBI.
No change should be made in the current--- mission of the military. counter inteltigence
services; however, present restrictions
should be relaxed to permit the use of trusted
military personnel as FBI assets in the
collection of intelligence ·regardi.'1g student-
related dissident activities.
Mor e information is needed.---
c ..
:NOTE: The "FBI is opposed to the use of any military unde r cove r agents
-to develop dorn e s ric inte'llig2I1Ce intorrnation because thi s wo uld
be in vio lation r,c th e De limitations ~(j-'-::le"""er.L "'-'1·1';::>rni lita ry...... J. _ '-l.L.!.~-':.1. Ul .. ...., ;:.J. ....l.;.LJ.~~..1. :.,:) .CA;:,.!. e !J.l. ~L. 1.. __ L.1 .L_~
ser-vic es jo ine d bv the --;:;,-.-.,00"'0"'" any modification Of "-hoJ. 'i.J.v_::;, ~~_ \.. J) 1 ..C.J... D.1., -. ~~ ~ ......c 1 .. '.J 1..:.._.1.. G....__ i - L .. .:._
Deli.21i~2.tio:13 Agreement "'t;r.tcr. wou lrl extend G19ir jur is dic tic n
b2YC)!d rn atte r s of interest to t'r~eD::p:lrt:'rl2:1t of D2f6~se.
\
TO:;:J ~~~::.=E?_:GT
:-L~\NDLE \:1_-\ CO~,'Il:~T CF~l\~~;ZLS Ol':"Lr-
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H. BUDG:::T
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.-L', :_; ~,t:\!\PO\,lEH RESTRICTIONS
The capability of member agencies, NSA, CIA, DlA, FBI,
and the mihtary counterintelligence s e r v ice s , to collect intelligence
data is limited by available resources, particul2.rly in te r rris of budget
and/or qua Iifie d manpower. For some age nc ie s fiscal lim itat ions or
recent cutbacks have been acute. Budgetary requir eme nt s for some
agencies, other than the FBI, are r evie wed and passed upon by officials
who, in some instances, may not be fully informed concerning intelligence
requirements.
CIA reoorted that recent and current marroowe r reductions
(the Balance of Payments and Operation-Re-Crlction~-ex-ercises) have
lowered CIA's capabilities abroad with a cor r aspondingdec r ea.se in its
level of operational effectiveness. Lowe red capabilities have occurred
at a time when the communist services are expanding in V/estern Europe,
Africa, the Near East, and Latin America. There has also been a
serious loss in flexibility of deployment and some loss of cover positions.
The military services noted that cuts Iri budget requirements
for counterintelligence activities have the effect of seve r e ly hampering
the ability of these services ·to accomplish missions relating to coverage
of threats to the national security. Budgetary deficiencies have occurred
at a t irne when investigative. work loads are increasing significantly.
Manpower limitations constitute a major restriction on
the FBIrs capabilities in the investigation of subve r s ive activities.
The problem is further cornpl ic ate d by the fact that, even if substantial
numbe r s of Agents could be recruited on a crash ba s is , the time required
to conduct ba ckg r ound inve st ig at ioris and to provide essential tr ai ni ng
would me2.ns2¥.21'al months! de lay in pa r sonne l being avai lable for use
against the rapidly e sc alat ing subversive situation.--..~.~-(.
'1\T01\ "1' 1 ~.. 1 ' r on thc act i .., f U ~ !.1.';':>':-\;, wruc 1 nas 2. pot e nt iar [0 r e oorr on e 3.CtlVlt12S 0 " .0.
subve r s ive e len.ent s, has ne ithe r the current f,-:DC:S nor the; bud;et2.ry
mechanism for expanding its :r;;2()~1l'C8S in this due ction. 'I'h is is due
to the natur e n' 7-:'~\ Ie sr"h-'''''--' -. ;~.,:"., v.hich is l i i['eri ~O "'0"01"''''-.1 ..... .l,I.' ..t~ .1..':.. Vl. _,~_~ v 1.,.'-~,.dLv ....._· :~l ....::::>::>!.C),~) v. Ll"vJ. "" _lm1. '-~ ... v. I ~:-:"\.1.~e '.
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In the event, as a r esult of this report] additional
collection r2oui:;:ements should be lev ie don the aze ac ie s involved. -~.,
it would be nec2s~sary to prov~de for ~ssent.i~d fund~ng. For exa_ffiple)~ '1 !:~:.
if the scoue of N~A cover-age "is br oadane d to ne r m it cover age or If. i''; ._
activities· of U. S. subve r s ive e leme nt s and/o; the military services l
are called upon to provide counte rintelligence functions or assistance i.
not being furnished at present, adjustments will be necessary in their~
budgets to cover the increased costs.
DECISION: Budget and 1vlar..pov,'erRestrictions
Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as
---'-- to projected manpower needs and other costs in the
event the various investigative restraints herein are
lifted.
Each agency must ope rate within its current--- budgetary or manpower 1imi.tations, irrespective
of action required 2.S result of this report.
More information is needed.
[7537]
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PART THREE
EVALUATION OI' I~~TERAGENCY COORDINATION
!.. I. CURRENT PROCEDURES TO EFFECT COORDINATION
,
l
j
There is currently no operational body or mechanism
specifically charged with the overall analysis, coordination, and
continuing avaluat ion of practices and policies governing the acqui si-
tion and dissemination of intelligence, the pooling of resources, and
the correlation of operational activities in the domestic field.
-J
;_J
Although a substantial exchange of intelligence and research
material between certain of the interested agencies already exists, much
remains to be done in the following areas: (1) the preparation of coordinated
intelligence estimates in a format useful for policy formulation; (2) the
coordination of intelligence collec tion resources of the member agencies
and the establishment of clear-cut priorities for the various agencies;
and (3) the coordination of the operational activities of member agencies
in developing the required intelligence.
-'li'-'j
-'
-
II. SUGGESTED MEASURES TO P,'1PROVE THE COORDINATION OF
DO:rvIESTIC INTELUGE0iCE COLLECTION
:'l-:' -.
It is believed that an interagency group on domestic
intelligence should be establ ished to effect coordination between the
various member agencies. This group wou Id define the specific require-
ments of the various agencies, provide r egu.la r evaluations of domestic
in~lEgence, develop r-ecorrm endations relative to policies governing
operations in the field of domestic intelligence, and prepare periociic
domestic intel ligence estimates which wou Id incorporate the results
of. the combined efforts 0: the ant ir e intelligence community.
Me rnber ship in this gr oup should consist of the pr inc ipal
officers responsible for dom est ic i:-:telligence collection activities
of the Federal BL1.rC:2-'..!of Inve stigat.cn, the C entra l Inte llisence Agency,
.- '::2 -
TOP SEC}-::'ST
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the National Security Agency, the Def errse Intelligence Agency, and the
counterintelligence agencies of the Departments of U1eArmy, Navy,
and Air For c e , In addlticn, an appropriate representative of the
White House would have membership. The committee would report
periodically to the White House, and a Vlhite House staff representative
would coordinate inte lligence or iginating with this committee in the
same manner as Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President,
coordinates foreign intelligence on behalf of the President. The
chairman "would be appointed by the President.
This interagency group would haveautho r.lty to determine
appropriate staff requirements and to implement these requirements,
subj ect to the approval of the President} in order to meet the
responsibilities and objectives described above .
DECISION: Permanent Interagency Group
An ad hoc group consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA,
DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies--- should be appointed and should serve as long as the
President deems necessary, to provide evaluations
of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic
intelligence estimates, and carry out the other
objectives indicated above.
A permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA
DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies---- should be appointed to provide evaluations of
domestic intelligence, prepare per-iodic domestic
intelligence estimates, and carry out the other
objectives indicated above.--- '-,,- ....
No Iur'the r action required.----
1'1101'2 information is needed.
NOTE: The ?I3I is oppo s ed to the cr-eation of :l pern!J.nent corn-nittce
for the purpose of provj ding evaluations of domestic intellic.:;ence,
- ~3-
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N I in fhe nO0; say process ~f pre~afing
a report there was more than one working draft, b tu , no,
Mr. Huston.
3 this is the signed report. ./' '
1.\
, "This is ~he final
II
This is the report
Mr. ~70olsey.,4 report?
that went to the5 Nr. Huston.
I
6 President, yes, sir. The signatur~ is on it.
I
7 Mr. woolsey. Thank you.
8 Mr. Huston. That report then was reviewed by the
'9 principals, by at leas t -- and again, now , Senator Thurmond,
10 I am getting into an area wher~ I can't testify as to direct
11 knowiedge, only what I was told -- but the decision was
12
13
14
made after the initial draft report had been prepared and
reviewed by the members of the working'group, that a
report would go back to their principals for approval and
15 the reports, ~·:£mt. I was told at; least that the draft reports
16
17
went to !1r. Helms, ACr.1iralGayler and General Bennett for
their approval. However, I did know at that time the draft
18 report had not gone to Mr. Hoover for his approval because
Itt. S~llivan and others that were working th~re, who were
Mo
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25
'from the FBI, felt that unless this report had the unanimous
approval of the other princ i pa Ls tha t rt.r.Hoover simply
I,vouldnot sit sti 11 for any t.hi riq that' smacked of interference
with his Dwn operations and so'it was my understanding it
other principals that they then submitted the report to
1f 0 r.~ c: .....<::-1"-"1 ''''''1' ,r. :-. _.' !'.J J\~ .• I -..... . , ' t, ' .i .._).,....,,;:1., ~ \ .... ' [7542]
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At that point,then the r.e.por:twas transmitted by
~r';(:1
• ~ot."" Ii ...
.!-1r.Hoover.
,Hr. Hoover then proceeded~ to obj ect to virtually,
I can't recall, it has been three years since I read the
If
4 report -- but I don't remember wh~ther he objected to any.
(
of the analyses but he objected t~ virtually every option
available to the President that would in any way change in
, I
any manner the It-laya.n which he was at that time operating
5
6
7
8 the FBI.
-,'9 I was told that he origirially wanted to place his
12
--20
10 abjections into the body of~he- repcfct, however, his staff
"II tried, successfully prevailed upon him to understand that
although he was Chairman of the COrnr:littee 1,t wa s not a
13 report of the FBI but a report of all of the agencies ana,
,.,
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14 therefore, his objections should be relegated or should be
15 in the farm of a footnote.
16 He then proceeded to footnote his objections and the
l7 report then ~as signed after some disagreement among the
18 ,other principals as to what; the effect of these footnotes
19 were and all.
21
l.!r.Hoover to the 'i'7hite House and ,.,assubmi tted then to
nr. Haldeman. At that tine I prepared a memoranc.um in
23
•whch I outlined "That I believed to be the consensus of the
24.11 T,JOrking group as to wh at opti one 'o:ere (1va i.Lab l.e to t:;:C
president that he should choose and also set forth what I
ld" i._'"[7543]
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21.4 H.R~ Haldeman testimony
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-'fro DASH. \Vere you aware that ~[r. Hoover, Director of the FBr.
opposed, at least entered his opposition to most of the recomrnenda-
tions in that plan '?
Mr. HALoE:'oL\x.I knew that-I think in the recommendation itself
which was signed by Director Hoover as chairman of the committee,
he had indicated in the various recommendations his d isaz reement
with some of. them in spite of the fact that they were the committee
mmendatlOn. .
e was transmitting them as the committee recommendation with
dissent. '
.u r. D,\SH. \'\~ell, now, did Mr. Huston seek to get your assistance in
overriding ~Ir. Hoover's objections'?
. )1r. H.\LOE)L\X.Yes; I think he did. .
)1r. n\SH. And did he send a series of memorandums to YOU with
reg-ard to that? ..
'Mr. HALDDL\X. I have seen the memorandums that have been put
into exhibit and reprinted in the papers and they would indicate that
he did. yes.
Mr. 'D.ASH. Well, did you just see the.m~as they were reprinted in the
papers or do you actually recall receivmg those memorandums and
reading them? '
Mr. H.\LDE:\UX. I have a general recollection. I cannot identify hav-
ina seen or acted upon any specific memorandum without lookinz at it
and reviewinz it, I do kI10W that there was a definite concern o~ ~1[".
Huston's part and on the other side, OIl the President's part, that there
was--we knew there was a problem gping into this. One of the reasons
for brinzine this group tozether was the fact that communication
between theOFBI and other Intelligence agencies was at best minimal.
Mr. DASH. Let me just show you one memorandum and I think this
has already gone into the record. S~e at least if you can recollect it. It is
a memorandum dated August 5,1910, from )1r. Huston to you, subject,
"Domestic Intelli,gence"*, which is primarily dealing with the problem
of J1r. Hoover's objections and indicating that the program ought to
move forward and asking your assistance. I ask you to take a look at
it, see if you do recall it and if you do, would you comment. on it?
Mr. 1VILSOX.Mav we keep this, ~Jr. Dash?
Mr. D,\SH. It is my only copy at the moment.. '\Ye can make a Xerox
copy for you. Unfortunately. our Xerox machine. is broken down. That
is why members or ourcommlttee do not-have COplE'S.
ThIS has been entered in the record at a prior time.
Mr. IL\LDE)o.x. I cannot positively, without any doubt, say I read
that memorandum at the time it was sent to me hut I have a verv clear
recollection of the general content of the problem that existed at. that
time and I probably did read this memorandum.
Mr. D,\SH. WOtild it be fair to characterize that memorandum as
Mr. Huston beinz consid.embly upset over :\[r. Hoover's obstinacy in
opposing the planand--
Mr. H,\LDE~,L\~. Yes.
:Hr. DA~II rcnntillllin::; 1.• \.ncl indicating rhat it '.YHS quite nrgl.'llt that
the plan [In forward and seeking your assistunce?
:,\fr. H,\LDF::.\L\X. Yes.
·1I
I
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I will' not abandon my rt:S':Jor.!>ioili';o. I w'ill co-';'" !, r - ""........u:
to do the job I was dectd to co.· .
In the .::.ecOr:lp:l.."1)-i:1g statemect, I have ~t iort~ tC~ ,
Iacts as I k..,O\., them as t1:=:: relare to my own role,
With r~~rd to the specific =.!l::~ticr.$ tbt h:l.'i~ c..:-~ ~
made, I can and cia state c.t.!;oric:ill y:. . -0.
J. I :h~~ no prior kno. ...ledge of the \Vat!~t::
operation. . -
2. I :00\ no part in, nor W:lS I aw:t.-e of any subseouec:
efforts that rn.:!y have been mad:; to co ..·~ ~-.;
\Vate.T-te. ..
3..At no ti.-m: did I 2lJ thor.zc: any ono- oc - ..:. ~ _._I..v~
. cl::mency for the "'Iate~!e cldc~u, nor c!i:i 1
knoW' of :u"y sucb off cr.
4-. I did not kr-.DW',u!l.il tbe tL-r.e of my own invesl;T'.. '(' -~.....
bon. o. any-effort to provid.! u= Viat.=..._:;ate cd~,
ants wltb fu.,2s. ~
5. At no t.lr-~- did I a!t~?; or d;d I authori:u! ~"'''''''''''''
to atta.1pt, to implic.;lU:t.'1:: CL~ i."J t.j~ "\Vat~!';~~'
m:ltto'.
6. It W3.$ noe l.t!101 t.h:: ti.-n~ of my own inycnj.,.;:;::O:
t.~t I 1~=rl of tb: bre:l!:·iil Zl th.= o5!~ ;f l'/L-
Ellsb~rg':~sych.iZlt.~ .::l_tld I speci5e~y 2.t.::."~o:-i:=;
the fUIUlShir.g of "L~ l1'J"o.-r:'"..::.tio::lt::> Jed-- ....- T' -
7•
..r " ."L. ' S vp_DClu1::rzuUlofn::d Tlor encoun'7ed sul..or~i- ...c '..' .., U ~ l" :s t,
eng~g~ 1..'1 illc:gi1-or Jmp:-o-ou c:;""7lp;;li""" t-.c·: -. . ..s~ - -Q..
In th~ ~ccom~'J..i"1·nfl_g- :;t.~t~"7!=n~ I h-'v- <".J'"(7'....t •• • J- ~ .., .. ~ --''-..,'' ,0 pro
Vld~ L'-:~ b::tck~ound rDZ\tm:!y pl:l~~ ~,",,.,,t u..-· " ,- .'--" ._':..t..:onsl'
Pt.""$cective. I luy~ sp::-ci.r}e--..lly s~~~>d th..,· ': ..; •• - •. ~ ._ .. ,-xc~t.: ....v
pri\i1ege.~yjll n~t ?e invo"l,;::-das to ~I'I tc:sti.'1":.ony cc;ccr-::
mg posslOle cnrr'.;mJ cond Llct or disct:.SSions of " i' ;.
, • .1 d . }, pc:s.s. o.cnrnl11~ con uct, 1.'1 U.:: r.1:ltt=:-s nnd:::- i:_·wcsri..,.... ·;o~· :
want th~ public to It::1r::'lt:J~ tru~~ about Vi::..~c"~- •. :,..,
th~.gu.i.lcy of any i1J:pJ .::.edaM bro:..lg~t to j~sci~~- •...1
-.-.Inzig. \vho is now an ~oclate judge of the U.S. Court
(
" Iairas.
. Mr. Sarnoscn has been A<:t~.,g Administr-tol'" of Gcn-
>.; eral S~r.-ic~ since June 2, 1972. He joi ned the General
-·'Sc:r\'ices Ad::~.:.nist.;::.t~on in 1909 as Commissioner of the
Federal Supply Ser ....lee. From 1970 to 1972 he W~ Com-
missioner of the Public Bu!.lC!i~gsSe"'lcc: in GSA arid t1::
fi~t Deputy Admin:s~tor of GS.\ for S~l Projects.
He carneto t.~e Gener-t Services Ad~in:.s~-:lcion ~ft:!"
6 y~~ in P~!",~'1.S>·I\"=.n~State gove~!;T',::~t, wh~-e he W?.s
secret!..'] of 2:ci--::in~tn:.ion a.'1d bud;:t secr:t.::..7 ':lnd::.:"
Gov. R~"'T.1ond P. Sh:~.k:, ::l.I""ddeputy s.:cr.:::.ry for pro-. . ~.
curem~'1t, de:Jar..=lent of ?:"cp::-'"ry ;'..'1d st.:~p1!o, u:._~
Gov. "\Villio:l.";W. Scra.,tO::l. prior to e.rne.r..r.;goye~:r.::.r:t
se:rvice, he ',vas employci by th: GC!.O'!d Ekcc.--:c Co, for
12y~
ltfr. S~~~n was oorn on Oc~be:- 8,1925, l... War.-...:l,
R.I. H~ ~~ved his ::0..5. c~ if} b~:::$S ::ld.7~-..i.5-
. tr:l!ion {rem tr-= U niye.~ty of Rl:ocle bk.:ld in IS51 ~d
_ h.::!.5 done gr..d~t.e work at t1:..= George W~~--q.::l
Univ~ty ..
.' Activei:: ~eve-..1profl!$Sional ors-'1:.,.-.~on:s, Mr. S:unp-
, S:OTl"vaspr-~t:.d tbe Sy"n~ IIi Award for out;t.,.n6-:5
tons toward the adV2.nce;ne.'1t of arc.'-:.it~::u.-::: by
, }". '0-9
Socie!:"'j of A..-nenc::...'1 Re~~tl!;-ed Arc!].lt~ts m 1_ 1-.
--Tn 19i3 he was.sd~t1:d as one of the Top Te.n Public
~Vorks·l'vren of tbe: Y ~4!.:") 2nd he was n::...-ned ~. hor-or .....-),
~embei-ofthe-Ameri:::::ln I:.stit'.1t~ of A~rjt::-::ts. .
,<' -He ar:d ills wife, BI~nch~, b;l'/e Jour cl:ild.rJ1 =-nd res:ce
.. in \Vashington, D.C.
Nc:rn:: For t.~e Pr'!"Iice~tJJ 50te~~t upon announcin3 hl.s i;1t.:ncior\
. to r.otcir..J.l.e ?YIr. S..:::lp~n, se:: the p~eCin3" it!rn.
"
"l~!'-;::s:::::-:~::,,_::..:\c:- _) to. : ...... -- - • ..,:,~ .~:.:: : - •• - ... .:- -: '--._ •• -:
sl~r.d~::; 0: :'~:::= ::~:,::-.::.:~.:.~~-~:_::..~~:~.~;~::.~:(.~'~:~:~~ :
tot::'..lly unr::l:.::d to ',I Z'_,c:;:..~, G:l. ~ '-'._c ... ~ ~rr ,. -- ,:1
the c;:.:;~. Yr_cy COL::J 1:::::::: ,0 L;r::-::~ cO::lprcr.::";: of S::-'_)l"
ti ....e: r.:tt:':'!1:l1 ~c~:i:y ~;::Gr.:1=.::O:1.
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The purpose of this statement is threefold:
-FiN:, to set forth the Iacts about my own relationship
co the \V;;.t~r;a'e matter ;
-Second, to place: in some perspective some of the more
sensa;:io:1al-and in:J.ccurate-of the charges that have
tied the headlines in !'ecent days, and also some of the
matters ~:ut are currently being discussed in Senate testi-
rnony and elsewhere;
_ Tnird, to draw the distinction bet.,....e:e:tm.tional secu-
rity opencions and the \\i?.terga~e case. To put t.Ile otr-.er
matters i...l pe:;;pecti·.e, it ;dl be necessary to ciescribe L~e
national security cper3.tior.s first.
In cit.:..'1g these m.tion::.! security I:'!atters, it is not my
intention to place a natior.;:.l s.:':curity "cover" on \V 2.ter-
gate, but rather to sep::.r:J.te them out f"om Vlate:-gatc:-
2nd at the same time to expbin tl:e context i...'1 which cer-
tain actions took place that were later rriscon.strued or
misused.
LO:1g before the W:1tergate breal.;:-in, three import2...1t
national security ope"::ttions took pl<!ce which have subse-
quently become entungled in the Wate,gate case.
-The first operation, begun in 1969, was a prDgr::tm of
wiretaps ..All were legal, under the aut.~oricies t.I~en exist-
ing. They were underta:;:en to find and stop ser:ous
nation;:>] security leaks.
-The second oneratlon wasa rea.."'5c:;sment, which I
,rdered in 19iO, ~f the adequacy or i;1ccmal ~ecL1rity
( ,l!easures. TlLis .resul.ted ::1 a ph.n and, a directive to
\_>,tre::.gthe:1 our 10 teU:gence opc;-;:>.twns. T ney iI/ere p:-o-
t~ted by ~Ir. Hoover, and as a result oEllis protest they
were not put into eEect.
-The third oper::..tion was tk es:ablishment, in 1~il,
0.[ a Special Investigatioils Unit in the \\'ilite HOLjsc. I:.s
pri.-nary mission was to plug k8.~";sof .vit::.l security infer-
mation. I ;:;.1sodirected (his gTo~? to Vepare an accurate
history qf cert3.in cr.lci::.l n8.:ional securi.cy IT::ltlers vir.lch
. occ1:lITed under prior ac:ninistr8.tlons, on whicD. tl:e Gov-
emrnent's records were incomplete.
Here is th~ backrround of th~e ~h-ee securitj' opera-
.,:): -
tiens ini~i2.ted in my ,,\d!:1i_,"1istr_tio~.
1969 W8£7A.PS
ir:;~::':':!::s.L!!lless further leaks could be pre vented. This
req:.i:::d. 5!'.ding the source of the leaks.
In order to do this, a special p:-0!Sf:lm of wiretaps was
• • ,.I' • '19~9 d . .I!,_;~,:,.;.e~ 1[; r.1H.!- . ° 2.."1 terminated In February 197;.
F3\ .~- than ?" t.J.O< or .., .; ~ d ~ t' ._" '_. ~l,- _v • _, L \~,.n.::> u.a lon, were involved.
~;:.e': ?:";:iuced ~m?iJrt~nt leads .t~:lt made it p()~si:)lc to
c;,.:~~ :::e secur.ty of h:ghly sensiuve materials. I author-
• ,.l ,.. r h i di .IZ;:_. ~ enure pro;ram. t.ac in ividual lap was under-
t,,~-:e~L~:::.ccordance with orocedures lezal at r;"'~time .,n..l, v ....1, .................. Uo.4.'~
i......a;::':0:d ',~-ith loo,;:;t2..rt:i.i:1g precedent.
Tc~ perso;13 who were subject to these wiretZ!.ps were
dete::r.i.:-:ed chrough coordination among the Director of
tJ:e FBI. my A:_~islant for i\'ational Security Aff:drs, ani
the _-\ctC1mey General. Those vvirerapped were selec:ed on
the :~h of access to the information leaked, mateD::!! in
sec~,:' £iJes, and e\ide:tce that developed a5 the inqui!"f
proc~2d. . ..
Ir~ormation thus obtained was made: available to senior
c:: • , '1...' f . 1 .O,,,C.2..:5 f.f:SPOl1_'!t;I,c: Gr-~at.:ona secunty m:ltters in order
to c1";":-wJ further lea!u.
In the spr.ng aRd summer of 1970, anoth'tr security
prob:e::! reached critical proportiom. In March a wa\~
of rx,;nci.ngs and explosio'1s strud: colIe-;;e campuies and
ci:ies. Tr:e:-e were <;.00bomb thrc:~t.s in one 2';-hour period
· ~ , . 'C' R" d' 1in :::W lor.,; lty. tOli!1g an Vl0,ci1Ce on college carr.·
pt.l.3C'5 :eached a new peak ~ftc:r the C::1:nbodian ope:--ation
and ~';c>, t!7..gcci~ at Kent State and ]ad:~on Slate. The
19S?--703Chool year brought nearly 1,800 campus d.::m-
o!".5~ciOn5 8..ndoeuly ~.50 C:lSes of ::liSO'1 on campus. :"L1:w
coI:ez=.; closed. Gun battles between f;.lenilb-style g:Ot:D~
a,-.:1 ::.:;.licc.- w.ere taki.ng pbce. Some of the disruptive 2.·c-
ti\1U~ w.;:re rccei\':ng foreign support.
CG::1pE.:ating the t:1;;k0: m2.intaining secur!t" was the
fae: :.."-tac..!" 1956, ce,,::lin type; of undercover FBI op~r-
.:,..,,,,, .~;. t~.-1 b~",n c 1"1Irt~ 1 r ~.. ' ••a ..:v.,- ..._c IL" .•_" O[ '-'. '" ~C [or m,.ny }e:lrs naa Dc:en
~u~?=:-:dd. T,lis ilbo had suost:l:ltiaUy impJ.ired our :lbil-
icy :0 (;01:ec( forei~;n int::il:.:;er.cc if11om1:J.t:on._';'t the sa;-;1c
tIme, ::he ~eb~onships bct',~·een the FBI and other 1.11t",1};-
ge.nce 2g.~r.r:ies h:J.~bc~~d~terior:lti~g ..By ~by 1970, fEf
D"ec:cr Sc:jvC'n:1ut o~! h:s :J._;er1cy'sl!.1iscn \"ith (he Cf:\
0= Jl:':~~ 5, 197,), r 171Ct with the Dlrector of t:'e FBr
(:.fr. Heover), the Direcor of the Ccnrral h:~c:l:i':;f::-:ce
..\;:-:-.c. :~fr. FJ':::lJ.;G Ecbs), the D;,"cto, of ([1;' D: ..
.- .. ..,-'t.:-.--.:.;I;".p'r"'.~.--;- ..r.c,(C~· ...r""I D,,"'" 1.}--' n,~ .. .l\.. .. ~\" _ ••• '_~"2J-r ..... _, \-..1.. •• ; \ ~'.l.'. .,.IZ1.ICi \. J.J".~;'!l·,:.:tl~)l 2.":;'2
.'~ ~ ~. _ ,. _'. _ . t' .' ., '\' '\ .; f I .;: •r' ,,.',. \' ~n .... f ., --
I,. ~ _ L I __ ...........) I \.1 l.1. '... _ '\ •• L_ !:1:1. l ••H': ....l: I t I.. ) • • (,_ : • '-.... "," \ I',~r:~. .!. \ :,- :.:: [
G.::<~~·. \,,'C dis.(ussec! tile lW;~:1t ;Ired icr !1~:CI~rL'1L.:L:·
. '•.. ,~ ,. , .. - . \
, \ ~,, .. " ...
i::,:: : ~~':i':"'C·C;'.~i: oi):ir,~: fl)j' ~':t'·l..r~~.\~:d it~t~~:; :::~.,=-\... ," ... _
;:'~..:,.::_:.. .:.: ....~ ()~l Jli~;: 2_; th(~ ~(.c~~(il.J \y'~_'r,~ r;,,-'::::,::: !.[7554]
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22. During the first week of July 1970 Huston sent the Special
Report and a Top Secret memorandum entitled "Operational Restraints
on Intelligence Collection" to Haldeman. In the memorandum Huston re-
commended that the President, from among the options discussed by the
Report, select in most areas discussed the option relaxing the re-
straints on intelligence collection. Huston specifically noted that
covert mail covers and surreptitious entries were illegal but nonethe-
less recommended that the restraints on the use of these techniques
be relaxed. Huston justified his recommendation in part on the past
practices of the FBI. Huston also recommended the formation of an
interagency evaluation committee, as outlined in the Report.
22.1 Tom Charles Huston memorandum, '~perational Restraints
on Intelligence Collection" (received from House
Armed Services Committee).
22.2 Tom Charles Huston testimony, House Armed ServicesCommittee Executive Session, July 9, 1973, 138-39.
22.3 H. R. H~ldeman testimony, 8 SSC 3028 •
.,
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22.1 Tom Hustom memorandum
".- -:', ~.--:- -- "." .....
.. ~JJ ....J ...Jv ...· ....·· ..
Presc"t, in::(::r):.::t.;:.:~iG'. s;·.o-..::d be b ro ad c r, e d to p.::r:-:-.:"i:
and proC7"-- r,.., __ -~v'_-" -;....-/'7SA 0': ..1_ - .'o ...~ ..... "' .... ._u. e. '-'-C,>"' ..... 'i .i. .... c con.rr.t.:.;·.• Cc..-=.V .. _
of U. S. citizens -..:..-;::-.,;;bi..-:;rr.a.t:ional f a ciLitie s .
Rationale:
The FBI do es ;40;; :.0.v e t1:e
<>
co.pabil::.ty to m on ito r
international CO:-:1r::-"':':"lic,,-:;io::s.:\SA is cu r r c cL;:
doing SO or. a r(;s-:.:rictea basis, and the infor:n~-
tion it has provided has b oen most ~1el?f'-11. iv:·l.!c..
of this inio~.·r.1atior. is pa r ticul a r Iy useful to t:.e
Whi tc Eo-..:.se arid it wou Ld ':.>e to our d is a.dvan ta z c::>
to allow th e FBI to aetermi:1e what NSA shou ld co
in this area without regard to ou r ovrti require-
ments. No 4ipprecia':lle risk is b.volved in this
cou r s e of ac~io~:.
Ele ctro.-.ic Surveillance s a::.G.Per-etra :i0:15. (pp, 26 -28)
Recommendation:
Present p r-oce du r e s sh ould b e changed to pc rmit
intensificai;ior. of co vc r r.g c of incividua.ls and
groupS in. the Gaited. Sta:;,;cs who po s e a rn aj o r
threat to the internal security.
ALSO, .p:::escn: p;:oceciur.::s s~-J.ouldb c charig cd to
penr,i:: i.-.V:r.;;ifica.!;i01-' o: cove ....·~c~:C0:' iO]:eib~-'
n«\tivtlil.l~ ":i(~.:::i?:o;lla;;ic c.;s·~~,'..J~~;;;.;·,~nts i," ti-.c
united St.J.i:es 0;' i•.-;;i:!res''; ;;0 '~i-'C in;;c:ii~cr.ce
comm\.U1ity: i- ..... - _.
penetr;:l.!;~O;:s ,_,'C 0?C r.:.;;: vc.
cove l'.'bi:! oi '~:.L:(;?"u" .3/.. ,.:·. .:l
. - .
0;:~~~.:·l.iZC<..1 C:-A.!1"'.e
tal'r,'-.:t!;, witi: 0 .•·.·. ~ .'(:'.'; ~,,-,~;·.o:;:i;·.,:c.:..<Lt~<\i:·.~t
subjec~$ or ~):(";_~.,il~ ;;-,-..,:;-::;" ::,c:l~r:;.;y i.--.;;(::LCSt:.
':,- l/' I •.... . -,
I ." .
\.
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.Jit1.. •.. ·t.·- ... . ..~... - . -
TO:-' :~=CIG T
I-1A~DLE VIA coxux r CHA);:\'ELS OXL Y
Mr. Hoover's statement th at the FBI wo uld not oppose
ot11.Cragc:1.cle s s ccking approval fo r ar.d operating
elcctror.ic surveillances is gratutious since no other
agen.cies have thc capability.
Everyone k,:owlec!_,;able in the field, with the exception
of Mr , Hoover, con cu r s that existing coverage is grossly
inadequate, CI..!>_ arid ?\SA note that this is p ar ti cul a r ly
true of diplomatic establishments, and we have Le azned at
the White House that it is also true of New Left groups.
c. Mail Cove rage (P? _29-31)
- '-
- .
. . Recolnmendation:
i
Restrictions on lcga'l coverage should be removed.
ALSO, present restrictions on covert coverage
should be relaxed on selected targets of p r ior ity
foreign intelligen.ce and internal security interest.
'.. Rationale:
Thcre is no valid argumc':1t against use or legal mail
covers except Mr.~ Hoo ve r ' sconce rn that the civil
liberties people may oecorrie upset. This risk is surely
-..-:- ---'-an acceptable onc arid hardly se rious enough to justify
denying ourselves a va Iuab l e and legal inte l l Ig ence tool.
-,
Covert coverage is illegal and the rc are se rio us ri s KS
-invol ved , However, the advantage s to be d e r ive d from
its use outweigh the risks. Thi s technique is pa r ti cul a r ly
valuable in identi:vb.cr eSDiona~e agents and other contacts
• J 0 • -
of forcirrn into Il iccn ce services.o b
D. Surreptitious Entry (pp. 32-33) .--~-..-.------'--.- ...------_- ._.- .._
Ilccomn1cncl;" t ion;
P'r os cnt restric~:io:1s should be rnod ifi cd to po r rni t p:::-o-
C~\l'(~ll1cntof vi~~dly needed ioreig:1 c r ypt og r api....ic rnat e r ial .
.--.:v,.
[7559]
TOP S.2CRZ:"
~il~:\DLE ViP. CO~viI:,\T CI·:.t~:-:NZLS OXLY
Page S
-I,,.
Rat ion al e ;
Use of ti1is t(!c:·j_:-~i(l\.:C i s c i c a r l y :;'J.~cga~:. 1"': a rno un t s
to burglary. It is also ~iglilJ· risky and could result
in great emba..:rassrnent if exposed. Howcve r , it
is also the rno st f r uitfu I tool and can produce the
type of intelligence which cannot be ob ta iried in any
other fashio:-~..
Tp.e FBI, in .!;.__~ M..:. Hoov e r ' s younger days, used to
conduct such operations with great" success and with.
no expos-ure. The information secured was invaluable.
NSA has a particular interest smce it is possible by
this techniq...:e to secure materials with which NSA can
break foreign cryptographic codes. We spend millions
of dollars a:;te:mpting 'to break these codes by rn achi ne ,
One suc ce s sful surreptitious entry can do the job
, successfully at no dollar co.s_t.
Surreptitious entry of facilities occup icd by sub ve r sive
.:' =:__' elements can t.u r n up information about identities,
methods of operation, and o thc r invaluable investigative
information which is not oth or wi s e obtainable. This
technique would be pa:-ticuldr1y helpful if used against
the \V eathe rrnen and Black Panther s. .
" d 1
. 'h...., L' "0 l- -...... 1...The ep oy::--.ent or. 1.:1 e .t...xecu~..ve ...r ot cccor l' o r ce lias
increased the risk of surreptitious entry of dip lom at ic
e5tablishmc;1~s. Hov..'ever, it is. th e belief of all exc cpt
Mr. Hoover that the tcch:1ique can still be successfully
used OI~ a selective oasis. ..._-----_.-.--_------
E. Devclop:Der,t of Campc:.S SOt:r'ces (pp. 34-36)-_ .. _.---- _ ...----- ....-..---_._-- ...._-_ .. _
Rccomrr,cndation:
Present rcst=ict:o~,s should be r el exc d to p e rrn it cxp ar.d cd
coverage o ; violcnce-pr:onc car-:~pus and s tud cat c r cl ar cd
groups.
r :
"
•
i
i
I•!
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TOl? S=CRET
HA~DL= vi.....C():.·:~:'-;7
'.
..
The FBI Goes :10~ cu :..r cnt ly r ecr-uit "-:1)" car.n:..)l:s sour ces
among individua.Lsb elow 21 years of age. This cir2..maticc..ll·,-
reduces til~ ?ool f r orn wrri ch s our ces may be drawn. ~-;::;:-,Eoo·.:c :
is afraid of a YoiJ.n6student sur Ie.cirig in ti:e press as an FBI
source, al though the reaction in the p ast to such events nc..s
been rriini rna.L, Aiter all, everyone as surn es tl:e FBI ha s
such sources.
The can?,pus IS the battle-ground of the revolutionary
. protest rrio vernent, It is irnpos s ibl e to g ath e r effective
intelligence about the rno ve rnen t unless we have campus
.sources. The risk of expo su r e is rr:.inimal, arid where
exposure o ccu r s the adverse publicity is rnod e r ato and
short-lived. It is a p-rice we mu st be willing to pay for
effective cove rage of the campus .5 ccn e, The intelligence
community, w ith the exception of. :'",:r. Hoov c r , feels
strongly that it is imp e r acive the we inc r ca s c the rrurnb or
of campus sour ce s this fall in order to forestall wid e sp r ead
·violence.
0 '.,
1, L' • fi L' L 'LCLA C a i rns ,...ae r e are no exi s lng res ...r arn ...s on rt s COverage
of over-seas activ~ties of US nationals, However, this
.• -. -.-- -- •. o ••• _ .... _ .... _ ••••• .cove rage has been g r o s 51)' inadequa.te since 1965 and an
:explicit directive to increase coverage is required •
. .'
"F. Use of Mi l ita r y UGcercover l'.~ents (pp, ~7-39) ;1~!.
.
I~I
I
.'
Recomrncnd~t.ion:
Pres cnt r e st:-ictio:1s should be retained.
Rat.i on al c r
The intclli.[!t~::ce cc rnrriun ity is ~::?;reedthat th~~risks
• .,. ... ~ .;.. -.4 - 0'. • - ""'" - •. '"' - t·....... ....
of Lif t in g t.1CS~ rC~I,..J..Ll..~61ts a r e g4Ac....(l.l.oL; ... n an
. f ... 1.. ..- :4 -, 1'1: ) - .......' .. -. \.1,··.·...1·('..••.,•• l-_v·......~: -; (~ ,.\.--o ~!i'/ ~)O:~~;;,J.i..l:.! 1~r..'-. ;'_.I,';_'c.~,-,-. ... _ ..._ LI_
by dC1i~:.Z su"
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,, .
Pa('1e -,
0-
Rccor:1a:(~ ;,d 6.~:'(;n=
\
E'ach ag cr.cy should su orn i t a dc tc iIc d es ~il~"l::..t(; a s to ..
projected rn an po we r n c e d s arid othc r costs in tI-L(! e ve ut
the va r'iou s Irrvos ti.g ati.ve r est r-ain ts herein. are liiteci.""
Rationale:
In the event that t1-~eabove r-ecornrn ondat ion s arc COnci....:::-rea
in: it will be necessary to rno di Iy existing bucigets to pro-,"'ide
the money arid rn anp owc r necc s s a r v for their irr:''C)lern('''''':'-'-:o~t" J .. :: .. _.I..\,..a"".:.. 1. ...
The intel1i~;cnce corr.rriuni ty has been badly hit in the b\..:.d::-;.,.~, o~
squeeze (I suspect the foreign intelligence operations are in
the s arn e shape) and it rnay ~";,.. w6~ be necessary to 2T..u~e
SOIne n1odificutiorLs. The p r oj e ct e d figures should o e ,
reasonable, but wil I be subject to individual review if t:-.is
recommendation is accepted.
OPErz ..-\ 7rJ~"'--:-.... ~.......I_'
.'...r: .
(pp, 42-·;3} j
I
!
---- "_:'
. Recommendation:
" .~.....---- ........ - Apcrmancnt co rnrrrit'tc c consisting of the Fl.)], CU\., t\SA,
DIA, and t1:e, rni l ita r y cou nt c r-i'nt cl l igcnc e clgcncics shoulc:.
be ap"Dointeci to urovicle evaluations of dome sti c intelli':' enc .....
... 6. .-" --,
prepare pCl"iodic do m e s ti c ir:.tcllige;"cc e s t irn a te s , an d c2..rri-
out the other objectives specified in the report.
...
Rationa.le:
'l'hc'nccd for incre.1.~;cd co or di n a.tion, jo in t os t irn atc s , 'ar.a.
• ~ ~..... ,I,' .J. ~-I-"-" ...- ·Oi z , -.- L' ...respons1ve~less ...0 ... .o '" ru ..c .L uu.:>c 1::; DV1.0US LoU .. :.e
intelligence con:.munity, The rc a.re a numt>c r of oper;:.tio;: <,:
•• , , J b 1 1 t' "'.- ..problC:;Ins w~;::.cn uecu ~o • e \\'01' ~cc. au Sl:'o.CC "\ir. rY:'O\",":~: l:~
!cal.ftl1 of a:))~ 111CC~1;:-~~1isl~1\'lIiic1l -:1~i;'I~lt jeo~)~i~·.(~ize l"4.is ~~~~(j:.0:.::!".
c .. , .. 4 ... ...CI.l\ \vo\~l(l ?·:-cJ..:.:r ;L~l ~4U .lOC CO!'""i-:'~111\:~(;C to see ;~O\' .." t:;~e .:":.,"S:\_·;~1
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report -- but I don't remember whether he objected to any
5 of the analyses but he objected to virtually every option
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.!.1r.Hoover.
Hr. Hoover then proceeded. to object to virtually, --.
I can't recall, it has been three years since I read the
6 available to the President that would in any way change iri
7 any manner the v-lay in which he VIas at that time opera ting
8 the FBI. •
..9 I was told that he originally wanted to place his
10 objections into the body of the report; however, his staff
ll.tried, successfully prevailed upOn him to understand that
.J
::J-e
It.
II
o
II:
<
:~
12
13
although he Has Chairman of the COm.r:1ittee i.tHas not a
report of the FBI but a report of a~l of the agenciesandr
therefore, his objections should be relegated or should be
15 in the form of a footnote.
16 He then proceeded to footnote his objections and the
l7 report then was signed after some disagreement among the
18 other principals as to what, the effect of these footnotes
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were and all.
At that point. then the report was transmi tted by
I.!r. Hoover to the Hhi te IIouse and "'TaS submi tted then to
Hr. Haldeman. At that tiMe I prepared a memoranc.tLr:1in
•whch I outlined what I believed to be the consensus of the
working group as to what;options were available to the
President that he should choose and il.lsoset forth Hho.t I
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regorded as essentially heing the risks involVea wi€h.cach
option as opposed to the potential benefiis.
Mr. Woolsey. Let me break in at this,point and say
r~r.Chairman, that the Corrmittee has as part of the doc~~nts
5 that were provided by the Department of Defense and the
1
2
4
6 intelligence cOmIill:lnities 'a copy of jan unsLcried 'and undated
? docureented called "Operational Restraint on Intelligence
, ,
8 Collection," which appears to be a document containing
9 recommendations and rationale with the page numbers keyed
10 to this overall study.
11 I would like to ask the witness' if this is the memo-
, 21
·22
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
23
randum or a memorandum whi ch he prepared to go along \·li th
the report?
Hr. Huston. Yes; this is the memorandum to Hr.
\.
Haldeman.
f.lr.~>1oolsey.•Thank you.
Mr. Huston. That memorandum then went, to Nr. Haldeman
.\.,ith the report I believe sometime in the first week of
July.
As I recall, at that time, at the time Mr. Hoover sent
the'report to the Hhite House, the President \'lasat San
Clemente and we decided to wait until he got back before
submitting the report.
24
25
Then on, as I recall, sometime in mid-July~ I received
a memorandum f rorn1·1r.Haldeman saying that the Presider.t had
.t c ,
\' ' ,.;
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•
carrying some of them out, at least, in self-declared, both intentions
and in backing, an~ the. reasons for "hat they were doing.
There "as some mtell1gence-there "as some FBI intelliaence in
this area, there "as some Secret Ser vice intelligence in this area as it
related to Presidential threats and security. And there was some inves-
tigative reporting by the press going on as to the background of some
of these acti\·ities, and all of these I think would add tozether to be the
sources at that. time of what we did have. 0
. Mr. DASH. But is it your statement that you were not fully aware
of the specifics of the Huston plan?
Mr. H.-\LDE:\L\~.I "as not-let me get into how that was set up. In
the meeting with the President and the heads of the security azencies
the problem was outlined and the President made it verv -cle~r that
he expected some cooperation, which there did not-e-which did not
exist at that time between these agencies, in getting b€tter information,
evaluating the information more effectively, and disserninatinrr it so
that action could be taken if there "as action indicated. or at least
awareness-there would be awareness of what was happening 0·, "hat
was going to happen.
The group assembled in his office at that time was designated bv
the President as a, task force to prepare recommendations for him as
to what ought to be done, what. steps should be taken to meet. the prob-
lem and carry out the request that the President made of this group.
e
It is mv understandinrr that that-those agency heads themselves
r by designation of members of thei r stn If dief ~et tIP such a task force
nder the chairmanshIp of DIrector Hoover which prepared an exten-
ive set. of recommendations. :\Ir. Huston worked with them. I under-
-stand on this, or at least they transmitted these recommendations to
. him upon their preparation, and those recommendations "ere sub-
mitted to the President. They were submitted, as "as cu~omar~ pro-
cedure'to ·~Ir. Huston, the staff JIlun assigned to that project, through
)Ir. Huston to me and through me to the President.
Mr. DASH. )fr. Huston actually reported to you?
Mr. H.\LDnL\~. He reported through me in this particular area. He
was-well. I do not know where he "as assigned at that time. He was
somt'times-part of the time he was at the "White Honse he was on the
staff' of the COllll::>" Iand part of the time he was on :'If 1". Buchanan's stu tf.
Mr. D.\sH. 'Yell. in reporting to you or throuah you, you saw all of
the papers that were being reviewed, did yon not ~ .
Mr. H.\LnE:\r.\~. I sawall the papers-not all the working papers of
the committee. I saw the r('Commendations that went to the President.
Mr. D'\"H. All right. Did yon read the recommendatiolls that went
to the Presidpnt?
.)Ir. H.\LDnr.\~. I am not sure I did or not. If I did it was not in any
detail. J had an idea it. was a proposal for an expanded intelligence
. activitv.)fr. ·D.\<;lI. "-rrr you nwn re in that p!"opo~nl there W,lS :1 rccomrncu-
Uationfor both n.tt ionul and inn-rna] ~t'(,lll"it.\".that tl1l'l"l' \1(' anH'l"C:lsE'dllse of wi!"C'tappill£; :lnd slllTPptirinlls l'lItry or hn'ak-in?)11'. H.\T.nof.\;\"". I am not :::lln' \Ylwtlwl' I \l"a::;or not. I nl:1Y H'J·Y w\'11an' beel!.
J [7569]
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23. On July 14, 1970 H. R. Haldeman sent a Top Secret memorandum
to Huston stating that the President had approved Huston's recommenda-
tions for re1.a~:U1g_1;;,_e~~raintso inte1li ence collection. Haldeman._, _...., =. ~,- -~~_...--~
requested that a formal decision memorandum be prepared. On or about
July 23, 1970 Huston prepared and distributed to the members of the Ad
Hoc Committee a Top Secret decision memorandurn~ with copies to the
President and Haldeman, advising of the President's decision to relax
the restraints on intelligence gathering by use of the techniques of
CQvering international communicat.io~i1ities, electronic sur-
II!f _
vei11ance and penetrations, illegal mail covers, surreptitious entries
M. _ ...... !11ft.. .,._~ _', - ~.yy I ...... :u;;tl$C$A ,-and development of campus sources.
"''U. y
23.1 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 3030.
23.2 Memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to Tom Charles Huston,
July 14, 1970 (received from SSC).
r -----23.3 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2874.
23.4 Tom Charles Huston testimony, Senate Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, May 21, 1973, 139-42
(received from Senate Armed Services Committee).
23.5 Tom Charles Huston testimony, House Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, July 9, 1973, 1389-90.
23.6 President Nixon statement, May 22, 1973, 9 Presi-
dential Documents 694-95.
23.7 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Richard Helms,
July 23, 1970 (received from CIA).
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Mr. n\SH. Do you know why Mr. Hoover opposed the plan?
Mr. HALDE)f/\N.I am not sure. I do not recall whether this mernoran-
, dum outlined the nature of his objections or not.e M-:. DASI~.Now, are you a,:are after the plan was submitted to thePresident, that this plan was in fact approved by the President?~lr. HALDE:-'IAN.Yes.Mr. DASH. After that approval, was the plan implemented?
l\Ir. ~ALDnr'\N. ~o; .it was not. As I understand .it, the approval
was rescmded, I believe It was 5 days later by notification to the azencv
head and that. therefore. in effect, the plan was not implement;d. -
Mr. DASH. ~Vhv was It rescinded ?
Mr. R.\LDE1L\N: Again, as I understand it, because of Director
Hoover's objection to a number of parts of the plan.
:Mr. D.\;;:H. Did you know that Mr. ~ritchell opposed this plan, the
Attornev Gmeral ~
Mr. H.-\LDE)UN. I am not sure that I knew that he did or that he
did Dot.
Mr. DASH. IVell, he has testified here before this committee that he
was not in on the original planning of the plan but when he first
learned about it, I think he says to Mr. DeLoach of the FBI. that he
went to see you and the President and strongly opposed it .and then
the plan was not implemented. He assumed that it was partly on the
basis of his objection. Do you recall that? •
Mr. HALDDL\N. I do not: but that is not necessarily-I certainly
would not deny that. If ':Mr.?lIitchell does feel that is the case, T do not
recall-I do recall the plan not being put into effect. I recall con-
siderable discussion back and forth as to whether it would be or not.
and the ultimate decision first, to approve and then to rescind. '
Mr. DASH.Did you become aware of an in-house White House effort
for that special investigative unit after the Huston plan was
_, rescinded 1r ,----.- 'Mr. HALDE)IAN.Well, the step following the rescission of the Huston
plan as it i~ now called, was the fo~mulation of an intelligence evalua-
tion, commltt~e that was another mteragency and Jnterdepartmental
grOtlp. It was not an in-hot:se'\Vhit~ House jrroup, although there W:lS
a "'bite House representatn·e. I believe Mr. Dean. on that intelligence
evaluation committee and its purpose was--one of the PUrp05e5 of the
Huston plan, coordination between t~e va.rious intelligence agencies
and an attempt to share and evaluate mtelhgence.
Mr. DASH. And who was snperyising this?
Mr. HALDE)L\~. I am not sure. It was set up-it was not an in-house
White House unit. as I said, it was an interazencv unit. I believe .Iohn
Dean was the IVhite House representative on it and I am not sure
how it was structured.
Mr. DASH. 1V'ould it be true that it was :'.fr. John Dean's role to be
liaison for the White House on intelligence programs like this'?
Mr. H"LDn£.\~. Yes; it would be.
Mr. Dxsrt. Now. diel there come a time when there was an in-house
'Vhite Honse special innstigati\'e unit 1
)fr. H.\WDL\N. You are-Ieadin!:!'_:_the question relates. I USSUIlH',
to this spt'cial inn>:=:tigations unit that was set l:p in U)'il.
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Turning to the question of security problems, it has been al lezed that
there was an atmosphere of fear at the lYhite House regarding 'kcurity
matters. I can state categorically that there was no climate of fear at all.
There was, however, a healthy and valid concern for a number of mat-
ters in the general area of national security and for a number of other
matters in the general area of domestic security. This was a rational
concern, and it was of sufficient import to require that considerable
thought be given to steps to combat the actual problems and potential
dangers that existed.
With regard to leaks of information, especially in the national secu-
rity area, it became evident in 1969 that leaks of secret information were
taking place that seriously jeopardized a number of highly sensitive
foreign policy initiatives that had been undertaken by the administra-
tion, including the ending of the war in Vietnam, the :\Iiddle East
crisis, nuclear arms limitation, and the establishment of new relation-
ships among the great powers. These initiatives were closely inter-
related; leaks about anyone of them could seriously endanger all of
them; and such leaks were takinz place. .
In order to deal with these TeaJ..."S,a program of wiretaps was in-
stituted in 1969 and continued into earlv 1971. The President has stated
that each of these taps was undertaken in accordance with procedures
that were legal at the time and in accord with longstanding practice
in this area. This program was authorized by the President of the
United States and the wiretaps were determined by coordination be-
- -~.- r tween the Director of the FBI, the President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs. and the Attornev General of the United States.
In 1970 the domestic security problem reached critical proportions
as a wave of bombings and explosions, rioting and violence, demon-
strations, arson, gun battles, and other disruptive activities took place
across the country-s-on college campuses primarily-but also in other
areas.
". .... -- In order to deal with this problem, the President set up an inter-
agency committee consistinz of the Directors of the FBI, the CIA, the
Defense Iritel lizence Agen;y and the National Security Agency. This
committee wasinstructed to prepare recommendations for the Presi-
dent-which they did. The report they submitted included specific
options for expanded intelligence operations and ::\fr. Huston, the
TFhite House staff man for this project, was notified by a memorandum
from me of the approval of the President.
As has been reported, Director Hoover expressed opposition to parts
of this program and as a result, the agencies were subsequently notified
that the approval had been rescinded. This approval was withdrawn
before the plan was implemented so the net result was that it never
went into effect.
Instead of this program, an Intelligence Evaluation Committee was
created in December of l!)iO that included representatives of the 'Vhite
House, CTA, FBI, :XSA, and the Departments of Justice, Treasury,
2874
was involved. Through the period of March and April of 1913 I have
<J.uite detailed notes regarding Dea.n conservations because 'at that
time he was giving me in formation for the President.
SECURITY PRoBLE~rs
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regarded as essentially heing . ,r~s::s
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invo11/;~'li~:ri th .each
option as opposed to the potential benefits.
Mr. Woolsey. Let me break in a~ this point and say
r·~r.Chairman, that the Corr.mittee has as part of the dC~G.:;er.ts
5 that were provided by the Departrr.ent of Defense and the
6 intelligence comm~nities a copy of an unsigned and undated
7 docwr.ented called "Operational Restraint on Intellis:er;ce
8 Collection," wh i ch appears to be a do curaen t; cO!1taining
9 zecozuneridat.Lo ns and rationale w.i, th the page nur:lbers keyed
10 to this overall study.
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I would like to ask the witness' if this is the meno-
randum or a memorandum Hhich he prepared to go along \-lith
the' report? "-
Hr. Huston. Yes; this is the memorandlli:1to Nr.
Haldeman.
Mr. Wools~y. ·Thank you.
Hr. Hus ton. That memor and tun then we nt to Nr. Haldenan
",ith the report I believe sometime in the first Heek of
July.
As I recall, at that time, at the tirne·~r. Hoover sent
the' report to the Hhite House, the President Has at San
.. ~ '=j ~..._ .+.. .J... .... h ..... 1 bCle~ente ana we ~eClQe~ ~o wal~ unL1L e go~ nac~ efo=e
sUD8itting the report.
Then on, as I recall, so~eti~e in nid-Julv~ I receive~
~....., ~ ,'"PI ~ .~~
." ... ( ,') ." J.....,.,; ~ ,-,~ ... \. '",-.. ._""- J...!. __ '.~
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ilpproved the recomm~nd~tions th.:ith.J.dheen
and that they were to be implemented; however, they were not
to be implemented in the mannD_r ~n wh_ich ..LT h~al sur~~-~~~
..L '-4 J '=, <-.::> L'-=~"
principals and explain to them the decisions that he had
made and to deal with them personally because I frankly was
convinced that anything less than that wou Ld othe:!:l..;ise,
any "vritten communication to !-!r.Hoover from anyone cthe=
9 than the President, know i nq !!r.Hooever, would not he we LL
10 received.
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Hr. Hoolsey. f.!r.Chairman, 'Le t; me ask at this point,
He also have a document provided by the De~ense Departi:'.ent
and the intelligence cormunity dated July 14, unsignec,
but a memorandum to !tr. Huston from I·!r. H. R. Haldeman,
15 subject, "Domestic Intelligence RevieH."
- ---""-- ,._~.
~ -
16 I ask the ,,·Ti tness if this is this docuraent; to whi, ch he
17 just referred?
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Mr. Huston. Yes.
r1r.Noolsey. ttr , Chairman, if I might break in at
this moment with a second question .
The witness is recalling with great detilil tl"_ese
I Hould like todocuments of three years ago .
•
23 I in the last f ew days 0:- since his Leavi nq the \·;rhite ::rO:.!S2 1"'.2
24
25
has either r e+zead them or seen 50::-.C oarts of t.heraor di scussc.:
them in detai 1 w i th anyone?
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l>lr. Huston. ~'lell, some of these dates r have' related
back to diary entries that I made and others I have talked
w.i th Hr. Buzhardt, you k now because r was uncertain fra:1.l-:ly
as to wh at. the guidelines we re w.i, th respect to "'hat matters
5 I would be free to testify. But I Hant to emphasize that:
6 I am largely speaking from memory and that if I say July
75th and it might be July 6th~ then I don't want you to think
8 I am misleading you. I am trying to be as accurate as I
9 recall.
10 Mr. 0001sey. That is fully understandable. I just wan t;
11 to get on the record to Hhat degree within the las few days
12
13
15
,,_' _'6
or since you have come to Washington your recollection has
been refreshed?
Mt. Huston. I carneto Washington late last night so
I was here this morning and I have talked briefly with
Mr. Buzhardt at the White House this morning and we discussedc-
I? "rihat documents . He told me I should come up and tell you What
I know and that is wh ac I am trying to do.18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Mr. Woolsey. Fine, thank yO?
"1' Huston So at this point, I received the mom r .drrr , • '"",.,0 an urn
from !'lr.Haldeman and then, as r say I I had recor.,r:~enC.edI and
I think the thing I refer to says your reco~~endatio~ on
/
page so-and-so was, an~ I am sure that related to the
recoP.1ll1enc1ationI made that he cull the Directors back 'Oerson.:...
ally, and so then a decision memorandum was prepared to be[7584]
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'sent out, Hhich is,the document that you read into the record.
Mr. Woolsey. Let me ask you in connection with tha~,
tacked on to the back of the decision docureent, which I
noticed you glanced at very briefly, is a 2-page doc~~ent
called "brganization and Operation of International Agencies
Group on Domestic Intelligence and Securi ty 1" wh i ch discusses
-'
its membership, observers, Hhite House liaison, starfing,
8 meeting, security and other procedures.
10
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'Let me ask if that document \Vas one that accompanied
the decision docume nt;, to the best of your knmvledge, -at
the time?
Mr. Huston. Yes,. I think 56. In any event, that
decision memorandum went out, July 20, did you say July 23
,.
sonetime in late July the decision memorandum ~'lentout to
our four age~cies.
" Shortly after it had been received by r'tr.Hoever I
received a call from Bill Sullivan saying that t,e Director
had gone through the roof and that he had called the Attorney
General or was going to talk to the.Attorney General saying
he felt that the Attorney General should have been consulted,
that the decision as reflected in the memorandum was incorrect
and he was going to get it turned around .
Senator Symington. You are saying u...o to this ~l'-o th
- '- .. I~ .e
Attorney General did not know about this?
Hr. Huston. To the best of my knowiec1ge the Atto~ney[7585]
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Kunzig, who is now an as.'jocQte judge of the U.S. Court
r Claims.
Mr. Sampson has been Actir.~~ Administrator of Gen-
eral Services since June 2, 1972. H~ joinrd the Gentral
-Serviccs Administration in 1969 as Comm issioner of the
Federal Supply Service. From 1970 to 1972 Ite was Com-
rnis-icner of the Public Buildings Sen·ice in GSA and the
fiost n.~P~!~Y/~Jrninistratcr of GSA for Special Projects.
He came; to the Ge~e~t Services Administration alter
6 years in Pennsylvania State government, where: he was
secretary of <l,dmin:.stration and budget secretary under
Gov. Raymond P. Shafer, and deputy secretary for pro-
.curement, department of property and supplies, under
Gov. \Villiam \V. Scranton. Prior to entering government
service, he was employed by the General Electric Co. for
12 ye:ars.
Mr. Sampson was born on October 8,1926, in \Varn:n,
R.I. He received his B.S. degree in business adminis-
tration from the University of Rhode Island in 1951 and
has done graduate work at the George Washington
University.
Active in several professional orginizatiOIlS, Mr. Samp-
son was presented the Synergy III Award for outstanding
contributions toward the advancement of architecture l)y
the Society of American Registered Architects in 1972.
In 1973 he was selected as one of the Top Ten Public
\\' orks'lvIen of the Year, and he was named an honorary
mem~r of the American Institute of Architects. .
. He and Ills wife Blanche have four childre.'-1 and reside, .,
inWashingtou,J2-,C ..
!i(yn:: For the Pre3ident's sbtem~nt upon announcing his intention
. to nominate }'lr. Sampson, see the pre-ceding item.
The \Vatergate Investigation
Jr'Iay22,1973. . .Statements by the President.
Recent'news accounts QTowin<Yout of testimony in thev ~ . J
Watergate investig3.tiom have given grossly mis1e:J.ding
. impressions of many of the facts, as they rdate both to my
own role and to certain unrelated activities invoh-ing n:l-
tional security.
Already, on the b:l5is of scc,?nd- and third-hJ.I1d he::tn.'\y
testimony by persons either convicted or themselves under
investigation in the c~c, I h:lVe found myself accus<:d of
involvement in activities I never heard of until I fad
ahout .them in new:; accounts.
These jmp'r.c~sio:15 could :llso kad to a serious misllnder-
5t~:[!din; of tho~t: n~tional security activities which, thol!gh
tot:t1ly unrc:bt..:cl to \Vatcr_€;ate, ban: become cnt:wgkd in
tltt: ClSC. TIIi:Y coltlcllcacl to furthc:r comp~c~ist: of scrr:;i-
tin: lutton'll !;ec.urity information.
to?)
I will not :~bantlon TOy rcsponsibiliries. I wil! continue
to do the job I V/Xi elected to do.
In the accompanying statement, I have s~t forth the
facts as I know them a:-;they relate to my O'rin role.
\Vith regard to the specific allcg"tions that have been
mack, I can arid do state c~te:sorica.ll y:
1. I .had no prior knowledge of the \Vatergatc
operation.
2. I tOO~( no part in, nor was I aware of, any subsequent
efforts that may have been made to cover up
Watergate.
3. At no time did I authorize: Cli1y offer of executive:
clemency for the \'fatergatc defendants, nor did I
know of any such offer. .
4. I did not know, until the time of my own investiza-
tion, of any effort to provide the Watergate deI~d-
ants with fund~ .
5. At no time did I attempt, or did I authorize others
to- attempt, to implicate the CL-\. in the Watergate..
matter. .
6. It was not until the time of my own investigation
that I learned of the break-in at the office of Mr.
EUsberg's psychiatrist, and 1 specifically authorized
the furnishing of this information to Judge Byrne-
7. I neither authorized nor encouraged su bordina tes to
engage in illegal or improper campaign tactics.
In the accompanying statement, I have sought to pro-
vide the background tb.t may place recent allegations in
perspective. r have speci5caUy stated th:J.t executiv~
privilege will not be invoked as to any testimony concern-
ing possible criminal conduct or discussions of possib!e
criminal conduct, in the mattcrs under investigation. I
want the puhlic to leam the truL~ 2bout W:J.tergatc and
those guilty of any illegal :u:tions brought to justice..
. Allegations surrouncu.ng the 'Watergate affair h:lVe so
escalated that I feel a further stat<!n1cntfrom the Prc:,ide:1t
is requin:d at this timc:. .
A climate of sensationalism h~ developed in whIch
even second- Of third-h::md he:lI'S<ly charges'4U'C headlt.'1ed
as fact ;md repe:tted :!3 bcL
Important national security oper.lt:!ons which the7:1-
selves h::td no connection ,vith \\'atergate have beco:ne
ent:lngled in the case..
As a result, some D<!.t1onal security information h:lS
already been made public through court ord.e~, thrOl!'''''h.
the subpoen:ling of documents, ~nd through tcstimo;v
\\itn~cs h:wc giv,·.n in judiciJl "-P.d Congrcs.s:o:".::tl p:-;'
ccedin~. Other scn:i.:t!vc documents :\rc now th.--e~t;:r.d
with dtsc!osllrc. Continued siknce :!bout tho,c OCl~,.....t;n-'"- , .... ~ ............ L...>
,\'ollld cornpromt~c r..thcr th:m P:-0tCCt t~em, :\11\,1\\'(l~t1;:i
~15o 5.:n't': to pcrrdu:ltc a ~(l3$ly dtst:);-tccl \-1c,,"-''''\';-~
, .... I T 1. l\.. L to
rc~:~nt p.:uti~l di::;<loSll:·N kn't': p"cn-of the n:\t~lrc :>.::.:1.
ptlrpC~C of thosc opcntions.
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The purpose of this statement is threefold:
-Fir.;~, to set forth the facts about my own relationship
the \Vater_:;ate matter;
-Second, to place in some perspective some of the more
sensational-s-and inaccurate-of the charges that have
filled the headlines in recent days, and a130 some of the
matters that are currently being discussed in Seriate testi-
mony and elsewhere;
-Third, to draw the distinction between national secu-
rity operations and the Watergate case. To put the other
matters in. perspecti ve, it will be necessary to describe the
national security operations first. -
. In citing these national security matters, it is not my
intention to place a national security "cover" on Water-
gate, but rather to separate them out from Watergate-
and at the same time to explain the context LTl which cer-
tain actions took place that were later misconstrued or
misuseci.
LO:1g before the Watergate break-in, three important
national security operations took place which have subse-
quentlybecome entangled in the Watergate case.
-The first operation, begun in 1969, was a program of
wiretaps. All were legal, under the authorities W.~enexist-
ing. They we,re underta~en to find and stop serious
national security leaks.
-The second operation was a reassessment, willch I
in 1970, of the adequacy of int~rnal security
This resulted in, a plan and a directive to
. strengthen our intelligence operations. Tney '\I'ere pro-
tested by Mr. Hoover, and as a result of his protest they
were not put into effect_ . -
-The third operation was th~ establishment, in 1971,
of a Special Investigations Unit in the White ~ou~. Its
primary mission was to plug Iea!~ of vital secunty mfbr-
mation. I also directed this group to prepare an accurate
history of certain crucial national security matters which
occurred under prior administrations, on which the Gov-
ernment's records were incomplete.
. Here is the backgrpund of these three security opera-
tions initiated in my Administration.
1969 WIRETAPS
By mid-1969, my Administrat!cm had hegun :3. number
of highly ser:.sitive foreign policy initiatives. The}' were
aimed at endincr the war in Vietnam, achieving a settle-_,
ment in the 1fiddle East, limiting nuclear arms, 3_nd estab-
lishing new relationships among the great p(lW~rs. These
bvoh-ed highly secret diplomacy. They Viere closely inter-
related. Le:l.."s of secret information about anyone could
endang:.r all.
Exactly th:lt h:lppel1ed. i'iews aCCGunts appeared in
_ I ·...-hich \~·ere obvi'::>Il::.lyb,,-~ed on le:1ks-somc of them
_:xtcn3i ...e ;1;"td det:li!ed-by people h:lving ~CCl'SS to the
rr.o~t hi.c:hiy ChL'3lf.ed security m:lt~ria!s.
Ther~ W:13 no war to C~ITy forward these diplomatic
initiatives unless further leaks could be prevented. This
required finding the source of the leaks.
In order to do this, :J. special program of wiretaps was
i!15n:'_;<ec in l7Ii<.1-1969 and terminated in Fc.:b,:-u<:"j 1971.
Fewer than 20 taps, of varying duration, were invoked.
Thev ?r-::duced important leads that made it possible to
t.:"T-•• I'" .. ..:. ...... t-... ;Io~. r L; h' c .,"t",. .. ... 1. I ..:;r"_~__c..e "ecur.Ll ,J. u.g ly sensiu ,e materirus. au thor-
ized :b..:3 entire progr:!om. Each individual tap was under-
taken in accordance with procedures legal at the time and
in accord •...-ith longstanding precedent.
Tee persons who were subject to these wirt'tapswere
determined through coordination among the Director of
the FBI, my Assistant for National Security Aff:!..iJ"3, and
the Attorney General. Those wiretapped ' ....ere selected on
the basis of access to the information leaked, material in
securrry files, and evidence that developed. as the inquiry
proc~ded_ ' .
Ir":0rmation thus obtained was made available to senior
offic:i.a.lsresponsihle for national security ma.tters in order
to cu=-w.i1 further leaks.
THE 1970 INTELLICE...~Cr: FLAX
In the spring and summer of 1970, anoth'er securin:
problem reached critical proportions. In March a wav~
of bo;nbings a.ild explosions struck college campu~es and
~iri~_ Th:relwe~e 400.b~mb threa:s in one 2?-hour period
ill 1\ ew \ or.,;: CIty. RlOtmg and VIolence on coHege cam-
puses rezched a new peak aft~r the Cambodian operation
and tI:e tragedies at Kent State and Jackson State. The
1969:-~O school year br:'light nearly 1,800 campus dcm-
onstnnons and nearly 2.)0 cases of arson on campus. 1fanv
coUe;-e:s closed. Gun battles between guerrilb-style gTot!P~
and police were taking place. Some of the disruptive :1(;-
ti,ities '~·e.rereceiving foreign support. '
CC:;-;1plicating the task of maintaining secllnt\' was the
fa~t G~t, in 1966, certain types of undercover FBr op~r-
atlOJ'lS r.1at had been conducted for many years had been
suspe::dd_ This also bd substantially impaired Ollr abil-
ity to collect foreign intelligence information. At the same
time, ~he relationships between the FBI and other intelli-
gence agencies h:ld been deterioratbg. By May 19iO, FBI
Direccor Hoover shut off his agency's luison with the CIA
alroge:her_
0:::: JI!.."1e5, 1970, I met with the Director of the FBI
p.er. Hoover), the Director of the Central Intelli<'"ence
Age:-:cy ()'lr. Richard Helms), the Director of th~ De-
feu~~ I::!:~lligence Agency (Gen. Donald V. Bt:'nnc:tt). and
the Di-e.:ror oi tile N aeonal Securir\- .'\tTep.cv ':\(1,.... 1'·0--1
, ~ • \.. U ..t. 1.'\ '-
GJ.~I::r;. \\-e disw.:;sed the urge!1t need for hctter intelli-
gence c;:er.1tions. I appointed Director Hoover as
ch~~:. of 3..:1 inte17.gency committee to p:-epare recorn-
mt"tlc.2.::0~.
0:1 J:';';1e 25, the committee suhmitted :l report which
~nJ:~~'~~~'~~'J~ :iO;;;f:;:-e':i~~~~: :~~i~'~~~~en;.1
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nl~';:'Jr;"1;!.jum of the options approved, Alter reconsider-
on, however, prompted by the opposition of Director
'cr the avencies were notified 5 days later, on july 28,
that the:';!ppro~'aI had been rescinded, 'The opti~ns ;~itidly
approved had included resumption of c,ertaL:_ :ntell:gen~e
operations which had been suspended 111 19::'0. These L'1
tum had included authorization for surreptitious e:1try-
bre ...l';nCT and enterinz 1:1'l''1ert-on soecified categories.t. _ .... ...lJI,":J 1 .......... "'.'::>' .. _'" -- r'- .
of targets in specified situations related to national
securitv,
B;::c~use the approval was withdrawn before it, hrad
been implemented, the net result was that the plan ior
expanded intelligence activities never went into effect.
The documents spelling out this 1970 plan are ex-
tremely sensitive. They indude-aIld are based upon-
assessments of certain foreign ir:.telligence capabilities and
procedures, which of course must remain secret. It was
tpjs unused plan and related documents that J~hnDean
removed from the Whire House and placed m a safe
deposit box, giving the keys to Judge Sinca. The same
plan, stlll unused, is being headlined today.
Coordination among om intelligence agencies con-
tioued to fall short of our national security needs, In
July 1970, havi.ng earlier discontinued the FBI's liaison
with the CIA, Director :Hoover ended the FBI's normal
"'/ith all other agencies except the \Vhite House.
o help remedy this an InteiEgence Evaluation Com-
mittee was crea'ted i~ December 1970, Its members in-
cluded representatives of the White House, CIA, FBI,
NS.-\, the D~partm~~ts ~f J us~ice, Treasury, and Defense,
and the Secl:et Service ..
The I!l,telligence Evaluation Committee and its st~ff
were ir.structed to i.-npro'~:e coordination among th~ ~.
telEger:ce community and to prepare evaluations :lIld eS~I-
mates of dorr:estic ir:teiligence. I unclerst:md that .lts
C'_cti·,.iti·~sarc now under investigation. I did not authOrize
nor do I b.ve n!1y knowledge of any ilkgaI activ~ty by
thi.3 CO!Tlrr:ittee, If it ",.ent b.:yond its charter and dId eu-
. 'I! 1 ,; 't' ~. l't \""'~rot~.11:' without m}'gage m ~ny l. ~ga..t <leu'.'l !~""' - ,....,. - ~
k:1()',~ledge or authority.
THE SPECl>'L I:-;vESTIGATIO::-;s U:-';lT
On Sund~lY, June 13, 1971, The New York Times puo..
fulled ~he first installment of what came to be k!1own ~
"The Pentagon Pacers." l-;-ot until 2. f::w hours before
publication did any ~esponsible Government omcicl know
that they had been stolen, .\[ost of'Eci:tls did not know they
. .,~ . a: '_1 " t' G mmen' 1,"..1 r~"deX13k~!. ~.;0 senior O!llct..u ()[ ne ove ., • at'" '-,.
thc:n. or k::ew with cert:l.!ntv what they cG:1tlioed.
AU th: Gm'emrnent k:lew, at first. was th:lt the pZl.!Jers
;')mpriscd 1:7 VOhlr.le5 and some 7,(:08 p.~ges, which h;~cI
h-;en tak'~n i,IJm the mr;st semtc:\'t~ fiics of th~ D~r:'..rt:nents
d St:'..~,::1.nd Dder.se anJ tht" CIA, cuv,~ring m:!it:1.ry an:l
,. ~. . . t ..-'1 °n"Yon(lip~~r:l::~~ 11'1.)··...4...'$ jrl a \v'..lf (na \~';:';;SLll.. gt")ll.~ ,.
:...Iorcover, a rnaj:)fit}, of Lite documents p'luEshed ',vil"
the first three installments in The Times had not been
included in the 4-7-volurne s~'.ldy-rai:;jng serious ques- (
tions about what and how much else might have been
taken.
There W<S everj reason to beiieve this '....as a sccuritv
leak of unprecedented proportions. ..
It created a situation in which the ability of the GDv-
ernrnent to carry on Ioreign relations even in the best of
circumstances could have been severely compromised.
Other govemmei'lts no longer knew whether they could
deal with the United States in confider-ceo Against the
background of the delicate negotiations the United States
was then involved in on a number of fronts-with regard
to Vietnam, China, the Middle East, nuclear arms Iirni-
rations, U_S.-Soviet relations; and others-in which the:
utmost degree of confidentiality was vit.u, it posed a thre:l.t
so grave as to reqt:ire e.'Xtraordinary actions.
Therefore during the week foilowing the Pentagon
Papers publication, I approved the creation of a Special
Investigations Unit within the White House--which later
came to be known as the "plumbers.". This was a small
group at the White House whose principal purpose was
to stOD security leaks and to inv~tigate oth.:!r ~sitive
security matters. I looked to John Ehrlichman for the
supervision of tJ--":sgroup.
. K . 1\ r Eb I' . ,. .Egll rogn, li r.il Icr.mart s asslstant, \';23 put m
charge. David Yo:.mg was ;"1ddcd to this unit, as were
E. Howard Hunt a..Tld C. Gordon Liddy. (
The unit operated under extremely tight securi~ rules.
Its existence a,"1d functions were knmvn only to a very few
persons at the White House. These included ?vf e..<.srs,
Ha1deman, Ehrlichman, ?....id Dean.
At about the time the unit was created, D::miel El15-
berg w;;.s identified as the person wh::J h:J.d given the Penta-
gon Papers to The New York Ti,!'nes. I told Mr. Krogh
that as a matter of first priority, the unit should find out
all it could about Mr. Ellsber:;'s associates and his ~oti\'es.
Became o[ the extrerrle gr,nity cf the situation, and not
then knowir.g what addirional nat:on~l sCC!"cts?\Ir. Ells-
berg might d!sclos~, I did impress upon :\lr. Krogh the
vital iiTlport~nce to the national secu.rity of his 2.S3icr,,-
",--
ment. I did not au.honze 3.:1d hld no knowledge of any
illegal means to be med to achieve this goal.
HQ'i.~'ever, because of the emphasis I put on the crucial
importance of protecting the national security, I can
understar..d how hi~hly motivated individuili cculd have
felt justi5ed in eng~ging in specific :lcti\'ities tb.::!.tI would
have l!:3J.pprovcd !lJ.d t:-.ey been brought to r.1:' 2.tti!;:tlon.
COn5cquen~J:', ;l$ Pr'.:sider.t, I mmt a"d co ,..<;sume re-
sponsibility for such :lctiOHS d.:spite the b.et th::!.t I at no
ti!I1C ap~)roved or h~d !~i1:J;..;!~d~e of them ..
T abo ;~"si";"!cd the t,n:t a r:."r.,!.ler 0f oti:cr inve.su· ...:ltor,·v 0 i
rn3.ttc;;" c!L:diag in Fan wi:h cO;TI.?::ing ~:1 aCCtlt:'..r~ r::c-
od of e\'C',H:; rcbtd to the Vietr1J.m WJ.!", on which t:-:e
Govc!'nrnen(s rccor:t5 \'''t~re iil.:lJ~q~l:.ltc: (r:1.:!.ilY pre·l·!I~'..!S
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23.7 Tom Huston
memorandum
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTm
July 23, 1970
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA CmnNT CHANNELS ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
The president has carefully studied the Special Repor~
of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) and made
the following decisions:
1. Interpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence.
National Security Council Ln te lligence Direc tive Numb er 6 (NSCID-6)
is to be interpreted to permit NSA to program for coverage the
communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities.
2. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations. The
intelligence community is directed to intensify coverage of individuals
arid groups-in the United States who pose a major threat to the
internal security. Also, coverage of foreign nationals and
diplomatic establishments in the United States of interest to the
intelligence community is to be~intensified.
3. Mail Coverage. Restrictions on legal coverage are to
be removed. Restrictions on covert coverage are to be relaxed to
permit use of this technique on selected targets of priority foreign
intelligence and internal security interest.
4. Surreptitious Entry. Restraints on the use of surreptitious
entry are to be removed. The technique is to be used to permit
procurement of vitally needed foreign crytographic material and
against other urgent and high priority internal security targets.
TOP SECRET
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5. Development of Campus Sources. Coverage of violence-
prone campus and student-related groups is to be increased. All
restraints wh i.ch limit this coverage are to be removed. Also, CIA
coverage of American students (and others) traveling or living
abroad is to be increased.
6. Use of Military Undercover Agents. Present
restrictions are to be retained.
7. Budget and Manpower. Each agency is to submit a detailed
estimate as to projected manpower needs and other costs required to
implement the above decisions.
8. Domestic Intelligence Operations. A committee
consisting of the Directors or other appropriate representatives
appointed by the Directors, of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the
military counter-intelligence agencies is to be constituted effective
August 1, 1970, to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence,
prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, carry out the
other objectives specified in the report, and perform such other
duties as the President shall, from time to time, assign. The
Director of the FBI shall serve as chairman of the committee.
Further details on the organization and operations of this committee
are set forth in an attached memorandum.
r- The President has directed that each addressee submit
a detailed report, due on September 1, 1970, or the steps taken
to implement these decisions. further such periodic reports will
be requested as circumstances merit.
The President is aware that procedural problems may
arise in the course of implementing these decisions. However, he is
anxious that such problems be resolved ",ith maximum speed and
minimum misunderstanding. Any difficulties whi ch may arise should
be brought to my immediate attention in order that an appropriate
solution may be found and the President's directives implemented in
a manner consistent with his objectives.
TOM CHARLES HUSTON
Attachment
cc; The President
H.R. Haldeman
TOP SECRET
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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE INTERAGENCY
GROUP ON DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND
INTERNAL SECURITY (lAG)
1. Membership. The membership shall consist of
representatives of the FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA, and the counter-
intelligence agencies of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force. To insure the high level consideration of issues and
problems which the President expects to be before the group, the
Directors of the respective agencies should serve personally.
However, if necessary and appropriate, the Director of a member
agency may designate another individual to serve in his place.
2. Chairman. The Director of the FBI shall serve as
chairman. He may designate another individual from his agency to
serve as the FBI representative on the group.
3. Observers. The purpose of the group is to effectuate
community-wide coordination and secure the benefits of community-
\vide analysis and estimating. When problems arise which involve
areas of interest to agencies or departments not members of the
group, they shall be invited, at the discretion of the group, to J01n the
group as observers and participants in those discussions of interest
tej them_ oSuch agencies and departments include the Departments of
State (I & R, Passport); Treasury (IRS, Customs); Justice (BNDD,
Community Relations Service), and such other agencies which may have
investigative or law enforcement responsibilities touching on
domestic intelligence or internal security matters.
4. \lliiteHouse Liaison. The President has assigned to Torn
Charles Huston staff responsibility for domestic intelligence and
internal security affairs. He will participate in all activities of the
group as the personal representative of the President.
5. Staffing. The group will establish such sub-con~ittees
or working groups as it deems appropriate. It will also determine and
implement such staffing requirements as it may deem necessary to
enable it to carry out its responsibilities, subject to the approval of
the President.
TOP SECRET
--' C'
[7598]
Retyped from indistinct original
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
-2-
6. Duties. The group will have the following duties;
(a) Define the specific requirements of member agencies
of the Intelligence community.
(b) Effect close, direct coordination between member agencies.
(c) Provide regular evaluations of domestic. intelligence.
(d) Review policies governing operations in the field of
domestic intelligence and develop recommendations.
(e) Prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates which
incorporate the results of the combined efforts of the intelligence
community.
(f) Perform such other duties as the President may from
time to time assign.
7. Meetings. The group shall meet at the call of the Chairman
a member agency, or the White House representative.
8. Security. Knowledge of the existence and purpose of
the group shall be limited on a strict "need to know" basis. Operations
of, and__papers originating ,vith, the group shall be classified "Top
Secr~t-Handle Via Comint Channels Only."
9. Other Procedures. -e The group shall establish such
other procedures as it.believes appropriate to the implementation of the
duties set forth above.
TOP SECRET
Retyped from indistinct original
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24. On or before July 27, 1970, Director Hoover met with Attorney
General Mitchell, informed Mitchell for the first time of the June 5,
1970 meeting and the July 23, 1970 decision memorandum, and stated
Hoover's opposition to the Plan. Mitchell joined with Hoover in opposing
the Plan.
24.1 "John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC "1603-04.
24.2 John Mitchell testimony, 5 SSC 1823-24.
24.3 Richard Helms memorandum to the record, July 28, 1970
(received trom House Armed Services Committee).
r ·~.9
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24.1 John Mitchell testimony
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sometime in 1!)70. ::-.rr. ~rit('hell. were yon aware of concern in the
'Yhite House and. perhaps. in your own office; the De part mcnt of
.Iusticc, that the «xist iurr intcll isrencc proirrruns against internal dis-
sent or demonstrations t hrouzhout the country we-re lacking and that
there was need for some new programs?
Mr. ~IrTClIF:LL, 1Ypll, I think, ::"I[r.Dash. I would put that on the
basis that there was Jack of adequate intelligence. That probably
more importantly so there ' ....as failure of coordination amana tIle
intelligence-gathering a::rencies to the point where problems ewere
existing in the country, that then> was a general f('('ling that we rIid
not han>, the Government (lid not have, adequate intelligence to antici-
pate the activities that were being carried out at that particular time.
Mr. D_\sH. After the Safe Streets Act of 1968. ::"Ifr.~[itchelJ. von did
recei ve as Attorney General some powers invol ving electronic sur-
veillance, did vou not?
)Ir. )IrTcnEuJo Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. D.\SH. 1Yas it your position, publicly taken. that, with rezard to
internal dissent, you had the power to authorize electronic sun-;illance
without court approval? .
)fr. )IITCHELL. "rell, when you say internal dissent. that is not a
sufficiently descriptive term. In addition to that, as you know', the Safe
Streets Act did not change measurably the activities that had been
carried out in connection with electronic surveillance in prior admin-
istrations.
)11'. DASH. "11at term would you use, "internal security" as a better
word?
)Ir. )hTCHELL. Internal securitv would, I think, be a better general
term to describe it. .' ,-
Mr. D.\SH. Right. And it was your position, was it not, that vou
did have the authority under the act, whether it was prior practice or
not, to authorize electronic surveillance without first having to go to a
court for approval? .
1\f1'. )frTCHELL. I would believe, )11'. Dash. a better way to put it was
that we continued the practice that was then in effect concerning the
" liS€' of electronic surveillance in connection with internal secur itv.
"'--)11'. D.\SH. 'Vere vou aware. )11'. )IitchelI. of the so-called Huston
plan, which we hnve received as part of the testimony of this com-
mittee, for an interagency intelligence program which would improve
somewhat the intelligence gathering in this countrv i
Mr. ~IrTCHELL. 1Yell, there \\'as a matter of time in connection with it.
I \Yas not aware of the fact that the heads of the ,-:niotls agencies \Yere
meetinn- on the. subiect matter. It came tn nw attpntion. "a's brought to
my att~tion by the Director of the Federal Bllre,m of Innsrigution.
To the best of my recollection I met \\-itll ::"III'.DeLoach and I met \Yith
~Ir. Hoo\-er. 'Ye'discussed tJw so-caJJe(l Hllston phn which is the term
that YOll han heen lISill!!'.Thp doclIment th11t \\"('cliscll:33ed\"Cr. brieth",
I di(in't get into man'/of the details of it. it wu.s more an 'oral dis-
cussion o'f it. at that stag-e h!l<l ::"Ifr.Hoonr's dissent to the pl'OI-isions
of it. T '''11S of tIl(' opinion. I ner<lt'd \-ery littlp com'incing- by ~rr. De-
LOflCh aw1 ::'I fl'. Hoo\'P!" th:lt this \\";1S not the propP!" approach to the
problpll1s that e::"i,t('(l at the tillle. and T joined ::'1[1'.Haon't· in opposing
its implrmentnt Ion.
•
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Mr. DASH. Were you aware, )1 r, )fitchell. that the plan did provide
for removing certain restrictions against illegal break-ins and elec-
tronic surveillance?
Mr. MITCHELL. Oh, yes, these items were discussed in conversations
that I had with )lr. DeLoach and )lr. Hoover.
Mr. DASH. Do you recall when you first became aware of the plan 1
Mr. )IITCIIELL. I can't put the date on it. I shouldn't trvbecause I
don't recall. •
~\Ir. DASH. Did you ha ve the plan ever ill your possession or did
you peruse the plan l .
)1r. MITCHELL. I had, as I recall, the plan in my possession dnrinz
the period that the Director of-the Associate Director of the FBI wa~
discussinz it with me. As I am sure YOU are awn re. '\fr. Dash, this mat-
ter was flandled and considered aside and apart from the Attorriev
General. It was considered in the committee that involved the heads
of the intelligence gathering community.
)lr. D,\SH. "Tell. did YOU know who in the White House were back-
ing the plan? . • .
)1r. )IITCHELL. Xo, I can't say whowas backing it and who was op-
posed to it but obviously '\lr. Hust?n was apparently backing it be-
. cause he was the author of part of It. The other people in the "'hite
House that I communicated 'With, at the stage in the process in which I
communicated, were understanding of the position that the Director
and I "ere supporting and the matter was disposed of.
Mr. Dc\SH. Well. were von aware of the so-called Haldeman-Hus-
ton memos ralatingto this 'plan?
Mr. ~IITcHEr"L. X0, sir; I do not recall seeing any 1Yhite Honse
correspondence on the subject.
Mr. D,\SH. Did you know when the plan had at one time been ap-
," _ ---- -c r proved by the President?
Mr. MITCHELL. ;\'0, sir, I did not know that until these hearings
were held.
Mr. n\SH. 'Vhy did you oppose the plan, ~lr. ~1itcl1E'll?
Mr. ~IrTCHELL. I opposed the plan for the wry simple reason that
in the case of domestic problems that I was \Cry much opposed to the
thought of surreptitious ent rv, the mail covers, and all of the other
aspects of it that were involved at the pnrticular time.
Mr. DASH. To "hom did von express this disapproval other than
)1r. Hoover or :\11'. DeLoach?
, )1r. )fITCHF.LL . .Jfy recollection is that r talked to both ~lr. Ha lde-t_:an and the President about the subject matter.~1r. D,\SH. AmI do yon reca 11\\I!PIl that was !~rr. ~rrTCllELL. Xo. but it was. of course, in the limited timeframe
which this nct ivitv took place.
~[r. DASH. Did yon know their reaction to your opposition at that
time?
)fl" )frTCHELL. ~[y recollection is that thov, both of them were np-
prer-int ive of mv views 011 the subject mutter- and rrcollsidl'lt'd it and
that was the erul of it.
Mr. 0.\:'11.X()\\", tIming l!Yjl--
,\1r. ~ftTClI ~:J.[,. I 5a'·_:_\·Xl"IIi'l' 11ll', :U 1'. Ihsh-,yhrn r 5:1\' r('('onsiclel"
it I llon't kllo\y ho\\ fai' tll('Y had gOllr into tlw ('ollsidl'ratioll of it bC'-
;.
•
[7609]
N~
N
[7610]
24.2 John Mitchell testimony
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because there has been too long a practice in this country for one of
these agencies to have information about jntelli~en,~e matters that get
into the file in the operative ag-cncies that can curry out a mission to
prohibit some of these things .i ust do not ha H! that information, and
I think a good example, without knowing the facts, is the recent as-
sassination of the member of the Israeli Ernbassv here in the District
of Columbia. Xow, obviously, the greatest amount of intelligence that
could possibly come with respect to that matter would be the CIA,
and if the CIA were knowledgeable with respect to the indi viduals
that might perpetrate such a crime they certainly have to pass it on
to the FBI and the IYashington police in order that proper action
can be taken.
I use this as a hypothetical case without any specific knowiedjre.
Senator Txotrrz. But did not the Huston papers describe something
else besides coordination?
. ::Ur. :JIITCHILL. Oh. yes; very much so. .
Senator Ixorrrz. Did they not describe the activities of the DL\ and
IA in sun-eil~ing. citizens,. di.53ident gro_ups, Bh.ck Panthers, the
eathermen? \' e are not talking about foreign enerrues,
:.\£1'. )IrrcID:LL. \\e11 , Senator. as I testified yesterday, I did not
. study the Huston plan. It was discussed with me. and I S:l.\Y some of
the notes from my recollection where Director Hoover objected to it.
- To the extent that it invol ved the items that YOl1 are talking about, in
my opinion, is one of the reasons that it W,15 turned down and not
implemented. But I am saying that, and we started this discussion on
the basis of CIA and its activities within the countrv, it has 1'.0 opera-
Utional activities and should not hare, that is not what it was createdr, but there is no rhyme or reason in the world why the intelligenceat they have should not be passed on and imparted to the lawforcement or investigati ve agencies in this country that do haveerational responsibilities.
Senator IXOlJTE. )[r. ~Iitchel1, getting back to the Presidential
papers, if this committee should decide to issue a subpena to get these
papers, what do you think should be the response of the IVhite Honse?
Mr. ~IITCHELL. \Vell, I am afraid JOu are going to have to ask ~Ir.
Buzhardt that; he seems to be making most of the decisions oyer there.
I have no opinion on the subject matter.
Senator Ixorrrz. As a former chief law officer, what are your
thoughts, sir?
Mr. )IrTCHELL. I am sorry, Senator. \Vas that question which YOU
put to me as a former chief? It would depend entirely on the nature of
the papers, as we discussed before. If they are matters of Presidential
communications I think there is an absolute pri';iJege. If the v r::et into
collateral areas where the President is not involved, I think th"it is an
entirely different subject matter. '
n~enator.Ixorrrz. Once again to the Hllston papers, you hnve ind i-ed that your knowledge is limited .to a discussion of it but accordingtestimony you had approved It. Did you approve the Huston phn??t.Ir. ::\IITCHELL. Xo, sir. that is absolutclv incorrect, If I rnav recountat I think the record shows, and certuinlv what is mv recol lecr ion
is that with respect to the Huston papers tliere werc corlfrrencE's held
under' the aegis of. I prt'sllme. '\fr. HU;:tOll from the \Yhite HO\l:3k>.
among tile heads of t(le intelligencc-g:1thering agencies, the CL\.. the
~.
)
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FBI, and the DL\, which resulted in a memorandum that prodded
for activit ies with respect to domestic subversives, of course, as well
as national secu rity, and involved such things 1,5 surre pt it ious ent ry
of places, mail COI"erS,et cetera. I was not part of that committee. I
had no knowledze of it until it was brought to my attention by the
Director of the FBI. It was then that the matter was discussed with
me and it was then or shortly thereafter that the concept was
terminated.
Senator IxoUYE. ';Vere von aware that the President of the T'nited
States approved the Husto·n plan?
~Ir. ~IITCHELL. i{0, sir, I testified vesterda ,. I was not.
Senator Ixo17YE. Is it not strange that the Attorney General, as a
participant in the discussions, that you were not aware of this?
)1r. )IrrcHELL. As a participant in the discussions? I was not a par-
ticipant in the discussions with respect to the plan. I was a participant
in discussions when Mr. Hoover and. I believe, )11'. DeLoach came to
me with their concerns about the matter. I was not a participant in the
discussions that led to the formulation of the plan.
UsenatorIX0LTYE. But you advised the President of the United Statesto your misgi vings and reservations?::\1r. )IITCHELL. It is my very strong recollection that I advised Mr.alde man and the President after it was bronght to my attention by.. . DeLoach and ::\fr.,Hoover.
Senator Jxorrrz. TI'nat is your relationship withM», Kalmbach,
sir? Do YOU know him well ?
Mr. ::\IITCHELL. w-n, I can't say I know him "ell. I hare known ::\1r.
Kalmbach since 1968.und have seen him infrequently over that period
of time. I k.11E'W him, 'of course, in connection with the 1968 campaign.
Our contacts between 1968 and 1970 or 1971 hare been very infrequent;
probably more social than anything else. And. of course, I knew him
durinzthe 1971-72 campaign, when he was a fundraiser.
Sen~tor IxoUYE. Did yon have any relationship with him during
the month or .Jnne. more specifically, 18, 19. and 20, of 1972?
)1r. MITCHELL. Yes; I had a very, very close relationship with Mr.
Kalmbach during that particular period of time, because it "as during
that particular period when I was talking to him daily or perhaps
twice a day. because he was kind enough-he along with his wife and
the secretaries in his office-to be of great assistance to my wife. who
was then out in Newport, and I am sure you know the rest of the storv.
Senator IXOLT£. ::\[r. Mitchell, I believe in response to a press in-
quiry rclat inz to Mr. )1cCord. your answer was something to the effect
thatMr, )[CCord has a privatebusiness and he had several clients and
your committee was one of the clients. Isn't it true that YOU were per-
Sonally acquainted n_:.ith::\fr. ~\[cCord? . ".
)1r. )IrrcHELL. 'i'i' ell, Senator, yon are askll1g two quest ions. The
press statement that you are t alkinr- about "as the. press statement
that. I put our when we first found out about thE' hn'ak-in. the burg-lnr-
ization of the Democratic Xational Committee. "here )[1'. )[c('ord was
im-oh"ed. E,"enihin!! in it ,,"a;';actHall" true.
I had one ni~f'ting. on April ;'5 ,\itl~ ~[r. )[i.'('o!'rl-is t111> onl.'" time
that. I han' e",', met ,,"ith the grntl"I11:1n :Inc! t:1lkrd to him. _-\ncl th:1t
mepting was f,)!" tIl!' purpose of hriE-fin!! me :15 T \\";15 ('omin.g- into my
]a" office, which ,\"as in the samehuilding" as rhe Committee> To Rt'-
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25. On either July 27 or July 28, 1970 Huston, on instructions from
Haldeman, recalled the decision memorandum of July 23, 1970 and requested
that the members of the Ad Hoc Committee return their copies to the White
House. Haldeman told Huston that Mitchell had called concerning the Plan,
that the memorandum would be reconsidered and that Haldeman, Hoover and
the Attorney General would meet to discuss the subject. Mitchell has
testified that he informed the President and "Haldeman of his opposition
to the Plan.
25.1 Tom Charles Huston testimony, Senate Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, May 21, 1973, 142-44.
25.2 Tom Charles Huston testimony, House Armed Services
Committee Executive Session, July 9, 1973, 1391-95,
1414-15.
25.3 Richard Helms memorandum, July 28, 1970 (received from
House Armed Services Committee).
25.4 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1604-05.
r:
25.5 John Mitchell testimony, 5 SSC 1824.
25.6 H. R. Haldeman te~timony, 8 SSC 3029-30.
25.7 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman,
August 5, 1970 (received from SSC).
25.8 Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman,
August 7, 1970 (received from SSC).
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.... t .. h '~ tn'e do curnen t; that you z e ad .i,nto .'sen~ ou , wnlC 1~ ~ tne record
Mr. Woolsey. " Let me ask you in connection wit~ that,
tacked on to the back of the decision'docu~ent, which I
noticed you glanced at very briefly, is a 2-page docu~ent
called "Organization and operation of International Agencies
Group on Domestic -Intelligence and Securi ty 1" wh i ch discusses
its membership, observers, Hhite House liaison, staffing,
meeting, security and other procedures.
Let me ask if that do curaen t; was one that acco~paniec.
the decisiO::1 do cume n t., to the best of your knm'lledge,-at
the time?
Mr. Huston. Yes,.I think so. In any event, that
decision memorandmLl weri t; out, July 20, di d you say July 23
sO!71etir.1ein late July the decision memorandum 'Hent out to
our four agencies.
" Shortly after it had been received by -Hr. Roever I
received a call from Bill Sullivan saying that ~~e Director
had gone through the roof and that he had called the Attorney
, ~o ~alk ~o ~'ne A~~ rgOlng ~ ~ • ~ ~ . ~~orney \7eneral sayingGeneral or \-las
he felt that the Attorney General should have been consulted,
that the decision as reflected in the memorandum was incorrect
and he was going to get it turned around.
You are saying up to this .'~ 1:1:-:12Senator Symington. the
Attorney ~eneral did not know about this?
nr. IIuston. To the best of my know Le dcte the "+-t~""ll~.1 :J :\ ~ U ~ • ey
~, \ ~~ '-~';<Jr t":l>t 't;"='" r:=-, .-'" rOT'
I _. ""I·,_.J"'~Ia·":_'-"'_·"_: -_:_:_.".....: '_:... :.._ ..... &.\. .....- ,'\
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1 General had no t been aware of this group or its activi,ties.
2
3
4
Senator symington. Hhat happencd when i·!r.Hoovez
heard that it had been implemented?
Hr. Huston. All I know is second-hane., vrhat I Has t "-'lo.!..\,.;"
,5 was Mr. sullivan told me that the Director was furious and
6 that he was taking the matter up 0ith the Attorn~y General.
7 It then seems to me that the next day or shortly there-
8 after I received a call from nr. Haldeman saying that
9 I know this is a point of some concern to you and I just
10 can't tell you exactly but either he said that he had
11 talked to the Attorney General or the Attorney General had
12 talked to the president, and it is my best recollection .he
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
said the Attorney General had talked to th~ President but
I am uncertain on that point. But in any event, he w ant.ed
me to recall .t.he memorandum, th,atthe'President wan tcd to
reconsider this matter and thai Mr. Hale.enan, Mr. Hoover and
the Attorney General were going to meet to discuss it.
I' don't believe I s en t; a memo randum out recalling. r·:y
bes t recollection is that Dave nCl'~anusI wh o was then in
1::' ' _._ t.i roo~ in th '7h' .1.. ITcharge o r tne Sl,-uaaori-" e I' l \....12 uo use , I went; to
see Dave and asked him to arrange to have the docunent
recalled. I remember the docu8ents being recalled Dec2use
I corr.mentedto DC:lvethat each one of t.he se do cumerrts that
ca.rneback had the stcl._rlesr emoved f rornit arid it was obv i ous
h x: ....h o ""q""'''''~l·r.S 112c1 ;:ept a coov or. the "I ....cac O.L ,-1'. U. \:_III~. _c. :~, '- l.. '-- uoctlmen\....cvc~[7621]
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though we had asked that it be recalled~
At that time that, I think, must have been either
last week of July or the first week of August. It was
about this t.Lrne that John Dean c arneover from the JUstice
Department and, as I recall, his appoint~cnt as counsel to
, ,
the President had been announced while Mr. Nixon was in
San Cleraenc'ein July. And wh en John ca-neto the \'lhite House
as counsel to the President I was' told by Mr. Haldeman that
John would henceforth take over the duties that I had had
with respect to the internal security matters and in essence
leading me to believe Hr. Hoover blamed me personally for
the whole mess that h~ regarded as a mess.
Senator Symington. John?' Nho is John?
Hr. Buston. John Dean. That John Dean wou Ld t.ak e
over, that Mr. Hoover associate him with this thing and,
fore,-John would handle the matter.
From that point on I really know no more. I have'_ no
more first-hand knm.,rledgeabout Hhat happened. To the best
of my knowledge, the report, the memoranda were withdrawn.
I have no knowledge at any point any further that any action
was taken to reinstitute it. I had heard fro~, I donlt
remember who, but a friend in the PDI told me in the earLv./
fall that there were dis~ussions going on with John Dean
and Bob Mardian and others with respect to this, and in
Septcsber or so wben Bob rlClrdiun, after he had been over, Lhere
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Mr. DASH. 'Vere you aware, )[r. )[itchell, that the plan did provide
for removing certain restrictions against illegal break-ins and elec-
tronic survei llance ]
Mr. )1ITCHELL. Oh, yes, these items were discussed in conversations
that I had with }Ir. DeLoach and :JIr. Hoover .
.Mr. DASH. Do YOll recall when you first became a ware of the plan?
Mr . .:\UTCHELL. I can't put the elate on it. I shouldn't try because I
don't recall.
Mr. D~~SH. Did you ha ve the plan ever in your possession or did
you peruse the plan ? .
)[1'. )1ncHELL. I had, as I reca ll, the plan in my possession durinc-
the period that the Director of-the Associate Director of the FBI wa~
discussing it with me, As I am sure you are aware, }[r:Dash, this mat-
ter was hanelled and considered aside and apart from the Attorney
General. It was considered in the committee that involved the heads
of the intelligence gathering community.
Mr. D_~sH. 1\Telll did you know who in the 'Vl1ite House were back-
ina- the plan?
~fr. ~1ITCHELL. No, I can't say who was backing it and who, was op-
posed to it but obviously )1r. Hust?ll was apparently backing it be-
cause he was the author of part of It. The other people in the 'Yhite
House that I communicated with, at the stage in the process in which I
communicated, were understanding of the position that the Director
and I 'were supporting and the matter was disposed of.
Mr. DASH, 'Yell, were you aware of the so-called Haldeman-Hus-
ton memos relating to this plan?
Mr. ;)IITCHELL. K0, sir; I do not recall seeing any 'Vhite House
correspondence on the subject. _ .
. Mr. DASH. Did you know when the plan had at one time been ap-
-:--proved by the Presiden t ?
Mr. )1rTcHELL. K0, sir, I did not know that until these hearings
were held. .
_. - [1'. D,\sH. Wl1V did yon OPP9se the plan, )[1'. ~[itchell?
11'. )1ITCHELL: I opposed the plan for the verv simple reason that
.he case of domestic problems that I was very much opposed to the
thouzht of surreptit ious entry. the mail covers. and all of the other
, aspects of it that were im-o,h'ed at the particular ~ime,
)[1'. DASH. To whom (ltd vou express this disn pprovn l other than
)1r. Hoover or}[r. DeLoach?
)[1'. ~frTCHELL, }1v recollection is that I talked to both )[1'. Halde-
man and the President about the subject matter,. . "
Mr. D,\SH. And do yon recall when that W11S?
)[1'. ~rIT(,HELL. Xo, but it was, of C011r5e, in the limited timefrarne
in which this act iv itv took place,
)1r. D_\:-H. Did yon know their reaction to your opposition at that
time'? .
)[1', )frTCJlF.LL. )[y recollect ion is that t hev, both of them were ap-
precint ive of mv \'~e\\s on the subject mnttcr alld I'Pl'oll"idl'll'd it :lllcl
that m1S thr rnd of It.
)[1'. ]).\"Ir. Xow. during l!Yil--
)[ r. )[ ITCI IELL. T s:n'-!'xeusp I11r. :\f l', Dash-\ylll'n I 5:1,'- rl'collsider
it I (lon·t kilO'" how far till''\" had g'OIll' illto thl' t'OIISidl'l':ltioll of it be-
.-
•
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cause as of that particular time to my understanding the plan had
not been implemented.
Mr. DASH. We ll, did you ever receive any formal notice that the
plan had not been approved or had been discontinued or been termi-
nated?
Mr. l\hTCHELL.Not to my recollection, I was just told verbally that
it was nil. .
Mr. DASH.Or 'Whether it had been approved? -'
... __ .....~r. )IITCHELL. No, sir.
Mr. DASH.During 1971, 'Wereyou aware of an intelligence operation
that had been set up in the White House under :'I[r. Ehrlichmun and
)lr. Krogh 'Which has become known as the Plumbers operation?
Mr. MITCHELL.No, sir.
Mr. D"~sH. 'Was there a time that you did become aware of that
operation? .
11r. :J1ITCHELL.Yes, sir, I did.
l\lr. DASH.When was that?
l\lr.l\hTcHELL. After June 17, 1972.
Mr. DASH. Now also, Mr. Mitchell, in 1971 were you aware of the
so-called Sandwedge ,plan proposed by :'Ilr. Caulfield for political
intelligence operations?
Mr. l\IITCHELL.I was aware of the concept that Mr. Caulfield was
proposing and, of course, I opposed that and it never came to fruition.
Mr. D,\SH. Did you ever have a copy of the so-called Sandwedce
proposal or plan in your possession? e
l\lr. :\hTCHELL. To the best of my knowledge-my knowledge of it
came in discussions with John Dean.
Mr. D.\sH. ,Vere you aware that that plan also included a so-called
.. covert operation and the use of bugging. or electronic surveillance?
..----c. Mr.l\IITcHELL. No; I have seen that in one of :\lr. Dean's exhibits
but that 'vas not the understanding that I had of the so-called Sand-
wedge proposal.~r. D.\SH. Did you know that the budget included actual funds to
purchase electronic surveillance equi pment?
... 1\1r. MITCHELL.No, sir; I had never got that far with the subject
matter.
Mr. DASH. Now, in any event, after the recommendation of :\[r.
Caulfield for the so-called Sand wedge plan, did you ask :\1r. Caulfield
for any operation or any particular assignment?
Mr. ·:\IrTCHELL.There has been shown to me by this committee a
memorandum that had to do with an investigation that apparently
was made uncler ~[r. Caulfield's aegis having to do with the so-called
~rcCloskev campaign up in Xew Hampshire. I do not know who hired
him or who paid him. I have seen the memorandum.
Aside from that, I would go to the point that :\Jr. Caulfield, who
I saw on the 2-.l:thday of Novernber 1D71. wherein :\lr. Dean brou ....ht
him over to discuss Hie concept .of his "'"0 rki ng for I!'e in the campaign
if and when I joined the campaign, :.\11'.Caulfield ~hdcome to work for
the committee as what. was purported to be an aide-de-camp at some
time in :\[arch and within 2 weeks or so, he was gone, had left the
cOlllmittee.
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FBI, and the DL-\., which resulted in a memorandum +hat provided
for nct ivit ies with respect to domestic subversives, of C()Ul-Se_as well
as national security, and involved such things as surrept it ious ent rv
of places, mail covers, et cetera. I was not part. of that committee. '1
had no knowledze of it until it was brought to my attention bv the
Director of the FBI. It was then that the matter was discussed with
me and it was then or shortly thereafter that the concept was
terminated. . .
Senator Ixorrrr. IVere you aware that the President of the Cnitecl
States approved the Huston plan 1
)11'. )fITCHELL. X0, sir, I testified yesterday I was not.
Senator 1x01.7Y<:.Is it not strange that the Attorney General, as a
pa rticipant in the discussions, that you were not a "a re of this?
)11'. )IrrcHELL. As a participant ill the discussions? I was not a par-
ticipant in the discussions with respect to the plan. I "as a participant
. in discllS510ns when )11'. Hoover and. 1 be lieve, )11'. DeLoach came to
me with their concerns about the matter. I was not a participant in the
di5Cussions that led to the formulation of the plan. .
;:,enator Ixomr:. But YOUadvised the President of the "United States
us to your misgi vings and re5ervations .? -
. )11'. MITCHELL. It is my very strong recollection that I advised ~lr,
Haldeman and the President after it was brought to my attention bv
1\ eLoach and ~lr.·Hoover. . .
Senator IxoUYE. IVhat is your relationship with Mr. Kalmbach,
sir? Do you h.110W him we111 .
Mr. :\IITCHELL. IVell, 1 can't say I know him well. I have known )fr.
Kalmbach since 1968 and have seen him infrequently over that period
of time. I knew him, of course, in connection with the 1963 campaign.
Our contacts between 1968 and 1970 or 1971 have been wry infrequent;
.." ..__ .,' .probably more social than anything else ...And. of c.onrse, I knew him
. dur inz the 1971-72 campaign, when he was a fundraiser,
Sen~tor Ixorrrs. Did you haw any relationship with him durinz
t4e month of June ...more specifically, 18, H), and 20, <;>f 19~2? ,.
Mr. MITCHELL. l'es; I had It very. wry close relationship WIth )fr.
Kalmbach durinz that particular period of time. because it.W,lS durinc
that particular period when ~ was talking to him d:lily ?r re.rhap~
twice a day, because he was kind enough-he along WIth his wife and
the secretaries in his office-to be of great assistnnce to my wife. who
was then out in ;\ ewport. and I am sure you know the rest of the story.
Senator 1),""01::"1.1:.:\lr )litchell. I believe in response to a press in-
quiry rolatinz to )11'. )lcCord, your answer was something to the effect
thatXlr. )[cCord has a private business and he had several clients and
your committee was one of the clients. Isn't it true that you were per-
sonally acquainted with )fr. )[cCorcl? . . ..
:Mr. ~IITCH"E£.L. l\e11, ~cn:ltor. you are (lsk1l1g two qneiitlOns. The
press statement that you are talking (lhont was the pre:35 statement
that I put alit when we ~rs~ f~und out ah~ut thC'hn':1k-in. the bur!!h1'-
ization of the D,>morl"atlc ~ atJOn:ll ('omnllttet'. where )11'. ,reCord \'>:15
im'olnd. E,-C'nihin!! in it ·\\",15 actually true.
I had one m·p"ting on ~\pril 5 \\"·ith Jfr. J[r('ord-is tllt' Ol~h- rinw
that'l ha'·c en'1' !l1rt with the g"rnrlrlll:lll ane! [:11kl'd to him. Arltl that
meetin'''' W:15 for the purpost' or hrit'fin!! me :15 T \\":15 rom in!! into m,·
law office, ,,,hirh W:lS in the same hl1ikling- :lS t!lt' ('ol1\ll\itt~t' Tt) R~·
.,:
•
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"
~Ir. DASH. 'Were you aware that ~rr. Hoover, Director of the FBI
opposed, at least entered his opposition to most of the recommenda~
tions in that plan 1
Mr. HALDE:\L\X.I knew that-I think in the recommendation itself
which was signed by Director Hoover as chairman of the committee
he had indicated in the various recommendat ions his disagreement
with some of them in spite of the fact that they were the committee
rec,ommendation. .
He "as transmitting them as the committee recommendation with
his dissent,nrr.D.\.sH.w-u, now, did Mr. Huston seek to get your assistance inrridinz ~1r. Hoover's objections!Ir. H.,;,WDL\X. Yes; I think he did.Ir. DASH. And did he send a series of memorandums to you with
rezard to that?SrI'. HALDE:l.[....x. I have seen the memorandums that have been put
into ex_},jbit and reprinted in the papers and they would indicate that
he did, yes. .
Mr. D.\SH. 'Well, did you just see them as they were reprinted in the
papers or do you actually recall receiving those memorandums and
reading them? "
Mr. HALOnL\x. I have a gen~ral recollection. I c~nnot Identify ha v-
inz seen or acted upon any specific memorandum without looking at it
and reviewinz it. I do know that there was a definite concern on ~rr.
Huston's part and on the other side, on the President's part, that there
was-we. knew there was a problem going into this. One of the reasons
for bringing this group togethe: was the fact that communication
between the FBI and other intelligence agencies was at best minimal.
.Mr. D.!,.SH.Let me just show you one memorandum and I think this
. ,---' has already gone into the record. See at least if you can recollect it. It is
. a memorandum dated August 5, 19iO, from ~Ir. Huston to you, subject
"Domestic Intelligence':", which is primarily dealing with the proble~
of Mr. Hoover's objections and indicating that the program alight to
move forward and asking your assistance. I ask you to take a look at
it, see if YOll do recall it and if you do, would you comment. on it 1
Mr. WrLsox. May we keep this, :J1r. Dash 1
1.11'.DASH. It is my only copy at the moment, We can make a Xerox
copy for you. Unfortunately: our Xerox machineis broken down. That
is why members of our committee do not have copies.
ThIS h:15 been entered in the record at a prior time.
Mr. HALDE)L\~. I cannot positively. without any doubt, say I read
that. memorandum at the time it was sent to me hut I han a yen- clear
recollection of the general content of the problem that existed at that
time and I probably did read this memorandum.
:'Ill'. D.\SH. WOlild it be fair to characterize that memorandum as
Mr. Huston being considerably upset over Mr. Hoover's obstinacy in
opposing the plan a~d--
Mr. H.\LOE)rA~. l' (>S.
)[r. D ....SJI rcontinuing 1. And indicating that it was quite urrrent that
the plan go forw'urd and seeking your assistance ~ .
Mr.IL\I.DD{'·\~. Yes. '
.Sf.'e BIXl\: 3. I'xhlblt No. 31, p. 132:5.
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Mr. DASH. Do you know why Mr. Hoover opposed the plan?
Mr. HALDr:;\L\N.lam not sure. I do not recal l whether this memoran-
dum outlined the nature of his objections or not. .
Mr. DASH. Now, are you aware after the plan was submitted to the
President, that this plan "Was in fact approved by the President ~
Mr. HALDE~[AN. Yes.
:Mr. DASH. After that approval, was the plan implemented?
Mr. H.\LDE:lL\::-l.Xo; it was not. As I understand it, the approval
was rescinded, I believe it was 5 days later by notification to the uo-ency
head and that, therefore, in effect. the plan was not-implemented.
)1r. D.\SH. ,Thy was it rescinded?
Mr. HALDE:lfAN.Again, as I understand it, because of Director
Hoover's objection to a number of parts of the plan. ..
Mr. DA~H. Did you know that Mr. Mitchell opposed this plan, the
Attornev General?
Mr. H.U.DE:lfAN. I am not sure that I knew that he did or that he
did not.
Mr. D.-\SH. Well, he has testified here before this committee that he
was not in on the original planning of the plan but when he first
learned about it, I think he says to Mr. DeLoach of the FBI. that he
went to see you and the President and strongly opposed it and then
the plan was not implemented. He assumed that it was partly on the
basis of his objection. Do you recall that? .
l
:Mr. HALDDtAN. I do not: but that is not necessarilv-I certainlv
.
W.Ollldnot deny that. If ':'11'.:'\1itchell does feel that is the case, I do not
ecall-1 do T'ec!lll the plan not being put into effect. I recall con-
iderable discussion back and forth as to whether it would be or not.
nd the u1timate decision first, to approve and then to rescind. .
Mr. DASH. Did you become aware of an in-house ,Yhite House effort
for that special investigative unit after the Huston plan was
rescinded ?
Mr. HALDE::'tL\X.Well, the step following- the rescission of the Huston
plan as it is now called, was the formulation of an intelligence evalua-
tion committee that was another mteragency and interdepartmental
group. It was not an in-house Wbit~ House group, although the:-6 was
a ,Yhite House representative, I believe Mr. Dean, on that intel ligence
evaluation committee and its 'Purpose was--one of the purposes of the
Huston plan, coordination between t~e va.rious intelligence agencies
and an attempt to share and e\'aluat~ l.ntelh~ence.
Mr. DASH. And who was supervising this ?
Mr. HALDE:'r!AX. I am not sure. It was set up-it was not an in-house
White HOHse unit. as I said. it was an interagency unit. I believe .Tohn
Dean W:1S the White House representative on it and I am not sure
how it ,,:1S structured.
Mr. D.\SH. 'Would it be true that it was :'fr. John Dean's role to hI?
liaison for the ,Vll ite House on intelligence programs like this?
Mr. HALDnr.-\::-l.Yes: it would be.
Mr. D.\SH. Now. did there come a time when there was an in-house
'White Honse special inyestigati\'~ unitI .'
Mr. H.\LnDL\-:-.'. You are leacl1l1g-the question relates, I <lS:;UIlH',
to this special investigations unit that was set up in 11)71.
•
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.by using all the r e s our c es potcnt.i2.lly av a iIa ol e , It b, of co\.!'_·-·.:.
• • "I. • •• ~-,
,a rrrat t e r of b.::.lanc.:.ng the ODVIOU3 r is k s <lgalnSl: the d e s ir e d
., _"I "L 1 1 d Ll . ,. .. •resu_ts. 1. tno •..:gr:c w e o a i a nc c th e s e T1Sr::S r at h e r oojectively
-Ln the report, arid Hoover is escabting the risks in or d.er to
cloak his, determinalion to continue to do bus incs s as u s ua l , ,
-- 4. At som e point, Hoover has to be told who 1S Presic.e:;.t.
'_.. ' He Ira s becoriw t ot a l ly unreasonable and his c ondu c c is d et r irn e .. L-1.. __ "'... e- ....
to our'doID2stic intclli2-cnce o o e r at i.on s , In the pa s t two "'2:::.1-",.'-" _ f _4'\,._1
h e has ternlinated all FBI lia i s on w ith NSA, DIA, the rn il it a r v
.!3~rvices, Secr et Service - - everyone except the 'White, He)Us':;. H~
s: '.f- d Ti " t' CI ~ .,., W. ev T'I . s· b _ L. 1l.er~lln::>_~e n2.1.::on v, i t n . 1... 1 - J' ,11 18 OU::i.C1 1-0 12.Ve a
cr~DDlina effect llDon the e:1~i:::,c CO:11ffi1.lnit,,' C'.nd is COl'f-··2...,.,r fO
....... #> _ b ..... ...._ - J -
. _-'-1' J ' • LJ • 1 L. .r..... t.' hhis p\l!J IC assur2.nce co. t;;.e ..1. reS1C!.eih a\o \one ITleC,-lng t at there
was close and eficcti;!c cO'J:::dination and cooper.a,::i_o:-~ ',~:ithin t;"!~
• • ~ 4
1
,. ...-~~....i... .. T l-. : ';:""'l p "';'L. ::"'I .L..L 'J.. "; l.' '!. ),-,'''rc-e .:.lgen::::,e corn,nl",l\.,. ..&.\.. IS .LB. O_ ",-,-nl. 1-0 remcrnuer 1-['.2.1- i:!1~
entire intcllig8nc~ cor;'1mt.;.ni!:y knov/s that the P.:-esident rn2.c.e 2-
positive decision to go ~lhcacl a;-.-d Hoover has nOVI succeeded i11
fo~cing a revie\v~ if he g.;t.3 his way it is goi:<g to l()ok li~e ~!.C
.' c 1 '-'1"'" "'n."" p..a~;rlc-t. I-To 1---.,1 h!s S~ . ._,lS rn.OTe PO".."';/CT.Ll1.. L..J. ,--".1. :"'J. -::.... ..L _':>..L\"';'" .L~L.. ..- j.j.-;\, ..... - .... ~!.;{ In L..ne
foo-tnotes and RN decided 2..g2..i...YJ.sthin"l., Th2..t should close the
. matter and I can!t i.wclcrstz,nd why the AG is a p2..:rty to reop~:;.i:1.g it.
All of us arc going to lookd2.rrm siily in'th~ eyes of Helr:'.:.s, G2."/lc::-,
BeD-Dett, and ~h~ rr:il_i~<l!'y chiefs if I-Ioo~.re:!..· can u"i12_ccrally re~.C2·::SC
.,.-, ' ., ._' i ' c-_·o- b~'-~cl on:l ··"~"l·L !.'1~L ~-~~\-.,...., ••2. ,::-'~~5~(terl.~lZl . ..L ("jC 1::.1.. ':"~;::"- o' (.... J.. ~i:'v to Lt -;.tt.. .~1.~~ ..d.; !-,cop_e "..........01 ..:.::.2~~
th£i::::- Z'.3ses oif to prep2.r2 2.n.:1 \'/hich. en its merits, W"-;] 2. fi:-c::-
, I
..... -::\-~~_ c..__ ,
. ,
~00 •..
r. ~l' \""'''1'51- -:--~_",1_,:: ....'.'~_,.. C",,_,_l('_, f-_:l',.:~....)n::~ 0l~b- :.. .. _...... \,,' - '" ""-5.
to ....'"''"',,~,_1 J~hc',rlC:C:l'::'-C::! C''.. t>,~:::>X!\:)l:S :,_:;:1 ,:-'. tho::: ':;.::,,~3 l\5 2_ '~.:'::'.:-' ::-:::..-/
~Jh~..;:'.~':~~,._-:n',','h:\.'>.-;i.~l si.·:~!)~'.r ;0 <'.\',2.': c,ssa:·:!. 2.:; :;-,:! SC:·2.:-,::::~
C~: ....:::n:.3.:l:'O,:" ~i.;,,,::.::; ,;.C.3 :C~Y:'l'::. Tl1:) c.:~~ ::;t?':~',:\.~I·:: ~:~l2.~ ::;_;::!:~:'.:,.:! i)~'.---i.~
.,. --__..",.- .- ... "._"_: -_._."'::-"'_".1':"''S:1.:- .... ~~ .:'..~ ~.~.~:~ ,', \:.';;.1'::1. l ..._•.'_J'_~~ ::~.. - -
.-.: ,.
, . "
,
.:...._\' .. ' .. .... ' ~.
", '. '-"," .....
. t' .'- 1\.._..·
...... ~ ........ _# ••
.,... ...... o_·· •• ~.-:
I'i ,,-,,'
( : ~
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Genc2"2..1 "'.';2.5 kidding h irn s cl.I wh en he s a id the c arri pu s e s would be
OU1·C'I~ ':"'11'- 1'··-'l D''{~:- or cdi-r» L ..""\,.i J:·~l-·j· ":)L. l e a s t "'0 ..~~. ~"," b ~.... -..:..It.. ~i _::> .:...t.! ~ .... .1.1..:> 1...-' '-_._I.._1.....i.. t. .... ~ .... c._~ ~,,-.ut.....) •• O~~:1 e CJ..o3ed ..
d own in S'2;?tc;n'')(!l". I don't Ii k e to rn ak e pr c d ic t io n s , but I 2.:-.1. -
n ot at 2.11 c onv in c c d , on the basis of the i.nt c l Ii g enc c I 112.-.-c 5:2;<;:1,
th2..t'\T/e ~.=~~n:,r""../ay near ov c r th e l"-lL!Li1Pon this pr ob l e rn, i.::cl I
arn cO:1'.:i:-:C2(! t112.:: t h e potential 10:;: c v en g r e at c r violence is
J.. ' 1... • L· , "':. . • .l- t'p~esec~, ..." 2.TIU \"':112 1;,2.,,\/'(! a. p o s it iv e OQllg2.t~O:1 ....o 2,:':£! (;\,,"21"Y step
within CUl- power to pr cv erit it.
.
6. Hoover can be expected to raise the iollo'Hing poi...ts
in you!' rn e ct ing i
(a) !'Our pres ent efforts a r e adequ2.-!:c." The ans:::,' e:::-
l"!';_ f-,ullshi-t I T~.i3is pa r t ic ul az Iy true wi th regard to FBI carne_.,.: J.J , ... c..:.."'!.l.:US
cov e.r ag e ,
(0) "Thc risks are too 0"!'C2.t, t h e s e f olk s are 0"0=,,'-;' ~-oo , 0 ---.;:, -
get the President into t:;:oubl::! arid EN I;<,-dbdter listen to rnc , t; -
The answ er is that we hav e consid er edLhe r isl;s , ·,'1<!. believe :£'.-2-.r
, -
a r e 2.cc2:)t:o.ble C!.r:d j'_1.:;tificd tUlcicr the circt,rnsta.nc'2s. 'We 2,::8
\7Hling to weigh c8.ch e_xccptio:::.ally s~nsitive opcratio.:l on its
_''__ buL ~'ne Dire-f-o~' 0·1"rho ~BI l'S "'""'::>l'rl to t-.l-c "'l'c:-l~S 'v'fj"-"---~r::::l·e...l&.:.,:J, t.. 1,... - \,....,. ~. '"" - - J:J- ~... (..0.4'- .. u_'" , ~...:....:..G
t' 'L t:' Lh" co-'-~-" 1'- at. si-;--,'.c-P. NTo..t.,in'" ".,., "-0 ...l1-e 5 ecurl·_)r 0_ ..1 G Uh'-~ J <> l. ~- -, - J. .. ~.- -b .'I,--!;-,J. p·:)se ..0
do has 'nei: been dO:le iii. the past - - c'-i"1Gin the pC'.st it \':2.5 ah'i2.'.r;:;
J
don~ -,successfully.
..
(c) "I do:\'t ha',,rc the personnel to do thc jo~ the
_P:esident '.;,rants do:,e. It The 2.nS\'/er .15 (1) he has the p2op1e 2.nd/o-;:
(2) h~ C.?l1 get tl:em.
(d)
E th~y w~nt_ to." The ans-,ve,: is
.. t.J_ r"'eL L~ '-.-' }"\.;'I~ no z._t.,__.:~o::ityC2~...1 t..;.;: L. 1.. .. L;'_':' ~1: J,. ...... '"
It 2.3 Cl:l. FBI iob.
"
I r-:: :) ~~ .~;.~ (-; 7~::-:·~c
.....~~..,--- ..-'~-~--"
.- :.' -. -:":'.' ~ -~.
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(c) IIIi \'/8 do Lhe s e thi ne s the "j a ck al s of the I
<:> press an:l;;he
" .I3CLU w il l f i nrl 0''':'::: '.'Ie _c2.n't a v c i d le2.k~.1! ,\ n s w e r : ~\'I- .• _.- • ~ -l.."_""<"L. ecanavold
Leak s b- '·e, ......r t r ei n cd t r u s t e d -'-C"''''5 -rod~' ;...... , .-
Uo .. '- . J ................ . _!,-.:,:J LJ.c_ .40",!,~' !.. ~•• :H .... o.g dl". r.._A. •• cs ....rl.::Ll!"\ci :\::.L10V/lCCgc ai-
sensitive cp e r a t.i o n s on a strict need to know oasis. "'.,Ve do nlis
on_o~her s ea s it iv e ope r at ion s ev ex v day.
{f) IIII I have to do these things, th e Attorney Gener2..1
will have to approve th ern in w r it irig , 'II This is up to the AG, out
,I wo:.rld tell Ho ov e r that he h a s been instructed to do the:m. by
the PY'esiclent and he is to do them on that a ut ho r ity , He needn't
10d~ fo r 2. s c a pe goat. He has his authority from the President
~,-- a nd he do e s n It n e ed a ;,'n:iti:en rri e rn o from the AG. To xn~intairl
security, ViC sho uld avo id w r itt en comIYll'...nic2..tions in this area. ,
(g) u.'Ne clo.nt need an Inter-Agency Committee on
Intelligence Op e r at iori s b e c a u s e (l~ w e+r e doing f in e :dghi:; nov/ __
good c co r d in at ion, etc. -- a nd (2) there arc other .existing groups
whi c h C2.n ha nd l e this a s s ig nrn e nt , II The. an sw e r is th2.t Y',Ie a r a •
clb~"'1g' Io u s y :;:-i_:;ht new a rid th e r e a r e n+t ot hc r groups vvh i c h c an
'do the job we have in rn ind b e carse . (1) they d on+t m\:!ctj (2) the~"
don't h.::;.ve t~!e p(!o:?le on the:rn we W2..C?t or h2.vC some pz:ople we
dO,::t'f \V2.p.,t; (3) thBY dO::-J.lthavc the authol' icy to do wh::.c \-';0 \v2.::.t
clone; , (4) ulti:-:J.::l~ely t{-"is nco,': op~:;::2.tion V/ill l-eplacc the:rn; end
(5) 't~~~j" ~.Tc:\!t linl,ed to t:le 'V{lli~e I-Iouse st~ff.
; ..,
The:;.-e <.:i.·e doc.otless· anot:-t~l' dozen or so sp,~cicus arg'-'_'--::'~!1ts
4-' '11' 1,1.1.'1."-",:"1-.'>0:'·1 ,.~ r-c..n.a~ .ri.Jo"\rCl- ~'''''j:_ r~:'lse, DL.\. !.-r L.j '.', J..!1 ~'-- 1. Slmi 2..~ qtt~.l.!'"y". ho::;~
th ' .'1 - '1 ~ 't' \ ~ ...t.,. . -_~.;; '!tOlJ. \';/11_ D2 2..;)_r-~ \..0 co:;,',·!:.:.c..~ i12 .!"u qI 1...:.10 In1po·tt;2 ..!lC~ an~
n-9cessity'" of gStti~l; 1-IcC)"',"Ci:to go c..long. \'.~e l"'..2.\'-c \,·o.r!-(cd [or
t1,\'n \~fO,...1-~'1 ;:-\- 1" _1 "'-. _ • .... ",,_"-!. .1,.'-_1. o .....ge.1.
1 1 .., .. • '! "' !'"\ ~"'I 1 ; ,~"! ... ,",, \7·.~ ; ......("\ ~ -. 1'-:,; ...--:r: c::'l ~~. (' 11,:'" L ', ... ':"\ -- •' .. ~r-(t, .i."':.2.d. 2.0:2n0a21~C! n0?c. - '-'_...__. '-' ,- ....t, """ ....... _ ......_•. ,t-. •• ', _._ !: ..!_ i'...!t:~:-~
of thl5 (:a:":=t:!'~ ..-, fe,'c ~)1..!1"c1~"(10~~"'.~~~~ic ";~:>1~ ..~..:.;;~ 2.~~~I L:~~~0l."dt2r
~11:·"':'.~:~''';~ ti:_·:: \'·cl";/· E:'.02.'i2 ,-.--.i. Ol.:'.~: .30~:2·~~·. ·I~.:~cl~::.~(:'tl·':~ i,~~!""~~t t~:~
::\.~::-~, S·.~t i;: (:2..:1 ?·:CJ·,,<.(:~ t~~·.:,:::,:,~··.·::~·.·:.'0i.s ·th~: !l--:~.~·::C3 "" C~.~.!.·2~:>:;sibl ..~?
:-,~:)~.") .:.:·~1?J~·~~.:"~·~~)·,,- ..~'~.!. ?;:(.' ...~.:.. ......'.'-5 '~.·i~:l.t~~~ "i-r:~~._""\S t..) ?::~-·,..~r..c t;.:·~
,
/
"'~"I., :-> : ••• -. '.., -:-' .......
• _ ..•• .1 •.. _1- ._._ .. -- ... _ ..-- -----
.I I
•..;.._:-- ,.'" •• ' '.' ) - •••. J' •• _ ....
'-,,'
, ,. ,\ '-:' .. "), .
\..:.-:., ....' ......
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dete:cio:;:-aLioil Perh2.ps
in ~ri~tnam w iIl d efu s e the tense but
;'
,There is this final point. For' eight e en rn cnt h s vr« h~~.'c
"watched people in t hi s govc:;"nrnen: igrlOTe the ,P1"esident's 0-':;,">--. ., . ' .. ., - ...·--oJ~
tak e actions to e rrioa r r a s s hun, prornoce clcnlsclves ..at his
expense, and generally lTI2.~(e his job rn or e dif£:cult. It :i.2.~~e::;
me fighting n12.~, and wh a]; Hoover is cioing her e is puttir:g
hi:r:nseli above the President. If he t hou zht the Attornc\- Ge""'--,,' I-.._.. , .. --~..._.!. ~
ad-Jice should be solicited, he should have done so b eIo r e the
report was sent to the. President. After 2..11,Hoo ve r was c:~:!.i:::7;.:>'~
of the cornrrrit t e e and he coul.d hav e asked the AG for h i'"co-.. ~;.._, ":".t.-.l..--:-:.~.:lt.5•
But no, he didn't do so for it never occurred to h irn that the
Pr id L' ..... .L.' .,". t: L L d ,. .._- CSl en ...V!Oi.lJ.C1 nOL: agree 'WhJ1 rn s z oot n ot c o oj e ct i on s . He
th ought all he had to do was put in a fo ot not e and the rn att er Vl2.S
settled. He had' ab solut e ly no Int e r e st in th e views of NSA,
CIA, DI..~1 a n d th e mj'lit2.ry s er vi c e s ,'. arid obvi ou s Iy he h2.5
_.Jittl(! ir,tercsc in oar view s , .o r appa r cnt ly even in the d ec isio nn
" of the President. I don't see how we car. to l er at e t.his , but
..TO .
b e iriz a iacali3t, if not a z ea.l is t, I
o ' ~
Le. ~_,_~-h",f' vr e ''''2.'" have to co so.G...~t.: .~ .......~ ."" I --- _J." .......
,- ..
-::-I .', .
, I
.'(()~,
TO}_{CHARL2S H'USTO~';
!
,
~.~-,.'/::.--
, .. _. ..._j,
.J:-'\ ,---'
1;:"--- .... i
,-.
.- .._"
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H.r~ Hoover has departed for the Ues-t Coast wher-e he plans to V2.ce.tion.
for three we 2:-t s • If you "l-rait until his return to c Lear up the :p:-ob1e::s
._surrol.:ndi!:g our Domes t.Lc Intelligence operations) we 1-Ti11be into tee !28~;
school year vithout any preparation •
.,
~.£lesituaticiJ. in Por t.Land is begilli'1ing to look very tense -- th-3 An-::::-ic2..:l~
.L"'_oo--lc'" Convent Ion could. become the first bat.t Lezround for a nev vave Of' ....... w. _y .., - c;:.'4 .10 ~{C\!u'::l~:_
;violence. Coming just as the school year begins, it could serve
for widespread ca~pU3 disord~rs.
" ~.. .'
I ,\,,_eco:::mendtr.at you meet llith the Attorney General and secure his C1''''''~''1''':'''l..J_._Jl'V_ '>.#
for tee Preuident's decisio!J.6,tl.at the Director be info~ed that th~ decisions
. -will' stand , and th'<:l.tall i..'l.te11igence agencies ar e to proceed to iwple::r.2~t tt-;;:l
,. .
at once. ..'
"
~ \ OVV"'\.
TOiJl Ci-~/iliLES l-I]S'1vI'i
. ~. . .. : ..
<t3·
;_);/?y ;r-:·.=~. ~ ~ . 7-:· .. .-. \
C~·:-;8?;?~\IJ_ ....------_ ...-..---
" ..-._ .'. _...:: ..._ ___...._ - _ ..__ ---
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